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Abstract
REFLECTION, REFRACTION, AND REJECTION: COPPER SMELTING
HERITAGE AND THE EXECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Bode J. Morin
This dissertation examines the global technological and environmental history of
copper smelting and the conflict that developed between historic preservation and
environmental remediation at major copper smelting sites in the United States after their
productive periods ended. Part I of the dissertation is a synthetic overview of the history
of copper smelting and its environmental impact. After reviewing the basic metallurgy of
copper ores, the dissertation contains successive chapters on the history of copper
smelting to 1640, culminating in the so-called German, or Continental, processing
system; on the emergence of the rival Welsh system during the British industrial
revolution; and on the growth of American dominance in copper production the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. The latter chapter focuses, in particular, on three of the most
important early American copper districts: Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula,
Tennessee’s Copper Basin, and Butte-Anaconda, Montana. As these three districts went
into decline and ultimately out of production, they left a rich industrial heritage and
significant waste and pollution problems generated by increasingly more sophisticated
technologies capable of commercially processing steadily growing volumes of
decreasingly rich ores.
Part II of the dissertation looks at the conflict between historic preservation and
environmental remediation that emerged locally and nationally in copper districts as they
went into decline and eventually ceased production. Locally, former copper mining
communities often split between those who wished to commemorate a region’s past
importance and develop heritage tourism, and local developers who wished to clear up
and clean out old industrial sites for other purposes. Nationally, Congress passed laws in
the 1960s and 1970s mandating the preservation of historical resources (National Historic
Preservation Act) and laws mandating the cleanup of contaminated landscapes
(CERCLA, or Superfund), objectives sometimes in conflict – especially in the case of
copper smelting sites. The dissertation devotes individual chapters to the conflicts that
developed between environmental remediation, particularly involving the Environmental
Protection Agency and the heritage movement in the Tennessee, Montana, and Michigan
copper districts. A concluding chapter provides a broad model to illustrate the
relationship between industrial decline, federal environmental remediation activities, and
the growth of heritage consciousness in former copper mining and smelting areas,
analyzes why the outcome varied in the three areas, and suggests methods for dealing
with heritage-remediation issues to minimize conflict and maximize heritage
preservation.
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INTRODUCTION
Essential for social identity and collective purpose, heritage enriches us through
remembered precursors and prospective heirs. But these enduring benefits blind
us to a mounting backlash. Age-old aversion toward husbanding the past today
grows more virulent. Nature conservation arouses similar hostility, but animus
against heritage is harder to counter. Environmentalists can threaten global
extinction; heritage advocates warn merely of lower quality of life. To many that
seems a lesser, even a negligible threat.
-David Lowenthal, 2000 (“Stewarding the Past in a Perplexing Present” in
Values and Heritage Conservation, 18)
In its simplest form, this is a heritage dissertation. It examines the debates over
which things a community should save, how the final decisions are influenced and
negotiated, and what, if anything, should ultimately be remembered about the past.
These are not, however, simple or uncontested questions because the significance of past
events and historical materials are not accepted equally. This dissertation uses a specific
genre, industrial heritage, and the complicated perceptions of value in an often disheveled
and blighted landscape to explore these questions. Industrial heritage poses challenges
other types of heritage do not. In terms of merely preserving industrial structures,
complications of process-interpretation and structural-deterioration exist in forms and
scales that simply do not affect historic house museums or living-history farms. Further,
industrial sites can encompass entire landscapes and, because of increasingly complex
and historically significant operations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, often
include some hazard or hazardous waste threat to human health or the environment. Both
of these situations tend to complicate the industrial setting leaving a tangled legacy in
1

need of both commemoration and remediation, ultimately making heritage preservation
quite complex and expensive. This dissertation will explore how a community that
desires to preserve and commemorate its history, articulates and negotiates that desire in
the face of sometimes overwhelming opposition. In this case, the opposition comes from
a well-funded organization, often with the support of development-oriented community
groups, aimed at remediating the waste streams that emanated from that very same
historic landscape, with the historic resources in question standing in the way of the
simplest and most linear forms of remediation.
Peter Howard defines heritage broadly as anything, including material objects,
ideas, customs, and practices, anyone wants to save or remember for any reason. 1 For the
purpose of this dissertation, heritage is simply reflected in the recognition that historical
events represented by surviving material culture have helped shape the present, and that
those material things and events that have the most relevance, integrity, and significance
are worthy of remembrance and some sort of commemoration, documentation, or
preservation. Scholars such as David Lowenthal and Mike Wallace place heritage in a
broader social context by critiquing its practice when used selectively to promote
nationalist ideals or false identities, and extolling its virtues when used to articulate
positive or negative historic events that shaped the present. This work, however, will not
judge the specific choices communities make or argue the significance of their choices.
Rather it will accept that heritage practice, as broadly defined, is good for a community

1

Peter Howard, Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity (New York: Continuum, 2003), 6.
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and that the better a community can define, manage, and protect its heritage, the stronger
its identity will be. 2

Dissertation Format
This dissertation will consider historical events leading to industrial heritage
conflicts by examining the broad technological and environmental history of copper
smelting, then look more specifically at important historic copper mining and smelting
communities in Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana. Each of these three districts has
existing heritage plans which are enriched and contested in various ways by the
environmental consequences of its mining periods. This dissertation will focus
specifically on the issues of smelting technology, waste generation, environmental
remediation, and smelting landscape preservation. Part I, comprising Chapters 1-4, will
explore the technological and environmental histories of copper smelting that led to
American domination of copper production from the 1880s to the 1980s. Chapter 1, The
Basics of Copper and Smelting, focuses on copper uses, ores, and general smelting
practices. Chapter 2, A Short History of Copper Smelting through 1640, develops the
five-thousand year history of the copper smelting blast furnace, culminating in the
emergence of standard practices in 16th-century Germany, and examines the early
recognition of smelter waste and environmental degradation. Chapter 3, The Welsh
System, develops the nearly 200-year dominance of the Welsh smelting system based on
2

See: David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
─The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and
Mike Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1996).
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the perfection of reverberatory furnace practice, and discusses concerns about and early
lawsuits related to waste streams emanating from the concentration of 19th-century
smelting activity in Swansea, Wales. Chapter 4, The American System, discusses the
adaptation of European copper smelting technology in the United States, and significant
increases in copper demand brought on by electrical applications. The chapter then looks
more closely at smelting technology in the three American copper districts based
chronologically on when each district started large-scale copper mining and smelting: the
Michigan Copper Country on the Keweenaw Peninsula in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula
(1840s), the Ducktown district in southeast Tennessee (1850s), and the Butte-Anaconda
district in southwest Montana (1880s).
Part II looks more closely at these three districts, exploring the histories of the
districts leading to significant early waste disposal problems and the discovery of new
environmental problems after each location had largely stopped mining and smelting that
ultimately led to a listing on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL). The chapters
also examine for each district, early, pre-Superfund heritage plans and later heritageenvironmental conflicts and their resolutions as communities attempted to preserve
elements of their past while remediation professionals worked to clean up the landscape.
Chapter 5, Montana, discusses the placing of the Butte-Anaconda district on the NPL in
1983 and the heritage discussions, plans, and preservation projects that occurred over a
fifty-year period. Chapter 6, Ducktown, discusses the district’s principal responsible
party’s efforts to keep the location from being officially labeled “Superfund” in the
1990s, and the privatization of both the cleanup activities and later heritage decisions.
4

Chapter 7, Quincy Smelter, discusses the Michigan Superfund project that began with a
NPL-listing in 1986, but whose last remaining historic smelter was not considered for
remediation until 2004, when efforts to include it in the national park fell short and
asbestos issues grew more important. The Smelter’s ultimate fate was still not officially
determined as late as July, 2009. The Conclusion introduces the Model, a predictive
method to explain the historical processes rural mining districts undergo as mining peaks,
diminishes, and ends, leaving communities with lower population, greater economic
distress, contaminated landscapes, and poor images, and the efforts of those communities
to respond to these problems.
Ultimately, this dissertation will demonstrate that, despite the well meaning intent
of federal laws designed to protect both heritage and the environment, not all people
share the same values, perceptions, or interpretations of the landscape, and conflicts will
most certainly rise without clear, predictable outcomes. But a community with a strong
organization, knowledge of laws and practices, and persistence has the best chance of
protecting their cultural resources under threat from remediation.

A note on site selection
This dissertation aims to examine the conflicts between heritage planning and
environmental remediation. While conflicts between the two are played out under a
variety of circumstances, copper smelting proves the ideal subject, not only because
copper was one of the most important and heavily mined metals throughout history, but

5

because its extraction and processing have led to some of the worst environmental
degradation.
Copper was responsible for the first major mining boom in the United States and
quickly led to U.S. global production-dominance because of the nation’s vast reserves
and innovative adaptation of European technology. Further, copper mining and smelting
led to some of the largest Superfund projects in the country, including one whose
estimated costs should exceed one billion dollars. While iron was the most important
metal historically and was mined and processed on a much larger scale than copper, its
ores tended to be richer and generally much less toxic to human health than copper ores.
Further, iron’s heritage is well established with many preserved blast furnaces, steel
facilities, bloomeries, foundries, blacksmith shops, and several heritage trails and state
and national parks. Other metal production, such as gold and silver mining and smelting,
tended to be on a smaller scale than copper, largely because of their rarity, and therefore
less of an environmental impact, and lead, although more toxic than copper, was only
produced at about one-third the rate of copper in the 20th-century, never generated the
historic-interest of copper mining. Its major mine sites were only just being considered
for NPL listing in mid-2009.
The three sites selected for this study represented significant copper mining and
smelting regions that pursued heritage planning amidst Superfund cleanups. Both the
Michigan and Montana copper districts led global production at one time and had (have)
high historical integrity. Both had multiple heritage projects that documented and
commemorated their histories, and both had landscapes considered toxic enough to
6

warrant Superfund cleanups, although the Michigan district was significantly less
contaminated than Montana’s. Montana’s heritage community was (and is) dominated by
local groups and Michigan’s by a formal combination of local groups, Michigan
Technological University, and the National Park Service. The Tennessee copper district
was for short periods the second or third leading copper producing region in the country,
and, while it never produced at the rate of either Michigan or Montana, it developed
important by-product processes including the largest sulfuric acid plant in the world.
While its contamination problems were nearly as bad as Montana’s, except for scale, its
cleanup company negotiated to keep its district away from an official Superfund
designation but still followed all Superfund remediation protocols—but not the heritage
considerations required for federal agencies.
Other important copper districts that warranted consideration for this dissertation
included the mining district in Ely and Elizabeth, Vermont. This region had a very long
history of copper production from the 1820s to the 1920s, at times rivaled the Tennessee
district in terms of production, and has had an on-going Superfund remediation project
since 2001. Unlike Michigan, Montana, or Tennessee, however, its heritage component
is being managed by the State Historic Preservation Officer as mandated by the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), in the manner that the NHPA and the Superfund law
intended. While the project is not controversy-free, it is in many respects following the
model for federal projects involving heritage that the other three sites should have
followed, and as such, does not present as great a conflict as the other districts. Some
Arizona copper sites could also have been considered because of their production
7

dominance following Montana. However, Arizona mining and smelting landscapes,
several of which are still active, have not generated Superfund attention like the other
three sites. Similarly Utah, which has led copper production for much of the 20th century,
is still active and thus not covered by Superfund. Swansea, Wales, could have been
considered for an international comparison, because for over a century its copper smelters
dominated global copper production and generated the first documented pollution
lawsuits. But its smelting landscape is not in conflict. Its community decided after the
final decline of metallurgy in the region to demolish much of its historic copper smelting
landscape and promote the region’s proximity to the ocean as its primary tourist draw
rather than its industrial heritage. While all of these sites are or were important
producers, none of them attempted to use their histories, and hence heritage, to revitalize
their economies to the extent the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana copper districts
have.

Scholarly Context
Most scholarly work on the history of mineral districts through the 1980s has
focused on the opening and peak periods of production, with perhaps minor consideration
for their slow decline. This dissertation focuses on the after-effects of mining and
smelting production and adds to a growing body of literature examining landscapes and
waste-streams as an important feature of historical inquiry. The Environmental History
movement, begun in the 1980s, seeks to explore the relationship between human activity
and nature. Important works like William Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis (1991) and
8

Richard White’s Organic Machine: the Remaking of the Columbia River (1995) interpret
landscape- change and perceptions of landscape, as a direct construction or reflection of
human agency, especially as the land itself became less of a wilderness and more of a
commodity with American westward expansion. More specific to mining contexts,
Duane A. Smith’s Mining America (1987) and Richard Francaviglia’s Hard Places
(1991) look at significant changes mining made to the landscape. Smith’s work is a
history of the mining industry’s actions and attitudes toward the environment and charts
the evolution of wanton waste disposal practices of 19th- and early 20th-century mines that
had evolved by the later 20th-century to at least minimal consideration of remediation.
Francaviglia’s work seeks to understand and contextualize the current, abandoned
landscape of former mining activity, including former communities, unused structures,
and significant waste piles. 3
Adding to the broader studies above, the following works look at specific copper
mining locations in a broad context and consider the generation of colossal waste streams
and sinks. Fred Quivik’s dissertation, Smoke and Tailings, an Environmental History of
Copper Smelting Technologies in Montana 1880-1930 (1991), explores the social, legal,
and technological history of responses to early and major smelter smoke and concentrator
tailings discharges into the environment surrounding Butte and Anaconda, Montana.
Timothy LeCain’s dissertation, Moving Mountains: Technology and the Environment in
Western Copper Mining (1998), explores the idea of mining efficiency that evolved from
3

William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis : Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) ;
Richard White, Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995);
Duane A. Smith, Mining America: The Industry and the Environment. 1800-1980 (Lawarence: University
of Kansas Press, 1987); and Richard V. Francaviglia, Hard Places: Reading the Landscape of America's
Historic Mining Districts (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991).
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an early conservation principle at mining universities into a corporate-economic goal of
lowering costs and expanding throughput, ultimately leading to considerably more
production and production waste. Gavin Bridge’s dissertation, Regulating Nature: the
Ecological Origins and Environmental Implications of Restructuring in the U.S. Copper
Industry (1997), and Kip Curtis’ dissertation, An Ecology of Industry: Mining and Nature
in Western Montana (2001), both explore western mining from the perspective of
significant and destructive landscape change. 4 Even Cronon touches on copper mining
in “Kennecott Journey,” in Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America’s Western Past
(1992). He places the 1990s ghost town of Kennecott, Alaska, into an historic
environmental context exploring the effects of distance, isolation, and local resources
(organic and inorganic) on the Euro-American mining community, and the effects of the
mine on urban areas in the Continental U.S. concluding that “the mere existence of …
minerals did not in and of itself determine the events that took place [in Kennecott].” 5
While these works largely examine the formation and consequences of large
mining waste streams and dumps from an environmental history perspective, a few
authors have approached similar landscapes and worked to define their value as it exists
today, largely from a heritage context. Mary Elizabeth Curran’s master’s thesis, The
Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and Resiliency (1996)
explores the idea that the long-term residents of Butte were less concerned about the
4

Fred Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in
Montana 1880-1930" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1998); Timothy J. LeCain, "Moving
Mountains: Technology and the Environment in Western Copper Mining" (PhD dissertation , University of
Delaware, 1998); and Kent Curtis, "An Ecology of Industry: Mining and Nature in Western Montana"
(PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 2001).
5
William Cronon, "Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town," in Under an Open Sky: Rethinking
America's Western Past (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 48.
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toxins in the landscape than they were with their history and heritage. David Robinson’s
“Heaps of History” (2000), describes Toluca, Illinois, residents who sought historic
landmark status for “Jumbo,” a large coal waste pile, because of its prominence on the
landscape and heritage value to the community. In “Living in Anthracite: Mining
Landscape and Sense of Place in Wyoming Valley” (2001), Goin and Raymond discuss
the loss felt by eastern Pennsylvania residents when their historic coal waste piles
disappeared because of remediation efforts and, with them, the loss of historic context for
one of the last remaining historic coal breakers and the loss of historic identity for the
communities. Don Hardesty, echoing similar sentiments, decries the loss of historic data
in the complete remediation of mining and other industrial waste dumps in “Issues in
Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites” (2001). 6
Further, Fred Quivik’s important articles from 2000 and 2001 focus on waste
streams. The first, “Landscapes as Industrial Artifacts: Lessons for Industrial
Archeology” (2000), reflecting his dissertation, argues that industrial archeology had long
looked only at the productive side of manufacturing and that there is almost as much to
learn from the waste streams and the destructive side of manufacturing. In a second
article, “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of
Hazardous Materials: An Assessment of Superfund's Record” (2001), he argues that,
despite federal laws mandating that all activities executed with federal involvement or
6

Mary Elizabeth Curran, "The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and
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and the Historic Longwall Mining District," Journal of Illinois History 3, Autumn (2000), 162-184; Peter
Goin and Elizabeth Raymond, "Living in Anthracite: Mining Landscape and Sense of Place in Wyoming
Valley, Pennsylvania," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 25-49; and Donald Hardesty, "Issues in
Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 19-28.
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funding consider and mitigate potential impacts to cultural resources eligible for the
National Register of Historic Places, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in
general, and under Superfund specifically, has a poor record regarding legally-required
heritage protection. 7
Except for Quivik’s “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources” article,
these works mostly describe historic waste generation, landscape change, environmental
history, or current heritage values associated with the contaminated industrial landscape.
They do not explore the gap between environmental remediation and heritage
management beyond raising awareness. This dissertation will bridge that gap, looking at
the broad technological history of copper smelting that led to significant environmental
problems, then, taking a cue from Quivik’s “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural
Resources” article, examine the conflict that develops when remediation officials have to
negotiate with heritage planners at sites that deserve to be both remediated and preserved.
While all the works cited here inform and enrich this dissertation, other heritage
concepts are needed to fully understand how communities in historic mining districts
whose mining wastes have been determined contaminated enough to warrant managed
remediation by the Environmental Protection Agency or state environmental agencies,
engage their landscape. These include the notions of perception and value, which often
inform each other and help direct actions. For example, to a person or group who values
heritage, a landscape full of old building and mining structures is perceived as an
7

Fredric L. Quivik, "Landscapes as Industrial Artifacts: Lessons from Environmental History," IA: The
Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology 26, no. 2 (2000), 55-64, and ———, "Integrating the
Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous Materials: An Assessment of
Superfund's Record," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 47-61.
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important historical asset and potential economic resource. Hence, they fight to preserve
them. A person or group disinclined toward heritage and more inclined toward new
development may see old buildings or a landscape full of mining ruins as blight and a
hindrance to progress and, in the event of serious contamination, something that should
be remediated no matter what the cost.
In the report “Values and Heritage Conservation” (2000) on the changing value of
values in conservation decisions, Getty Conservation Institute editors Avrami, et al., state
that “values are critical to deciding what to conserve… [and] the real source of the
meaning in heritage.” 8 Material culture, they continue, “has different meanings and uses
for different individuals and communities. Values give some things significance over
others and thereby transform some objects and places into heritage.” 9 The 2000 report
and the follow-up report, “Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage” (2002), recognize
not only the importance of value to individuals and communities, but that through a
recent democratization trend, new groups, such as professionals from other fields and
special interest associations, tend to make heritage decisions “complex negotiations to
which diverse stakeholders bring their own values.” 10 Avrami, et al., ultimately
recognize that divergent social groups “will continue to ask more and more from material
culture—and heritage in particular—as they negotiate identities, form communities, and
seek a more salutary and prosperous future. The extent to which groups at all levels do

8

"Values and Heritage Conservation," ed. Erica Avrami, Randall Mason, and Marta de la Torre (Los
Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute, 2000), 14.
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Ibid., 1, 4, and 7.
10
"Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage," ed. Marta De la Torre and Randall Mason (Los Angeles:
Getty Conservation Institute, 2002), 3, and "Values and Heritage Conservation," 68.
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this cooperatively or competitively is perhaps the greatest cultural and social question of
next century.” 11
Another approach to understanding heritage focuses on two organizational
directions in planning and management applied by Jon Price in 2006: the official,
professional, state-sanctioned or top-down approach and the community-driven, local, or
bottom-up approach. Price writes:
Official top-down heritage interpretation…is concerned with the development of
the visitor, and concepts of historical validity. It has a didactic intent, and is
concerned to place its subjects in context in a perceived and social
continuum…[and] tends to deal with broader context of the industrial activity and
places the activity and its context in juxtaposition with examples of comparable
experience elsewhere.
Community-led interpretation, on the other hand is concerned with the validation
of recent experience…to explain the behaviour and activity of preceding
generations to present generations, and it places its subjects in a polarized context
of ‘then’ and ‘now’… and tends to deal directly with the detail of process,
whether strictly industrial…or ancillary domestic. 12
In each of the three regions studied in this dissertation, both forms appear.
Bottom-up, community-led heritage and interpretation planning is led by grass-roots
efforts, local museums, and historical societies, and top-down interpretation is
represented by National Register of Historic Places districts and nominations, Historic
American Engineering Record documentation projects (in two districts), a National
Historical Park, and, in one district, the EPA and a cleanup company. No district had just
one type of organization; each had varying degrees of top-down and bottom-up heritage
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planning that argued, with varying degrees of success, for preservation amidst
remediation planning.
In addition to concepts of value and perception, I also propose a few terms to help
elucidate this work. Successful mining districts largely had periods of increasing
production after they were established, longer periods of high production, and ultimately
a period of decline. In all three sites examined here, the period of decline was followed
by a documentation of serious environmental contamination and a Superfund cleanup.
The declining mining period, when a region was not as economically productive as it
once was, experienced dwindling population levels that led to a blighted, abandoned, and
demolished landscape. Often, the remaining population was forced to deal with
economic downturns and significant contamination that led to a general, community-wide
sensation of loss or an ethos of defeat that could trigger heritage projects to commemorate
the past.
In other respects, the term “glory days” could be used to describe periods of high
production, booming mining towns, and general success for miners, mine owners, and
townspeople. However, the term is never used in a contemporary sense. It is always
used to refer back to a period more prosperous than the present. In some respects, it is
this idea that many locally-driven, bottom-up heritage projects, to the consternation of
historians like David Lowenthal, hope to use to lure and educate tourists about the
importance of their once important district. These are the glorified, heroic landscapes
that heritage projects try to recapture or celebrate in some way.
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The ethos of defeat is often worsened not only by contamination, but the attention
generated by on-going environmental remediation. To end this ethos, however,
remediation becomes necessary to both clean and remove the stigma, often to the
detriment of the heroic landscape. But heritage is also a means of alleviating defeat by
drawing attention from declining mineralogical importance to remembering the heroic
period. Inevitably, neither remediation nor remembrance can be executed without
negotiation and compromise, especially in historically significant contaminated areas.
Some environmental treatments may be modified and some heritage lost, leaving a
compromise landscape.

Legal Framework
Heritage protection and environmental remediation are important components of
modern western societies, both adding value to historic places which, at times, include
very seriously devalued post-industrial landscapes. As such, nations write laws and
establish practices to promote heritage and remediate contamination and assign agencies
to enforce their laws.
The United States, Great Britain, and many other nations have heritage laws and
professional standards of practice to identify and protect the material things, places, and
traditions of the past based on the inherent values of each country. In most nations, a
relative value is based on the significance of a particular artifact, structure, landscape, or
tradition; but heritage can be significant on a personal, local, regional, national, or global
level. Value and significance are determined by the meaning a particular cultural object,
16

location, or practice has to the culture identifying and protecting it. The home of the first
president of the United States, for example, is a key physical representation of the roots
of this nation. As such, it has great symbolic value and hence great significance on a
national level and is protected, preserved, and interpreted in a manner befitting the most
important structures in this country.
Heritage laws and policies evolved in the United States based on and stemming
from traditions established for the preservation of important ecological sites, and the
primary responsibility for national heritage thus rests with the National Park Service, an
agency whose purview encompasses the protection of significant landscapes and sites of
historical importance and/or natural beauty. Over a century, the United States developed
a system to identify and document structures and landscapes of regional and national
significance, and to preserve and interpret significant structures and landscapes held
privately, regionally, and federally. The U.S. Antiquities Act of 1906 first permitted the
official designation of historic landmarks and created penalties for harm caused to
federally-owned cultural resources. Sixty years later, the National Historic Preservation
Act of 1966 (NHPA) authorized the formation of the National Register of Historic Places,
created and assigned duties to the State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO), and
established rules for managing historic resources on federal property.
While some states have state-level registers of historic structures and communities
have historical societies and preservation boards, the most important list for heritage
designation in the United States is the National Register of Historic Places. To be
eligible for listing, a privately- or publically-owned site must meet certain criteria of
17

regional or national significance, be in its original location, and largely be free from
major ornamental or structural changes since its time of importance. Sites on the
National Register that meet an even higher level of national significance can be elevated
to National Historic Landmark status. As of 2008, over 80,000 properties, representing
over 1.4 million individual resources, are listed on the National Register, but only 2,400
of them meet the criteria for National Historic Landmark status. 13 While these
designations provide little legal protection for privately-owned sites, a listing at a
minimum requires some form of documentation that proves a site’s significance and
authenticity, thereby fulfilling an important heritage step by creating a record of an
important structure or landscape. 14
The most important parts of the NHPA for this dissertation are Sections 106 and
110. 15 Section 106 requires that all undertakings or projects executed with federal funds
or requiring federal permits consider and mitigate the potential damage to cultural
resources worthy of inclusion on the National Register. Further, Section 110 designates
the heads of each federal agency to be responsible for and develop plans and procedures
to protect historic resources eligible for the National Register within their own agencies.
The NHPA (established and) requires State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPO) in
each state to determine National Register-eligibility of potentially impacted cultural
resources and approve mitigation efforts, and provides for a National Advisory Council
to address national heritage issues, advise the president and congress on historic
13
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September 29, 2008.
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preservation, and resolve conflicts. If, for example, the Air Force desires to construct a
new hangar building at a base in the United States and the desired location includes the
archaeological remains of an 18th-century Native American campsite meeting the
National Register eligibility requirements, then the Air Force must consult with SHPOs
and reach agreements to mitigate the damage to that site. Mitigation, however, does not
necessarily mean cancelling a project, but, based on the site’s significance, mitigation
could mean, at a minimum, excavation to recover material culture and spatial data prior
to construction or, at a maximum, if the site proved to be associated with a significant
historical figure for example, finding other ways to execute the hangar project without
impacting the site.
Privately owned sites or those owned by states or municipalities fall under
different consideration. While no specific federal laws exist to formally protect
privately-owned heritage sites in this country, tax incentives encourage private historic
preservation efforts, and community historic districts can enforce protective covenants
for included properties to ensure they are maintained appropriately.
Overall, laws and practices exist to protect heritage in the United States especially
if the federal government is involved through, licenses, permits, projects, or financing,
but the relative value of individual heritage sites or traditions to the acting agency are
almost inconsequential. The laws require consideration of impacts by federal projects on
all heritage, as determined eligible by the National Register criteria, in the belief that the
preservation of the historic things, places, and traditions of the past is in the best interest
of the Nation.
19

A second set of United States laws enacted in the latter half of the 20th century
stemmed from a national response to the lasting effects of industrialization and its
impacts on human health. These laws evolved in part, from a history of nuisance
complaints against polluters dating as far back as the 17th century. For example, early
19th-century Welsh farmers, whose crops and livestock had died because of smelter
smoke from Swansea, were among the first to use nuisance laws to attempt to limit
industrial pollution. Early 20th-century American farmers, state governments, and federal
agencies similarly sought injunctions against or damages from large copper smelting sites
because of significant pollution injuries to property. The fact that the majority of the
early cases brought by individuals were settled, dismissed, or lost by the plaintiffs, and
the governments’ cases largely resulted in negotiated settlements, suggests that economic
growth was more important to the nation as a whole than then known pollution nuisance
until late in the 20th century when the more serious effects of contamination became
much more identifiable and quantifiable.
While these cases highlighted the potential impact of industrial activity on human
health, they did little to alter the expansive growth of the economy and spread of ever
more complex industrial activity. Not until the mid 20th-century did people in the United
States begin to question the lasting effects of industrial activity on the landscape,
especially as environmental disasters and deaths from contamination seemed potentially
preventable and studies demonstrating the effects of long-term exposure to more invisible
toxins became more alarming. Beginning in the 1940s, Congress passed laws regulating
the output and transportation of hazardous substances and, in 1970, created the
20

Environmental Protection Agency, whose mission, simply stated, was to protect human
health and the environment. It was to execute its mission by establishing pollution
standards, monitoring industrial effluent, accessing fines, and prosecuting pollution
violators.
The Clean Water Act (1972), that substantially expanded the 1942 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, and the Clean Air Act (1970), that substantially expanded the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955, went a long way to curb current and future pollution by
setting limits to discharges and establishing penalties for violations. The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) established rules for the transportation
and disposal of hazardous wastes and provided conservation standards for natural
resources. While all three of these acts had implications for current and future pollution,
they did little to remediate the continued effects of past pollution and existing hazardous
waste deposits. While the 1977 Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act collected
taxes from active coal mining to be used for abandoned mine reclamation efforts, it
wasn’t until 1980 that the government addressed a broader spectrum of neglected waste.
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), more commonly referred to as “Superfund,” to identify
significant sites of past pollution, prioritize the sites based on potential damage to human
health, and plan for and execute the remediation of those sites. Further, if the original
polluters, their later corporate owners, or current land-holders were economically viable
or legal entities, then the EPA, which administers Superfund, could label them a
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) and attempt to force them to manage the cleanup or,
21

at a minimum, seek to recoup the cost of the clean up. In those instances where a PRP
could not be identified, CERCLA and the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) provided public money, the super-fund, raised from
chemical and petroleum industry taxes, to pay for the remediation of significantly
polluted sites.
For a site to be remediated under Superfund, federal studies called Preliminary
Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) must first determine the extent of the contamination
or confirm findings from other state or federal studies. These studies establish a threat
ranking based on potential public health impacts for individual sites and, if significant
enough, lead to listing on the National Priorities List (NPL) that officially defines a
location as a Superfund site. The next step, if the site requires a long-term permanent
solution, is a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) the EPA or PRP
conducts to outline the threat and optional treatments. The final choices of remediation
options, after considering public comments and opinions, are listed in the Record of
Decision (ROD), a legal public document that the EPA and PRP are mandated to follow.
Following the publication of the ROD, work plans, safety plans, and public involvement
plans are created to execute the ROD, usually completed under the broad heading of
Remedial Design and Remedial Action (RD/RA). 16 One key component of the RD/RA is
the Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAS) which require the
EPA to identify and enforce other federal and state statutes that apply to the clean up and
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federal undertakings. Often these include RCRA, the Endangered Species Act, and
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
Some of the 11,000 sites listed on the National Priorities List are military bases,
warehouses, or transportation sites, but the majority of them were listed because of longterm industrial activity and contamination. Because of this longevity, many of these
places also hold historic significance, as defined by the National Register criteria, to
American economic, social, and industrial history. Arguably, much of America’s
importance on the world stage can be attributed to its rapid growth and industrial output
between 1850 and 1950.
Prodigious American production affected the outcome of two world wars,
changed the structure of global wealth, shifted the seats of world power, firmly
established a middle-class, and, by and large, created the consumer economy. All of this
was done over a century with little regard for the destination of the non-commercial byproducts of production. Factories dumped waste water into rivers and oceans, vented
caustic gasses into the atmosphere, and allowed chemicals to seep into soils and
groundwater. Mines and smelter sites, often in sparsely populated areas, simply left their
waste tailings and slag wherever they could and usually only considered them again if
they interfered with production or could be recycled for additional profits.
Many old industrial sites therefore have dichotomous legacies. On one hand, they
hold significance to American history and mark economic, social, and technological
development and, as such, are important heritage sites. On the other hand, they are
responsible for many of the most egregious pollution releases requiring extensive clean23

ups and incurring considerable cost. Federal laws articulated by the NHPA and
CERCLA exist to protect or correct both legacies for the betterment of the public.
CERCLA, despite its specific health-relevance to contaminated communities, is not
exempt from the provisions of Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA, and as such, the EPA,
is required to consider historic resources it encounters.
However straight forward the National Historic Preservation Act is, federal
agencies are mission-driven, shaped by the personalities of their various staffs, and not
necessarily inclined to appreciate local heritage as much as the communities they work in
do. Further complicating heritage practice in contaminated communities, the EPA in
general does not have a strong institutional understanding of heritage. It has a small twoperson heritage staff within its compliance and enforcement division that serves the
remaining 17,000-person EPA. 17 In an almost too simplistic approach, the heritage staff
distributes a pamphlet titled, “Historic and Archaeological Resource Protection for
USEPA Personnel” with chapters titled, “Why Should you care about Historical and
Archaeological Resources?” (Answer: it’s the law, regulations require it, it’s policy, and
it’s a good idea), and “What are ‘Cultural Resources’?” 18 There are few other training
resources available for EPA, or state-level environmental departments for that matter, to
access heritage policy beyond a single preservation-remediation course taught by the
private National Preservation Institute and a book by Tom King, titled Cultural Resource
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Laws and Practice (2008), outlining regulations affecting cultural resources including
CERCLA although it is mostly geared toward heritage professionals. 19
While the EPA is not positioned institutionally to respond to heritage issues at
Superfund sites, many communities are equally unfamiliar with or not positioned well to
use the law. Without a strong voice from the community to force EPA compliance with
Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA, confrontations become one-sided and heritage is often
lost, or only minimally considered.
To provide a background for understanding how copper production historically
created environmental problems that would eventually lead to remediation efforts, the
opening section of this dissertation addresses the broad history of copper smelting. This
portion of the dissertation is mainly synthetic, drawing on the work of numerous scholars.
However, it does two things that previous scholarship has not. First, it provides a broad
synthetic account of copper smelting and its environmental impacts from antiquity to near
present. Past studies have focused merely on specific smelting sites in specific times and
even broader studies like Charlie Hyde’s Copper for America have focused only on
specific nation-states. Second, through specially constructed flow charts, the chapters in
Part I attempt to provide a basic idea of how often-very-complicated historic smelting
technology operated and a clearer understanding of how and why each of these
technological processes created environmentally hazardous materials.
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PART I

An examination of the broad technological and environmental history of copper
smelting from the earliest furnaces to the development of the German and Welsh
systems to the culmination of modern practice in the United States.

27
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CHAPTER 1. THE BASICS OF COPPER AND SMELTING
Copper smelting could be one of the oldest industrial professions. Unlike other
early manufacturing pursuits such as fire-building, stone shaping, pot-making, housebuilding, and clothes-making, however, copper production was much more complex. The
extraction of chemically bound copper from its stone matrix required an expectation,
even if not defined or entirely understood, that complex chemical and thermodynamic
processes applied to certain types of rocks would yield repetitive results. Copper’s
earliest known uses date to the sixth millennia BCE, likely the result of working
relatively pure, but rare native copper. The first purposely smelted copper dates to only
3500 BCE. 20
Copper and copper alloy production were a significant metallurgical process from
the time they originated. The metal’s cost fluctuated based on production and supply
levels accentuated by wars and economic depressions, but some demand for copper
always existed and tended to increase throughout history and new uses for the metal
developed and populations grew. Arguably, copper and its alloys were the most
important metals from 3500 BCE until the advent and diffusion of bloomery iron forges
and rudimentary small batch steel making late in the second millennium BCE. Further,
easily melted and cast copper-based metals rivaled iron’s full importance until the advent
and diffusion of blast furnaces between the 6th and 15th centuries CE. 21
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Copper attained this importance because it was not only more plentiful than gold
and silver, but its bronze and brass alloys were considerably stronger, relegating the early
precious metals chiefly to ornamentation and commerce. While considerably less
plentiful than iron, its chief rival, copper had a notably lower melting point, so founders
chose it and its alloys for virtually all cast metal objects requiring certain strength
characteristics from bells to sculpture to cannon until the second millennium CE when
cheap cast iron started to become widely available. 22 Bronze, a copper alloy, was
generally stronger than and as ductile as wrought iron, but less strong than steel. Despite
the preponderance of iron on the planet, pre-modern steel-making could only be done in
small batches with rare phosphorous-free iron ore in a forge crucible and was generally
limited to weapons and tools.
While few can argue against the benefits of selecting a strong, ductile, noncorrosive, easily cast metal like bronze over wrought iron during the Iron Age, the
disadvantages of iron become nearly inconsequential given its much wider availability
compared to copper and its much lower price, estimated at only 20% of that of bronze
during the Roman period. 23 While it is difficult to quantify the number of early Iron Age
iron ore deposits compared to then known copper ore deposits, a comparison of 20th
century pig-iron production to 20th century copper production gives a general indication
of just how much more plentiful iron is. The average yearly world production of pig iron
22
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from 1910-2004 was 421,276,596 metric tons; the average yearly production of copper
from 1900-2004 was 4,473, 058 metric tons. 24 In other words, based on 20th century
data, copper production was just about one percent (1.06%) that of iron.

Copper Properties
Historically, uses for copper expanded as its specific properties—ductility, alloyability, corrosion-resistance, and conductivity—were successively exploited. The first
copper users prized the ductility of largely pre-industrial native or refined pure copper.
Because of its softness and density, copper could be hammered and hardened into shapes
such as crude knife blades, points, and tools but also formed and polished into colorful
decorative and religious objects. Due to the greater availability of native copper and a
scarcity of native gold in parts of pre-industrial sub-Saharan Africa, copper became as
precious a decorative metal for some tribes as gold was for others. Indeed, copper’s
aesthetic value to African tribes propelled its use in the Dutch and British slave-trades;
the metal formed one leg of a mercantile triangle the sent copper from Europe to Africa
to buy slaves who were sent to the Americas to produce sugar and rum (and profits) for
European consumption. 25 North American native copper played a similar role for
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aboriginals here. As the only metal available for tool and weapon use, it found its way
into extensive trade routes throughout the continent. 26
The discovery that molten copper easily combines with other metals to form
alloys, such as bronze and later brass, that have much greater strength and ductility than
pure copper presented new opportunities. These alloys were used in the Bronze and early
Iron ages for weapons, tools, coins, and structural and decorative objects, but copper’s
general rarity in the Earth’s crust made them considerably more expensive and limited
their use following the advent of iron. The lower melting points of copper (1083° C) and
bronze (999° C), however, made them the primary cast metal until the refinement and
technological diffusion of the blast furnace and the technological ability to reach
temperatures high enough to melt and cast iron.
Contributing to copper’s utility, especially in the early industrial age, was its
superior corrosion resistance over wrought and cast iron and steel. From the dawn of the
Iron Age, copper found use in metal applications in corrosive environments such as naval
weapons, instruments, and architectural fixtures and piping. Pure copper’s malleability
allowed it to be rolled thin, providing long-wearing, non-corroding panels for preventing
wood rot and infestation on roofs and ship bottoms. Loosely related to this third
property, copper and its alloys are also non-sparking and were (and are) used to make
tools for use in potentially flammable or explosive environments.
Copper’s fourth property differs significantly from the first three. Up until the
1850s, copper and its alloys were used primarily for their physical properties alone:
26
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malleability, strength, low melting point, and corrosion resistance. Copper’s fourth
primary property, and arguably the most significant, is its thermal and electrical
conductivity. Silver is a near perfect conductor of heat and electricity, often serving as
the reference point for determining/assessing conductivity in other materials. Copper is
considerably closer to silver than any other element with a thermal conductivity 94% of
silver’s and an electrical resistance of 1.67 micro-ohm/cm compared to silver’s 1.59
micro-ohm/cm. Gold, an even rarer metal than silver, is a distant third in thermal
conductivity (71%) and resistance (2.35 micro-ohm/cm). No other materials are even
comparable.
Using the earlier approach to demonstrate elemental rarity, the average annual
world production of silver from 1900-2004 was 9,111 metric tons, while gold was 1,191
metric tons. 27 Therefore 20th-century silver production was only 0.20 % of copper and
gold only 0.02%. While not as perfect a conductor, copper’s greater availability made it
the choice for thermal, communication, and electrical applications as they were
developed in the 19th century and diffused in the 20th century.

Copper Compounds
In general, copper is found throughout the earth in three primary forms, each a
copper mineral or compound surrounded by non-copper waste compounds often referred
to as gangue. If the grouping of metal compound and gangue can be mined and extracted
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profitably, the combination is called ore, and the ratio of recoverable copper to the
remaining elements and compounds determines the leanness or richness of the ore
body. 28
Native copper is largely pure but still considered a copper mineral. It is found
either as large, multi-ton masses or as small inclusions within larger stone deposits.
While native copper exists in many locations around the globe, only the Lake Superior
copper range proved to be commercially minable in the industrial and modern periods.
Other native deposits, while too small to be worked economically, tended to be indicators
of larger copper ore deposits, such as those in Africa and Chile.
Lake Superior native copper was found in three primary deposit types. First,
some copper precipitated from volcanic flows as large masses or into fissures and cracks
between already hardened rocks. Native American miners sought this copper because it
was accessible with modest stone tools through relatively shallow mines. Later,
following attempts by the French and English, these mass copper deposits formed the
initial objective of the first large American mining boom. The other two native copper
types, formed as tiny amygdaloid (almond-shaped) inclusions in a much larger basalt
deposit or small pebble-sized inclusions dispersed throughout a conglomerated sandstone
matrix called conglomerate, ultimately proved to be the more lucrative copper mining
deposits in Michigan.
The other two primary forms of copper ore historically and currently are chemical
compounds of copper and other dominant and trace elements. The two chief compounds
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are oxides (copper plus oxygen) and sulfides (copper plus sulfur). Chemically combined
in those compounds are often other elements that need to be removed in the roasting or
smelting process because of their detrimental effects on the final metal or their individual
economic value. An inclusion of arsenic, for example, a common trace element found in
many copper compounds and a significant, pre-bronze hardening agent for early copper
users, of just 0.4% will reduce the electrical conductivity of the final metal by 50%. 29
On the other hand, small amounts of gold and silver, also found in combination
with copper, are often recoverable in the smelting process leading to enhanced
revenues. 30 In some cases, the recovery of an ancillary element grew so significant that it
made copper the by-product. The Ducktown Sulfur, Copper, and Iron Company, for
example, was founded to produce copper but ultimately earned more income from the
sale of sulfuric acid. 31
While the first large-scale American copper mining endeavors worked native
coppers, the vast majority of the world’s copper, dating back to the Bronze Age, came
initially from oxide and later sulfide ores. By the mid 1950s, chemists had identified 165
different copper compounds, but only 16 were considered rich enough for commercial
extraction. 32 Nearly all non-native ore bodies originally formed as sulfide deposits, many
with sections close to the surface directly exposed to the air or covered by an easily
identifiable iron-rich gossan layer. Through the weathering action of rain and wind,
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many of the exposed or near-surface sulfide ore bodies were converted to oxides as the
sulfur was leached out or reacted with oxygen. 33 This process tended to leave oxide ores
near the surface of many ore beds that were easy to mine and smelt and became the first
copper ores sought by the earliest copper smelters. 34 Just below the oxidized layer was
often a layer of sulfide ore that had been enriched by the copper leachates of the upper
layers. 35 Then, below the rich sulfide layer, less rich sub-layers of the original deposit
that, although often very large, ultimately became too lean to mine. (See Table 1.1 and
Figure 1.1)

Melting and Smelting
All copper produced, with the exception of hammered native copper, was initially
processed in a molten state. In general, most smelting throughout history, including the
practice used with Michigan’s native copper, has been a thermodynamic process to
physically and chemically drive off waste materials and purify the metal. Initially, some
form of concentration or pre-smelting sorting was applied to reduce the levels of waste
the smelters would need to process. These steps included crushing ore and physically
removing waste materials or using chemicals to leach copper from low-concentration
ores. More complex compounds, however, often required more extensive concentrating
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Table 1.1
Copper Compounds 36
Mineral

Composition

Copper content

Native Copper

Cu

100%

Sulfide Minerals
Chalcocite

Cu2S

79.8

Covellite

CuS

66.4

Bornite

Cu5FeS4

63.3

Tennantite

Cu12As4S13

51.6

Enargite

Cu3(As,Sb)S4

48.3

Tetrahedrite

Cu12Sb4S13

45.8

Chalcopyrite

CuFeS2

34.5

Oxide Minerals
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Cuprite

Cu2O

88.8

Tenorite

CuO

79.9

Atacamite

Cu2Cl(OH)3

59.5

Malachite

CuCO3Cu(OH)2

57.3

Brochantite

Cu4SO4(OH)6

56.2

Azurite

2CuCO3CU(OH)2

55.1

Antlerite

Cu3SO4(OH)4

54.0

Chrysocolla

CuSiO3.2H2O

36.0

Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, 22.
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Iron-rich Gossan Layer

Figure 1.1 Typical Sulfide Deposit. Ergani Maden, Turkey. (After Tylecote 1976, 8)
and smelting to drive off contaminates and gangue materials. These processes sometimes
required multiple steps and could take up to several weeks to complete.
With the exception of small deposits of native copper on the surface, such as
glacially dislodged float copper, all copper minerals and ores needed to be mined or
otherwise physically removed from the ground. These processes could be as simple as
chiseling pieces off large exposed masses, as complex as hard rock underground mining,
or as extensive as open pit mining very lean ores. Once above ground, the ores went
through some form of concentrating to remove gangue and limit the waste material
entering the smelter. Early, small-batch copper makers simply hand-removed the waste
materials, while later more complex mills crushed or pulverized the ores and first used
water and then, as techniques advanced, chemicals to separate the copper compounds.
With the exception of a few 20th century processes, all separated copper compounds were
38

then subjected to extensive heat during smelting, to melt the mineral and remove gangue.
The smelting process usually required several basic steps, depending on ore type,
and ultimately coalesced into two distinct smelting traditions based on either a blast
furnace smelter, that mixed the ores directly with the fuel (discussed in Chapter 2), or a
reverberatory smelter, that separated the fuel from the copper and directed, or
reverberated, the heat from combustion over the pooled copper ore to melt it without
cross contamination (discussed in Chapter 3).

Native and Oxide Smelting
Native copper from Lake Superior required relatively simple smelting. The large
masses of pure copper were placed in removable-top reverberatory furnaces, melted,
slagged, and drawn off into ingots or other useable shapes. As the dominant form of
copper changed from large masses of pure native copper to ores, the smelting process
changed as well. Michigan’s pure amygdaloidal and conglomerate coppers were found in
a gangue mixture where they comprised only 1-3% by weight. These coppers required a
mechanical form of concentrating after mining, generally at a stamp mill. Then the
concentrated materials, now 60-80% copper, were melted in a reverberatory furnace to
avoid direct fuel contact, skimmed of slag, “rabbled” or paddle-mixed to induce the
oxidation of any remaining impurities from the gangue, then “poled” by placing green
hardwood into the molten copper to remove any remaining oxygen left from the rabbling.
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The oxygen combined with the wood’s carbon to form carbon dioxide and was exhausted
through the stack leaving pure copper to be drawn off into shapes or ingots. 37
The general process for smelting oxide ores of copper was nearly as simple as the
native copper process. Oxides, often of relatively high copper concentrations, were
generally charged directly with a carboniferous fuel in a blast or stack furnace where the
carbon atoms, freed during combustion, easily combined with the oxygen in the copper
ore, resulting in an oxygen-free metal and carbon dioxide waste gas. Often smelters
varied the mixture of ores charged into the furnace to achieve better results, such as
adding self-fluxing rock to avoid the need for additional non-ore fluxes to form and draw
off slag. 38 Sulfide ores were occasionally used in the mix, likely in a reverberatory
furnace, to create sulfur dioxide waste gases to encourage some oxygen removal, and
metallic copper matte, an intermediate smelter product anywhere from 40-90% pure, that
would then need further refining. 39 The general formula for oxide reduction, in this case
for tenorite, is:
2CuO + C → 2Cu + CO2 40
Sulfide Smelting
Native copper and oxides, however, were minority ores; sulfides were (and are)
considerably more plentiful and have accounted for up to 90% of ores mined. The
sulfides were also more complicated to smelt and generally served as the impetus for
37
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most technological developments in copper metallurgy. 41 Sulfur, in even small amounts,
reduces the ductility of copper and increases its melting point, just the opposite of small
amounts of tin. Because most copper ores contain significant amounts of sulfur, it
became imperative to remove as much of it as possible. As a result, sulfide smelting
evolved into a multi-stage process. Following concentration, sulfides ores were roasted
to drive off the majority of the sulfur. Because sulfur is flammable, roasting was often a
self perpetuating operation that ultimately ended on its own when most of the sulfur had
been driven off as sulfur dioxide. Without additional heat to speed up the process, like
the Welsh used in a reverberatory furnace, roasting the ore in open heaps, a hallmark of
smelting for 5000 years, could take many weeks. 42 The roasted ore was then melted,
sometimes with fresh ore (as with oxide smelting) to facilitate waste removal, in a
furnace to “fuse” the copper. Slag, made up of mostly gangue and other waste products,
was skimmed off. This 40-90% pure, intermediate copper, referred to as “matte” or
“regulus,” and required a second, higher temperature firing in a furnace to further oxidize
remaining waste products to produce a 95-99% pure copper called blister if it came from
a reverberatory furnace or black if it came from a blast furnace. 43 For most needs, this
copper required a further refining step to increase the purity to 99.9% and eliminate the
detrimental effects of other minerals on the copper.

41

A. K. Biswas and W. G. Davenport, Extractive Metallurgy of Copper (New York: Pergamon Press,
1980), 1.
42
William Henry Greenwood, A Manual of Metallurgy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875), 57.
43
Peters, Modern Copper Smelting, 224. This is a quite generalized version of the process which, prior to
the industrial revolution, could require multiple roastings and intermediate smeltings prior to a series of
refining smelts to purify the metal. In some cases, this process could take up to one year.

41

During the initial roasting, some of the copper sulfides are converted to copper
oxides when the sulfur is driven off:
2CuS + 3O2 → 2CuO + 2SO2 44
These new oxides then combine with additional (fresh) sulfides, as described above, to
form pure copper and more sulfur dioxide:
2Cu2O + Cu2S → 6Cu + SO2 45
As evident from these simple equations and Table 1.1, copious amounts of sulfur
are often combined with copper in the sulfide ores. For nearly 5400 years, this element
was permitted to drift off from the roasting process into the atmosphere. Sulfur dioxide
smoke, when oxidized to form sulfur trioxide, condensed in the upper atmosphere and
returned to the earth in the form of acid rain, often distributed over wide areas:
SO3 + H2O → H2SO4 (sulfuric acid)
By the late 19th century, smelters had perfected the industrial recovery and oxidation of
sulfur and its conversion into sulfuric acid. But sulfur recovery was not a universally
accepted or desired practice for smelters until governments forced the issue and a market
developed for sulfuric acid. Until then, blowing smoke and acid rain emanating from
copper production destroyed crops, forests, and generally weakened surrounding
ecosystems leading to some of the earliest environmental lawsuits. In addition to sulfur,
arsenic and lead are common elements found in copper compounds, and mercury and
acids are often combined in gangue or used in the smelting or refining processes. As
44
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smelting got progressively more sophisticated and as ores got leaner, new material
combinations and chemical processes were developed to ensure greater efficiency in
copper recovery, often utilizing hazardous compounds that, after use, were often
discarded into the local landscape.
In addition to smoke and chemical pollution, a portion of the copper escaped
processing and ended up in concentrations posing a potential threat. Although copper
ingestion was less probable, harmful, and lethal than lead historically, copper, in small
doses is a necessary component of several bodily proteins. Copper deficiency in
newborns can lead to death, but an excess of copper, called copper toxicosis, can lead to
gastro-intestinal disruptions, epidermal reactions, or fatal liver disease. 46
The more dangerous by-products of copper smelting, however, were, as
mentioned above, the atmospheric distribution of sulfur-heavy smoke from the roasting
and smelting processes leading to respiratory ailments, some cancers, and extensive
environmental degradation, and the release of lead, arsenic, and mercury, each a lethal
neurological or carcinogenic toxins.
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CHAPTER 2. A SHORT HISTORY OF COPPER SMELTING
THROUGH 1640
In that remote age when man was unacquainted with metals, and his implements
and weapons were fashioned of wood, of stone, and of bone, he has been
regarded as a mere savage, scarcely, if at all, removed in intelligence from the
wild animals with which he had to contend; and although this may perhaps be
near the truth as regards the man of early Paleolithic times, it is hardly a fair
designation for the man of the later stages of the Neolithic period,
notwithstanding that even he had made but little advance in what are termed the
civilized arts…Such were the men who were the first rude metallurgists. 47
-W. Gowland, 1912 (“Copper and Its Alloys in Early Times,” 11)
Four significant events in the early development of metallurgy first occurred in
and around southwest Asia and likely spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. Some
of these developments, but not all, also occurred independently, but later, in the Western
Hemisphere. The first was the recognition that metals, especially copper, which, in pure
native form is estimated at 200 times more prevalent in the earth’s crust than native gold
and 625 times more prevalent than native silver, held specific advantages for lithic-based
societies. 48 While native coppers were not necessarily stronger or sharper than the stone
tools and weapons they would eventually replace, they were malleable and shapeable
with stone hammers and, with repeated heat treating, hammering, and quenching, could
be worked and reworked into useful implements with relatively tough edges. The
adoption of native copper occurred at different times in different regions, but it is likely
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that Africa, southwest Asia, China, Russia, and North and South America each adopted
metal use independently. 49
The second major step and likely one of the most significant developments for
early civilizations was the innovation of smelting and the extrication of metallic copper
from ore. The first smelters occurred in southwest Asia and, over two thousand years,
likely diffused along trade networks across the Mediterranean, Europe, Africa, and East
Asia. While scholars debate the trade routes used for the diffusion of metallurgy and
argue whether or not China, Africa, and Europe separately developed smelting at about
the same time as or shortly after Southwest Asia, archaeological evidence clearly
suggests that pre-colonial South America did develop an independent smelting tradition,
but that North America, home to the world’s largest deposits of native copper and a cold
working and annealing tradition, did not. 50
The third step was the addition of alloying elements, initially accidental, that
significantly increased the hardness and reduced the brittleness of copper to make the
metal considerably more useful than stone or pure copper for tools, weapons, hardware,
and implements. The first arsenical copper alloys and tin-bronzes produced
systematically in large quantities likely came out of the Middle East but spread quickly
throughout the rest of the Eastern Hemisphere. Interestingly, China and the British Isles
with rich copper and tin deposits probably skipped a copper age altogether and, when
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smelting technology finally reached there, went directly into a bronze age. 51
Archaeological evidence suggests that South America also reached a bronze age before
Spanish colonization, but, unlike Europe, Asia, and Africa, would not develop an iron age
prior to contact.
The fourth step was the development of sulfide ore smelting. With this
innovation, copper smelting grew considerably more complex, requiring multiple
preparatory steps before charging a furnace, but the development, as shown in Chapter 1,
also significantly increased the amount of copper available to ancient societies. With
much more widespread metallurgical activities, increased weapons production, and
elaborate economic systems based on trade, civilizations grew more powerful and
wealthy, ultimately contributing to the formation of kingdoms and empires.

Early Smelting
Copper smelting’s exact origins are a mystery. Some late 19th- and early 20thcentury British metallurgists insisted that metal smelting began accidently in a campfire
ringed with copper oxides and went so far as to give the dimensions of that first fire.
Others stipulated that the campfire had to be located on a hill or used on a very windy day
to take advantage of increased air velocity. 52 More practical scholars, however, argued
that even wind-blown hillside campfires could not produce enough heat to reduce copper
from ore. 53 The more likely “accidental” discovery scenario placed the location at a
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pottery. Kilns, which had been around longer than smelters and operated with a similar
flue-draft as reverberatory furnaces would, generated enough heat under the right
conditions to fuse clay and melt certain stone types. Since powdered copper oxide glazes
were prized for their blue coloration, the first copper was likely reduced from an excess
of glaze at a pottery or from experimentation after the probably kiln-discovery of metallic
lead, whose oxides were also used for glazing material and reduced at a significantly
lower temperature than copper oxides. 54
Many metal historians place the origins of copper smelting in the 6th millennium
BCE in Anatolia (modern Turkey) or neighboring Iran based on scattered
archaeologically dated slags. Although the scale of production at these sites strongly
suggests some form of organized metallurgical activity, these remains cannot be
conclusively associated with smelting because the slags could have resulted from a
native-copper melting process, and no associated furnaces or artifactual evidence have
been documented from that period. The earliest undisputed evidence dates the birth of
smelting to sometime prior to 3500 BCE. 55

Analyses of copper artifacts from this

period reveal certain chemical compounds that could only be created through an orereduction process. Further complicating the temporal origins of metallurgy, no complete
remains of a smelting furnace are found before the Egyptian “New Kingdom” period
from the 14th to 12th centuries BCE. By this time, however, the Eurasian trade networks
had spread copper smelting across much of Europe and China. 56
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Early Metallurgy
Copper as a pure metal is generally too soft for practical tool making and weapon
use and tended to be employed initially for ornamentation or simple implements, such as
pins, that did not require high-strength. The primary means to modify the form of pure
copper, hammering with stone tools, often caused brittleness, resulting in a weak
structure and ultimately an unusable edge. Early metallurgists in the Middle East, and
independently in North and South America, however, soon discovered that the
combination of hammering and annealing increased copper’s characteristic hardness. 57
Annealing, a practice in wide use today, involved the slow heating of a metal to a specific
temperature range that reduced or “relaxed” the stresses inherent in a hammered metal’s
surface. These steps produced a stronger material which, following repeated hammering
and annealing, could be worked into functional tools or weapons with much more durable
edges and would not fail as easily under high impacts.
Despite the advances made in working pure copper, its hardness and durability
was still lower than some stone tools. In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, pure copper
was replaced by copper produced from arsenic-contaminated ore as early as 3500 BCE.
Copper Age smelters learned through trial and error that certain ore-types produced a
superior final metal even if they were not exactly sure why. These arsenic
“contaminated” coppers, referred to as arsenical copper or sometimes arsenical bronze,
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could be hardened with stone hammers faster and remained stronger than pure annealed
copper, resulting in even tougher and less brittle edges. 58
As copper’s importance increased, techniques of smelting and metal working
spread. One key feature of the early metal trade was the advent of the crucible furnace to
remelt copper ingots. Copper workers took raw standardized ingots—the direct,
relatively pure product of the smelters—and placed them in ceramic crucibles (bowls).
They either covered the crucibles with charcoal in a furnace or placed them in an open
charcoal mound to melt the copper under a blast. 59 While this was not a significant
technological departure from smelting furnaces, it was a notable event because it created
a two-step process and, with large crucibles, ultimately led to a means for melting and
casting greater volumes of molten metal than a single smelter heat produced. Later metal
workers used the process (or a similar one) to create specific alloys or recover precious
metals found in many copper ores. The key trade-advantage was that these simple
crucible furnaces could be built anywhere fuel was available, allowing smelter-produced
ingots to be shipped/traded from copper mining regions to nearly any other location,
thereby expanding trade and ultimately leading to the earliest metallic currency:
standardized copper ingots.
The next major change in copper production, and arguably the most important to
date, occurred with the combination of tin and copper to produce bronze. The addition
of small amounts of tin more than doubled the hardness and strength of pure copper while
lowering its melting point, making the alloy much more advantageous for working and
58
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casting. 60 Many late-19th-century metallurgists and anthropologists simply assumed that
tin was a similar, albeit rarer, copper ore contaminant as arsenic. Later archaeologists,
however, found little evidence of tin-contaminated ore in the Middle East. 61 The major
tin deposits available in the Bronze Age were located in Italy, Bohemia, Saxony, Malaya,
Nigeria, China, and Cornwall, while South America had deposits in Bolivia. Evidence
suggested that early bronzes were mostly arsenical alloys containing minute amounts of
tin, possibly the result of trace tin-contamination. True high-tin bronzes, containing 710% tin, which indicate an intentionally created alloy, did not occur until the advent of
extensive Mediterranean Sea and Danube River trade networks after 3000 BCE.
Tylecote, Childe, and, to a lesser extent, Dayton suggested that these first, high-tin
bronzes likely occurred as a result of copper-age smelting spreading to Saxony or
Cornwall where both copper and tin deposits occur. While they differ on the origin, all
three believe that early European metallurgists developed the first bronzes and then
brought the technique to the Near East when the Europeans began trading tin. 62 With the
growth of tin-alloyed bronze production, arsenical coppers slowly disappeared because
changes in smelting techniques required to make high-tin bronze tended to oxidize the
more volatile arsenic early in the process.
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Early Furnaces
By the time the first complete smelting furnaces appear in the archaeological
record between the 14th and 12th centuries BCE, smelting technology had been evolving
for several millennia, the smelting process had been somewhat standardized with similar
furnaces and ingot shapes occurring throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, and bronze had
been in wide use for over a thousand years. The earliest Bronze Age furnaces were
generally short, cylindrical shafts roughly two feet tall and two feet in diameter with a
hemispherical-concave floor, a single tuyere (forced-air nozzle) opening in the furnace
wall near the bottom, and a slag hole off the front. 63 A bellows, likely an animal-skin bag
or pot, forced air through the tuyere into a charcoal fire in the shaft, and generated
enough heat to melt the copper ores mixed with the charcoal. Metal workers then tapped
the slag, the lighter non-copper waste by-product, at various times during the heat while
the molten copper settled into the furnace floor. (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2) When cooled,
the metal solidified into a plano-concave ingot, typically 20 – 30 cm (8-12 inches) wide
and around 3.8 cm (1.5 inches) thick, weighing about 6 kg (13.2 lbs). 64 This general
shape and size eventually became a standard trade currency leading to the advent of
coins. 65 (See Figure 2.3)
By 1500 BCE, Bronze Age smelters, in an early and significant process
innovation, were tapping molten copper out the front of the furnace. This new technique
offered greater efficiency and fuel savings because the furnace did not have to be cooled
63
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Figure 2.1 Early smelter demonstrating skin-bag bellows. (After Gowland 1906, 15)
to remove an ingot from the inside. Further, the furnace lining remained intact and the
furnace could be recharged with ore much quicker, approaching a near continuous
operation and considerably increasing productivity. Tapping molten copper from the
furnace into an external ingot-mold ultimately led to a second standard ingot shape, the
larger, 30-40 kg (65-85 lbs) “ox-hide.” (See Figure 2.4)
Whether smelting had several points of near simultaneous invention or a single
inventor and multiple diffusers, the process had spread across Europe and Asia by the 2nd
millennium BCE, leading to expanding demand and pressure on known copper oxide and
tin ore deposits and a significant increase in cost of bronze. To alleviate some of the
growing supply problems, early metallurgists developed new alloys based on specific
properties needed for specific items. Weapons and tools, for example, required the
strength and durability of bronze, but cast artwork, coins, and some implements could use
softer, less expensive alloys. Lead, a soft, easily-smelted and highly prized material
53

Figure 2.2 Side view of “New Kingdom” era smelter demonstrating an air-blast tuyere
and the origination of the plano-concave ingot created when molten copper settled in the
furnace base. Not shown here is the notch for drawing off molten slag, although slag
removal was not necessary to create a plano-concave ingot. The glassy, hardened slag
could simply be chipped off the ingot top after the ingot was removed and cooled. (After
Rothenberg 1990, 39)

Figure 2.3 Comparison between a typical early Bronze Age plano-concave ingot
(left) and a typical late Bronze Age ox-hide ingot (right). (After Tylecote 1976, 31, and
Bass 1961, 87.)
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Figure 2.4 Typical late Bronze Age and Roman era smelting furnace capable of
producing an ox-hide ingot. Note separate slag and metal tap holes. (After Tylecote
1976, 21)

produced in greater amounts than all other non-ferrous metals combined through the 19th
century AD, became a key component of emerging metal technologies. In addition to its
eventual use in architectural, plumbing, and household vessels, it found its way into cast
bronze artwork, which often had high lead concentrations. Coins, too, were often bronzelead or leaded bronze-gold alloys. 66 In a similar fashion centuries later, Romans reacting
to the high price of tin significantly expanded production of the copper-zinc alloy, brass,
which produced a softer alloy than bronze and was used mostly for growing coin
production and mirrors. 67
The next significant development was the shift to sulfide ores. As shown in
Figure 1.1, an enriched layer of copper sulfide often existed below oxide layers of typical
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deposits. While the first copper sulfide use is as undateable as the origin of smelting,
Austrian and Irish archaeological sites from 1200 BCE and southwest Asian sites as early
as 2500 BCE demonstrate clear evidence of roasting, a necessary component of sulfide
ore processing. 68 Since many copper ore deposits have been worked for centuries,
however, it is unclear exactly when early miners reached sulfide layers. Nonetheless, the
advent of sulfide ore smelting does not seem to be treated with much reverence in
historical accounts of the early metal age despite its importance in significantly
increasing the availability of copper. Patterson, for one, simply suggests that the growth
of empires around 3000 BCE required a significant increase in the production of weapons
and tools and that bronze production expanded equally. This growth eventually
consumed known deposits of easily smelted oxide ores, exposing the more complex,
albeit richer, sulfide deposits below. 69
By the start of the Iron Age (1500-1000 BCE), the key components of copper
sulfide smelting and working had been established: mining-roasting-smelting and
alloying, casting, and working. But iron’s vast availability, ease of smelting, and key
strength properties saw it replace copper and bronze for many items, primarily hammered
weapons, tools, and hardware. Early ironmasters, however, could not reach iron’s
melting point and for most castings, especially sculpture, copper alloys still dominated.
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Trade and Empire
Trade and empire-building played key roles in the evolution and diffusion of
copper smelting technology from its inception through the Middle Ages. Extensive trade
networks developed in the ancient world, supplying regions poor in some products and
raw materials from richer regions in exchange for other goods and materials. Copper-rich
regions traded for tin and other alloying ingredients and exported copper, bronze, and
eventually brass throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. Like many other trade-goods,
copper ingots evolved into currency which, like precious metals, eventually developed
into coins. Trading cultures likely first used the Mediterranean Sea but later ventured up
the Danube River, exploring and prospecting for minerals to feed growing demand. The
Danube, according to Childe and Dayton, became a key throughway to Central Europe
after Ice Age glacial barriers retreated in the early Bronze Age, opening easy overland
routes to Europe from the Near East. Several writers, including Dayton and Childe,
argue that the Eastern metallurgists took copper smelting up the Danube and there
developed the first bronzes sometime after 3000 BCE. 70 While the origin of tin in the
first bronzes is debated, tin ores in Saxony and Bohemia proved significant during the
Bronze Age.
Coinciding with the growth of trade, increasing populations, and stronger metallic
weaponry, regions began to organize politically and dominate neighboring regions,
ultimately leading to the formation of kingdoms, then empires. With the growth of
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empires, the need for metals expanded dramatically. While the Egyptians, Trojans,
Phoenicians, and Greeks each increased the world’s demand for copper and bronze, the
extensive military, civilian, and political organization of the Roman Empire raised
demand for copper and other metals to a scale never before reached and not to be seen
again for nearly 800 years. The growth of the Roman Empire caused a substantial
expansion of the organization and production of metal extraction and working, including
a substantial increase in zinc, tin, copper, lead, iron, bronze, and brass use. 71 In addition
to Italian, Cypriot, and Middle Eastern mines, the Romans opened or expanded extensive
mineral deposits in Rio Tinto (Spain), Germany, Hungry, and Cornwall (United
Kingdom). The Romans used copper alloys for general construction, adornment, and art,
and to supplement iron and steel weapons and armor and, in significant amounts, in
coins. 72 One “tentative” estimate is that the total copper produced by the Romans
between 250 BCE and 350 CE represented close to 10% of all the copper produced from
the dawn of the copper age through 1900. 73

Early Environmental Degradation
With the great expansion of empire and metal works came environmental
consequences and landscape degradation, some of which were recognized at the time.
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The most obvious change related to deforestation. Mining and smelting activities
required considerable quantities of wood for roasting, furnace fuel, and mine-timbering.
One scholar estimated that given the amount of slag on Cyprus, metal production was
capable of completely deforesting the island 16 times over a 3500 year period. 74 Based
on Rio Tinto slags, another scholar estimated a total timber requirement of 100 million
tons for charcoal production alone over the course of ancient and Roman mining. 75
Another more recent study examined the toxic effluent of mining and smelting in
the Rio Tinto estuary over 5000 years. This study concluded that elevated levels of
copper and zinc already existed in water and sediments more than 2000 years before
large-scale 19th and 20th century open-pit mining. Oysters and clams, they found,
survived amid these toxic conditions, suggesting a direct link between mining
contaminants and human intake. 76 Similar studies have been conducted in Tuscany,
examining unusually high arsenic levels near mining and smelting sites (discussed
below), and in Jordan and Cyprus, tracking the bio-accumulation of 5000 years of copper
and lead production. 77
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The more serious and pressing environmental problem of metal production,
however, was not mining but the pervasive smoke emanating from smelting works. Early
copper and bronze works used open roasting and smelting processes that, prior to the 20th
century, lost up to 15 percent of its metal. 78 This copper tended to be vaporized and
dispersed into the atmosphere with little immediate effect on human heath, but long-term
soil contamination and bioaccumulation posed more significant lingering problems. 79
The effects of sulfur smoke from open roasting and smelting processes should have
created critical concerns for people living near metal works. While sulfur-specific
criticism does not enter the written record until the second millennium AD, early writers
did complain about the dangers of mining and smelting related-air pollution in general.
Nriagu, for instance, noted that Xenophon and Lucretius observed the noxious emissions
from metal mines in Greece, and that Pliny declared that smelter emissions were
dangerous to animals, especially dogs. 80 While these examples are not specific to copper,
all metal working, including precious metals, iron, lead, and copper contributed to a
Roman edict forbidding metal works in the city because of unhealthy emissions. These
conditions ultimately led to the oft quoted Roman law, “Aerem corrupere non licet” or
“polluting air is not allowed.” 81
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The Roman Empire provided the highest expression of metal working to date.
Copper, bronze, brass, lead, and eventually iron all reached peaks of efficiency and
production. Following the fall of Rome, however, the western world slipped into the
dark ages and smelting declined. The Rio Tinto mines, for example, had produced
copper, gold, silver, lead, and tin for nearly 3000 years before Spain fell to the Visigoths
in the 5th century CE. The Visigoths likely used central European mines for metals,
leaving the Rio Tinto sites abandoned and unworked. 82

Similarly, Italian and Cypriot

copper mines and works saw production declines and stoppages following the fall of the
empire. 83 Coins, an important use for non-ferrous metals, provide further evidence of a
significant drop in copper production because Roman coins continued in circulation for
hundreds of years following the empire’s decline before new European states began
minting their own. 84
Following the fall of the Roman Empire, Western copper production declined
significantly, but in the East, Chinese dynasties grew more powerful and increased
copper production through the first millennium, dominating world metal production.
China’s earliest copper works date to 2500-2000 BCE, possibly the result of trade routes
through Russia to southwest Asia. Like Saxony and Cornwall, China had tin deposits
quite close to copper deposits, and when smelting developed there, China jumped right
into a Bronze Age. Tylecote suggests that China’s great advances in metallurgy, such as
the first blast furnaces and water-powered bellows, supported the growth of its dynasties
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and empires and eventually spread to Europe. 85 Like Rome, demand for metals grew
with large-scale political organization, and China’s metallurgists responded with
significant advances. 86 China’s output levels during the Sung Dynasty in the 9thcentury
had been unequaled since the first century BCE. But the Mongol invasions of the 14th
century eroded the empire, discontinued coin usage, and with it, large-scale production of
metals. 87

The German Method
Despite the decline in Roman copper production and the abandonment of sites in
Spain, Tuscany, and Cyprus, many copper mining and smelting operations likely
continued to produce metal, albeit on a lesser scale, during the migration period. The
dominant European political groups in the mid and late first millennium were Germanic
and Slavic tribes from Central and Eastern Europe, and Moors from southwest Asia and
Africa. Not empire builders like the Romans were, these groups at first were more
transient and migratory. Even after their populations grew, stabilized, and became more
settled, they tended to control much smaller territorial areas than Rome.
From the fall of Rome until the resumption of large-scale metal production in the
late medieval period, little, according to Tylecote, is known about non-ferrous
metallurgy. 88 Although it is unclear exactly where migration-period cultures obtained
their metals, by the turn of the first millennium CE, Germany had clearly begun
85
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dominating Western mining and metallurgy. Whether or not the Bronze and Iron Age
Bohemian and Saxon mines continued to be worked immediately after the fall of Rome is
unclear, but by the 9th and 10th century significant non-ferrous ore bodies were worked in
the region.
These new mines soon altered the course of German metallurgy. Lodes in both
Saxony’s Harz Mountain and the Saxon/Bohemian Freiberg region were primarily silver,
but also contained significant copper, tin, and lead. 89 Much of the silver and copper
from these regions was converted into currency that, some suggest, contributed directly to
the financing of the Renaissance. 90 Demand for metals was so high beginning around
1000 CE, and the German lodes so rich, that miners and metallurgists overcame such
significant production obstacles as dewatering mines and separating the rich mix of
metals from their complex ores. Ultimately, these developments led to the emergence of
new metallurgical and mining techniques and the diffusion of German practices between
1000 and 1220 AD to new copper mines and smelters in Tuscany, Sweden, Hungary, and
several Saxon/Bohemian areas. 91
The German or Continental Method of copper smelting named to distinguish the
process from later Welsh Methods, likely evolved between 1000 and 1220 CE from a
concentration of mining and smelting activities in the mountains around Saxony linked to
significant copper and bronze production centers. Technologically, roasting, as discussed
in Chapter 1, remained an open-air process, and the smelters largely resembled the
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furnaces used by the Romans with few significant changes other than an increased stack
height and masonry construction. 92 (See Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6)

Figure 2.5 German multiple-bin ore roasting ca. 1550. (After Agricola 93 1950, 350)

While the physical components remained the same, just an order of scale larger,
key aspects of the overall process evolved dramatically. Newly formed kingdoms, some
perpetually short on cash, strove to maximize mining, especially of metals that could be
turned into coin. 94 Metallurgists developed more efficient processes to retrieve
recoverable amounts of precious or useful base metals (that could also be significant
wealth generators), to minimize copper lost to slag and waste materials, and to further
purify copper leading to better performing final alloys.
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Figure 2.6 German smelting ca. 1550s. Note similarities to the late Bronze Age furnace
in Figure 2.4. Except for stack height and the arrangement of the furnaces to better use
water power for air blasts, the process appears little changed. (After Agricola 1950, 389.)
One of the significant process changes standardized by 1400 CE was the waterpowered blast. This feature produced higher temperatures, greater output capacity, and
the potential for more continuous operation. The timing of the first water-powered blast
in the West is unclear. Rome may have used water power for mine pumping and ore
processing, and, although not formally documented, they may have used it to power
bellows as well. 95 These features, however, may have been lost in the Dark Ages, only to
be “re-discovered” or re-introduced later in the millennium. 96 (See Figure 2.7)
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Figure 2.7 Water-driven bellows ca. 1550s used to power smelting furnaces, similar to
those in Figure 2.6, located on opposite side of wall. (After Agricola 1950, 359)
Early German Technologies
The basic German smelting process was similar to the Roman, flowing from
roasting, to blast furnace smelting, to refining, but, unlike the ancient methods, it required
several more steps to recover precious metals and purify the copper. Following mining
and concentrating, iron-rich copper sulfide ore was calcined or roasted in heaps to drive
off some sulfur as sulfur dioxide smoke. Sulfur, which is flammable, would continue to
burn once ignited for up to 30 days according to Tylecote or 10 weeks according to
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Greenwood. 97 These now partially desulfurized ores, still containing some un-roasted
sulfides, would be reduced in a blast furnace over a 12-hour period to a matte, a partially
smelted intermediate metallic compound containing copper sulfides, iron sulfides, and
slag.
Next, smelters tapped the molten matte from the furnace, and, after it cooled, they
broke up the matte and resmelted it several times in combination with new ore, iron
pyrites (sulfide), and quartz flux to enrich the copper content and encourage the
formation of iron oxides that combined with the quartz to form slag. During these early
operations furnace operators also added lead or lead ores to alloy with silver. This leadsilver combination had a lower melting point than the copper and flowed out of the
furnace before any copper melted. The easily melted lead would then be similarly
separated from the silver, flowing out of a liquation furnace at a low temperature, leaving
behind relatively pure silver.
After numerous smelting operations, the resultant matte “cakes” were mostly CuS
(60-90% copper) and iron sulfide. The matte was then subjected to four additional
roastings, each one hotter than the last, to further drive off sulfur and oxidize copper and
iron. Halfway through the roasting process, the crushed pieces were remelted or “fused”
in another blast furnace, where most of the remaining iron was converted to oxide and
slagged. The copper matte was then roasted three more times to drive off the last
remaining sulfur, leaving behind a full copper oxide that was then sent to a blast furnace
for final smelting resulting in a 90-95% pure “black” copper. This copper, however, was
97

Ibid., 90; William Henry Greenwood, A Manual of Metallurgy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875),
50. Other sources claim that roasting could take months. The variation is likely due to differing heap sizes.

67

still not pure enough for most uses and required a final refining that usually included the
introduction of green wood poles into the reverberatory furnace’s molten copper pool to
induce any remaining oxygen to bind with the wood’s carbon and form carbon dioxide. 98
This very long and complicated process is diagramed in Figure 2.8. By the 19th century,
Swedish metallurgists had improved the German Method by reducing the several early
furnace meltings to a single fusion in a large blast furnace after the initial roasting and a
single final fusion after the intermediate roastings. 99

Spread and Diffusion
Like the Romans, German miners carried or transferred their mining and smelting
technology throughout Europe. Unlike the Romans, however, German miners operated
between independent, autonomous political entities with economies based primarily on
trade. Many of the medieval German smelters settled in mining regions of other states or
were recruited by states hoping to emulate German metal productivity. Other smelters
helped establish a basic industry abroad and then returned home. A second critical
method of transfer, not used by Rome, occurred through published manuscripts
describing mining and smelting techniques. Theophilus’ On Divers Arts (1100) and
Agricola’s De Re Metallica (1556) were both medieval German metallurgical texts, and
Vannoccio Biringuccio’s Pirotechnia (1540) was an Italian text describing similar
contemporary metallurgical procedures.
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Figure 2.8 German Copper Smelting Process ca. 1550 (Source: Author)
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Figure 2.8 Notes:
A. Fuel (Charcoal) is required at each roasting and smelting phase and quartz flux is
added to the blast furnaces to bind with the iron oxides and facilitate slag formation and
removal.
B. The initial roast only partially converts the iron pyrite and chalcopyrite (copper-iron
sulfide) found in the ore to oxides and releases sulfur dioxide. 100
[4FeS4 + 11O2→2Fe2O3 + 8SO2]
[4CuFeS2 + 7O2 → 2Fe2O3 + 4CuS + 4SO2]

C. Between blast furnace steps, the matte is cooled, broken up, and put in the next
furnace with fresh ores, new iron pyrites, and quartz flux to convert the fresh ore and
remaining unroasted chalcopyrite to CuS, convert the iron pyrite to iron sulfides and
slaggable iron oxide, and release sulfur dioxide [CuFeS2 + 5O2 + 2FeS4 → CuS + FeS + 2FeO +
4SO2]. Often copper-rich iron oxide slag is returned to one of the blast furnace steps.
D. Between roasting steps, the matte is broken and crushed and fed into the next roaster,
operating at a higher temperature, before being fused in the blast furnace. These steps
convert all the CuS from (B) and (C) to copper oxide, the remaining iron sulfide to iron
oxide, and the free sulfur to sulfur dioxide [CuS + FeS + 3O2 → CuO + FeO + 2SO2]. Here,
too, copper rich slag may be returned to an earlier blast furnace step.
E. The final blast furnace step completes the smelting process by reducing the copper
oxide to black copper and carbon dioxide [CuO + CO → Cu + CO2]. This copper required a
refining step to reach 99-99.9% purity.
Day and Tylecote cite three additional key Middle Age German texts, Nutzlich
Berbüchlin and Probierbüchlien, both anonymous revisions of earlier metallurgical
works, and Ercker’s Beschreibung Allerfürnemstem Mineralischen (1574), which in 1683
John Pettus translated into English as Fleta Minor, indicating Britain’s reliance on
continental techniques for post-medieval metallurgy.
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Despite the resources and information contained in published works, access was
limited not only to those with the ability to read, but, outside of Germany, to those
readers who could understand and interpret German or Latin. Therefore most
implementations of continental smelting methods tended to require the movement of
skilled workers. In addition to work at Massa Marittima in Tuscany and other historic
Roman copper districts throughout the Mediterranean, German workers ventured to other
areas that would eventually come to dominate world copper production, be recognized
for significant pollution, and in the 20th and 21st centuries become important heritage
sites. The first, Falun, Sweden, like the reopened mines in Tuscany, was a German
mining and smelting success and used and improved the continental method over several
centuries. The second, in the Lake District, United Kingdom, would, for many reasons,
ultimately fail to implement German methods. Welsh metallurgists would eventually
borrow an element of German technology, the reverberatory furnace, and use it to create
a completely new system that would rival, and then dominate world copper production
for a century. (See Chapter 3.)

Massa Marittima, Tuscany
Etruscans and Romans mined and smelted copper, lead, and silver ores in
Tuscany starting in the 8th century BCE and ending with the decline of Rome. German
miners and metallurgists restarted mining and smelting in the region in 1115 CE when the
region became part of the Holy Roman Empire. 102 Tylecote claimed the process used
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there at the time was a precursor to the method Agricola described two centuries later and
suggested it was the first documented procedure to include the intermediate matting step.
That is, after initial calcining, furnace workers smelted the ore in a shaft furnace several
times to create an impure matte, as described above, which was then refined in a
reverberatory furnace. 103 The region successfully implemented a system of manufacture
based on imported German methods though at least the 14th century. 104
Recent attempts have been made, like the studies of the Rio Tinto estuary
discussed above, to link high arsenic levels in the rivers flowing from Massa Marittima
and its associated smelting areas to medieval copper smelting, focusing on the disposal of
slag and the airborne disbursement of arsenic from historic roasting and initial smelting
processes. The findings, however, have ultimately proved inconclusive. 105

Falun, Sweden
Falun, one of the longest-lived mining districts in the last two thousand years, and
now a World Heritage Site, first began copper production in the 8th century CE and
continued into the late 20th century. The oldest surviving document, however, dates only
to the 1288 formal incorporation of a mining firm. While Massa Marittima was part of
the German-dominated Holy Roman Empire, Sweden was independent, but still attracted
and sustained German workers from the 13th century. As German copper output began to
wane in the 15th and 16th centuries, the 800 year old Swedish metal industry, including
103
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copper from Falun, came, for a short time, to dominate world output. By the mid 17th
century, Falun was producing 70% of the world’s copper, and its exports helped finance
Sweden’s involvement in the Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648). Falun ultimately housed
140 smelting furnaces and numerous ore roasting stalls using the system originally
installed by the Germans. 106
The high and lengthy production in Falun left considerable toxic residue on the
landscape. Ek and her group found high concentrations of mining- and smelting-related
copper, lead, and zinc in regional soils especially near mine sites suggesting airborne
disbursement. They also found high concentrations of copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, and
sulfur in lake sediments, likely from waste dumping or leaching. More dramatic,
however, the group estimated that the considerable emissions of sulfur dioxide from
roasting and smelting processes over 800 years peaked around 1630 and only
significantly declined with the advent of sulfur recovery and sulfuric acid production in
1850. 107
Ek’s study supports Brovallius’ claims in his 1743 treatise, Some findings and
comments on the smoke from the roasters in Falun, that the sulfur smell of the roasters
could be detected 80 km from the city and that the process completely devegetated the
area around the mine. 108 Similarly, the Swedish naturalist Carl von Linne wrote in 1734:
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“Never has any poet been able to describe Styx, Regnum Subterraneum and
Plutonis, nor any theologus hell as gruesome as we can see it here. For outside a
poisonous, acrid and sulfurous smoke rises and poisons the air far and wide so
that one cannot without pains go there. The smoke corrodes the earth, so that no
plants can grow around” 109
Similar descriptions, albeit on a lesser scale, could probably be applied to smaller and
shorter-lived copper smelting sites from the Roman period onwards.
Massa Marittima, Falun, and several Saxon mine sites all benefited from the
growth and standardization of German mining and smelting techniques partially due to
similar mining conditions and rich, accessible lodes. In fact, these were some of the
longest-lived and most productive copper sites in the pre-modern era. But not all efforts
to transplant the German system were successful. Most notably, the attempt to introduce
continental-style smelting techniques to Britain, a region with nearly as long a mining
and smelting tradition as Germany, failed.

UK-Lake District
The output of German mines in Saxony and Bohemia began to slow by the mid16th century partially due to the combined effects of wars, revolutions, and reformations.
But attempts to introduce the fuel-intensive German process into Britain in the 1560s,
during a period of dwindling British timber supplies and high wood demand from navy
ship-builders and ironmasters’ blast furnaces, proved challenging. This was because
conditions in England differed significantly from the continent, not simply because of a
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lack of fuel, but the rich British copper deposits the Germans tired to exploit proved too
deep to reach at the time.
The attempt to import continental techniques into England took several decades.
The first attempt to introduce a copper industry into Britain failed to lure German
smelters, forcing Henry VIII to continue to rely on continental sources for copper and
brass. Further attempts to initiate German mining also failed under both Edward VI and
Mary I. 110 But in 1561, responding to brass demands from woolen textile card-makers,
Elizabeth I finally succeeded. By 1564, Germans had established a mining, ore-dressing,
and a six-furnace continental smelting operation in Keswick in the Lake District. 111 Like
their European counterparts, smelters in Keswick roasted sulfide ores in the open air and
melted them in a water-powered blast furnace, then roasted the output six more times,
followed by eight more meltings, with lead added during one of the heats to extract
silver. 112 The chief difference was the use of coal- and peat-fuel early in the process to
conserve wood resources and reserve charcoal for only the final smeltings.
The introduction of the German method, however, was beset with difficulties
from the start. The imported German miners, for a variety of reasons, did not include a
refining phase in the production process. Whether charcoal shortages drove this decision
or the miners simply wanted to take black copper back to Germany for final processing to
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bolster a declining industry at home, the copper produced in Keswick was not suitable for
brass production and ultimately did not curb imports, mostly coming from Sweden. 113
The accessibility of ore also proved to be a problem. Much of the rich British
copper ores were located well below the water table, unlike the German lodes that tended
be found in mountainous regions where mines could be drained of water using gravity
and a series of tunnels. Without a means to dewater mines, the accessible Lake District
copper ore soon diminished. 114 Other areas with known deposits, like Cornwall, suffered
partially because of deep lodes and a lack of local fuels. Ultimately, high-fuel costs led
to high Lake District copper prices, and the unrefined, low quality of its black copper led
to limited demand and poor sales. 115
The Keswick copper mines and smelters operated, like the rest of the industry in
England, on a “small and erratic scale” until the 1640s. 116 A second smelting district
opened in Neath, southern Wales, to work some of the Cornish ores. Here, too, German
miners, traveling from Keswick, established a system based on continental methods. But,
here too they ultimately suffered from a lack of accessible ore and constant fuel
shortages, although, Tylecote speculates, the operation may have used an experimental
reverberatory furnace. 117 However the contributions made to the British industry are
measured, by 1610 all the German works had closed and the miners returned home. 118
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In any case, by 1640 two key problems—the lack of adequate fuel supplies and
water associated with deep ore lodes— had killed the British copper industry. These two
obstacles would be addressed with the successful adoption of coal fuel and the
implementation of the steam engine pump over the next century. While British
historians see these two components as “revolutionizing” the industry, it was also the full
implementation of another German technology, the reverberatory furnace, that allowed
coal to “revolutionize” British copper production. The combination of coal with
reverberatory furnaces led to a new smelting process that ultimately became know as the
“Welsh” system. 119
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CHAPTER 3. THE WELSH SYSTEM
Copper was won from its ore by smelting operations which seem rather indecisive
when compared to the way in which great pigs of iron were regularly born out of
the belly of the blast furnace. (Editor’s note accompanying Diderot’s 1766 plates
on copper smelting)
- Charles Gillispie, 1959
In A Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industries (1959), historian of
science Charles Gillispie suggested that 18th-century copper production was somehow
less decisive, assured, or even dramatic than iron production. 120 Given the complexity of
copper smelting and the countless process variations based on ore types and fuel and flux
choices, this appeared true especially when compared with much larger, productive, yet
simpler iron blast furnaces. Iron production required only three inputs into the top of a
furnace—iron ore, carboniferous fuel, and limestone flux—and one input into the lower
part of the furnace—forced air—to produce significant quantities of metal in just one
relatively short heat lasting only a matter of hours. Copper production, after evolving for
5000 years, still required no less than six, but often more than twelve, steps including
multiple and varied inputs, multiple roastings, and multiple heats that could last, in total,
up to a month or more.
Gillispie, enlisting Denis Diderot to further his point, quoted the 18th-century
encyclopedist, although more a philosopher than a technician, who decried the benighted
traditionalism of men of ores (implying copper smelters) for remaining “stubbornly
120
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attached to their old methods…because there are none whose methods are less
enlightened.” 121 While clearly a metaphor for social evolution during the Enlightenment,
Diderot either did not grasp or chose not to recognize the significant changes to copper
smelting developing in his own lifetime. It is true that the first application of coke to
blast furnaces (1709) merely half a century before the publication of Diderot’s
Encyclopédia significantly changed iron making, but the application of the reverberatory
furnace in Wales and the rapidly evolving Welsh smelting system in Diderot’s own time
had a similar effect on copper production. While the reverberatory furnace was not a new
development in the late 17th century, the Welsh system’s reliance on it was, and the new
methods ultimately led Wales to world production dominance in the 18th and 19th
centuries, especially as productive regions using the German system began declining.

The Reverberatory Furnace
The reverberatory furnace was not a new invention when incorporated into the
Welsh system. In fact, different industrial processes had used some variation of this
furnace for thousands of years. Its key features included a separate combustion chamber
that isolated fuel and its potential contaminants from the materials being melted in the
hearth and a heat distribution system that reflected heat off the furnace ceiling down onto
the hearth without mixing the combustion gases with the melt. In most cases, the furnace
relied on a natural draft created by a tall stack (flue) located opposite the combustion
chamber to draw air into the fire, distribute heat along the furnace ceiling, and vent the
121
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waste gasses. (See Figure 3.1) These
features kept the hearth materials free
from impurities found in the fuel and,
as such, permitted use of a much
greater diversity of fuels and, in most
cases, resulted in a much purer metal.
In addition, the flue-draft arrangement

Figure 3.1 Typical Reverberatory
Furnace Arrangement (Source: Author)

allowed smelters to locate furnace sites

virtually anywhere because they did not have to be tied to streams for water power to
drive blast-furnace bellows.
Coghlan suggested that early pottery kilns, the likely source of the first copper
smelters, evolved into reverberatory-style furnaces with separate combustion and hearthchambers and a flue chimney providing the draft. 122 By the Roman period, pottery kilns
had evolved into fairly sophisticated furnaces with reflective square-vaulted or circulardomed hearths, heated from below by a separate fire box directing heat (and smoke)
through a grated floor. A small opening in the top of the dome served as a smoke release
and flue. 123 (See Figure 3.2)
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Theophilus was the first known
western writer to describe a furnace
primarily using reverberated or reflected
heat. These furnaces, found in glass
production, dated to the 12th century and
operated similar to Roman pottery kilns with
separate fire boxes, but were longer and
Figure 3.2 Roman Era Pottery Kiln
(After Walters 1905, 444)

more rectilinear with only a slightly concave
ceiling. The heat of combustion, instead of

being directed through the hearth floor from below, traveled along the furnace ceiling
reflecting downward similar to later, true-reverberatory furnaces. 124 (See Figure 3.3)
While Theophilus did not specify the draft arrangement of the glass furnace, he described
a brass-making crucible furnace that, like a reverberatory furnace, drew air into the fire
through an induced draft from the furnace flue. 125
The earliest intentional application of reverberatory furnaces to metallurgy
remains a mystery. Since the technology existed and was widely known prior to the
Roman Empire, it is likely that early metallurgists knew of the glass-maker’s and potter’s
furnaces and their ability to reach high melting temperatures. While metal works would
have found two main features of the reverberatory furnace, a separate fuel box and a
natural flue-draft advantageous, the chief drawback to the potters furnace, its high fuel
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Hearth
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Figure 3.3 12th Century Glass Furnace.

(After Hawthorne and Smith in Theophilus 1963, 50)

consumption, may have rendered it too expensive to adapt, especially while the blast
furnace and abundant wood resources proved adequate. A further problem could have
been the complexity of the reduction and oxidation reactions which may have been too
difficult to control (if understood at all) in early reverberatory furnaces. They would still
plague the furnace in the late 17th-century British copper industry.
Given these limitations, metallurgists for millennia tended to focus on improving
known blast-furnace technology. But the advantages of the reverberatory furnace
eventually overcame the difficulties, and the first metallurgical application of the furnace
likely occurred when users required a less contaminated, purer metal or alloy than a blast
furnace could produce. British metallurgical historian R.F. Tylecote suggests that metal
83

workers at Massa Marittima (Italy) used a reverberatory furnace for copper refining
possibly as the early as the 12th century, and that the melting furnace depicted in the 14th
century York Minster Bell Founder’s Window (UK) is reverberatory. 126 Similarly,
Jenkins cites two German reverberatory furnaces used primarily for bronze melting and
smelting in gun-foundries as early as the 1480s, and a Leonardo da Vinci sketch of a
furnace with a separate fire-box dates from that same period. 127
In any case, by 1540 the reverberatory furnace had become a known and
advanced feature of some metal works as evident by the discussion in Biringuccio’s
Pirotechnia. Biringuccio notes the furnace’s use in roasting and smelting ores and in the
remelting and production of bronze. He also describes Leonardo da Vinci’s plan to use
reverberatory furnaces to cast a bronze colossus horse for the Duke of Milan. 128
Agricola, however, does not mention the reverberatory furnace directly in De re
Metallica (1556), but hints at it by including a drawing of a domed roasting furnace with
a separated fire box inside the hearth. 129 In another section, Agricola describes a Saxon
furnace, “not unlike a baking oven,” fueled through a hole in the back of the hearth used
to smelt lead. 130 Baking ovens of the period looked very similar to Roman pottery kilns
with domed roofs and offset fires, the technology was well suited and well timed for new
development with new fuels.
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The Welsh System
The Welsh system evolved in the United Kingdom over the 18th century based on
three developments: (1) the successful adoption of the coal-fired reverberatory furnace in
place of German-system blast furnaces, (2) a significant legal reversal, and (3) growing
demand for copper in specific markets. Historians have well documented the British
wood crisis of the 16th and 17th centuries and the significant boost coal-fuel provided to
industrial output and technological development in Britain. The adoption of the
reverberatory furnace was part of this transition. A key component of the 16th- and 17thcentury failure of German process blast-furnaces in the British copper industry was
inadequate fuel for the furnaces and insufficient capability to dewater deep mines.
Smelting English and Cornish copper with coal-fired reverberatory furnaces and the
eventual pumping of mine waters with Welsh-coal-fired steam engines solved both of
these bottlenecks in United Kingdom copper production. (See Figure 3.4)
Nearly as important, the British government reversed the 1568 monopolies it had
granted to the Society of the Mines Royal and the Society of the Mineral and Battery
Works to operate mining and smelting works, and manufacture brass. 131 Prior to
instilling a patent system in the 17th century, the crown used monopolies to protect
investments and encourage new development, ultimately intending to end the country’s
reliance, in this particular case, on imported copper. As discussed in Chapter 2,
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Figure 3.4 Location of British and Welsh Coal and Copper Deposits
(After Day and Tylecote 1991, 132)

however, attempts to create new copper production systems failed, and the monopolies
actually stifled new development instead of encouraging it. In 1689, Parliament passed
the Mines Royal Act, substantially limiting the rights and powers of the former
monopolies. This act, combined with improving reverberatory smelting techniques,
finally made copper production “commercially possible” for many small producers and
led to substantially increased output starting in the 1690s. 132
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In the early 17th century, Parliament shifted from assigning monopolies to
granting patents to encourage industrial development. Like monopolies, patents
protected early innovators, but unlike monopolies, the patent system permitted others to
develop alternative industrial processes for the same ultimate output. Even though many
of the alternative methods were efforts to sidestep royalty payments to patent holders,
new technologies and innovations followed.
The emergence of three new key markets for copper in the 18th century further
contributed to the evolution of the Welsh system. First, several copper smelters began
operations in the late 17th and early 18th centuries focused on producing a purer copper to
be used in the growing brass industry. While smelters were scattered throughout western
England, Wales, and Cornwall, the production of brass tended to be centered on Bristol
and the Bristol Brass Company, which dominated the regional industry for most of the
18th century. Royal Mint contracts formed a second key new market for copper but the
copper-alloy coins produced for the Mint did not require as high a grade of copper as
brass works. The dominant contractor was the Governor and Company Copper Miners in
England or, more commonly, the English Copper Company. This market, however, was
not as regionally fixed as the brass market and tended to have facilities closer to London.
The third market to develop in the late 18th century was the ship sheathing and cladding
industry centered in northern Wales. It used copper sheet to protect wooden-hulled ships
from rot and marine encrustations. Here, too, a very pure copper was not required, but
substantial rolling and nail-production processes were.
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Despite new market demands and a continuing fuel shortage, the reverberatory
furnace was not an immediate success. Yes, it could be fired with multiple fuels, giving
it a distinct advantage over blast furnaces, but for the first twenty years of its use in
copper smelting, it proved difficult to operate and did not eliminate the impurities in the
ore necessary for good brass. 133
Day and Tylecote date the first successful reverberatory copper smelter to the late
1680s in Bristol. There, lead smelter operator Lord Grandison invoked his patent rights
and forced Clement Clerke to stop smelting lead with coal in a reverberatory furnace.
Undeterred, Clerke simply developed a very similar copper smelting system and was
issued a patent in 1687 for “a new invention, being severall sorts of furnaces, vesels,
wayes and meanes that never before were knowne.” 134 Although Clerke’s Bristol copper
works failed to survive beyond 1697, it left behind two important legacies. John Coster,
the technician largely credited with successfully implementing Clerke’s copper
reverberatory furnaces, left the company shortly after 1687 and, by 1691, had opened the
Upper Redbrook works in southeastern Wales. The second legacy was the Lower
Redbrook works, opened by the English Copper Company in 1691 in nearly the same
location as Coster’s, with patent rights purchased from the Clerkes. 135 This feature of
locating competing works in direct proximity to each other became a hallmark of the
industry since companies could rely on a density of skilled labor and the knowledge base
of a stable technical community.
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Coster’s Upper Redbrook system relied mostly on reverberatory furnaces with the
exception of the final refining, which used a shaft furnace because his copper was
primarily destined for the Esher Brassworks outside London, which required a highly
pure metal still not attainable in a reverberatory furnace alone at the time. While
Tylecote considers the Upper Redbrook arrangement a transitional step between the
continental system and the Welsh system, he also suggests that the use of the blast
furnace could have been a means to either avoid paying patent royalties to the Clerkes or,
more likely, an indication that he was prevented from using the system patented by the
Clerkes. 136 The English Copper Company, on the other hand, purchased inventions from
and ultimately hired Gabriel Wayne, a former colleague of Coster, to manage its Lower
Redbrook works. Beginning in the 1690s, Wayne produced coinage copper for the Royal
Mint using multiple reverberatory roastings and smeltings similar to the Clerke patent.
Although the smelter was a key producer, ore-supply problems prompted Wayne to leave
a few years later for Bristol, where he opened a smelter in Conham just north of the city
in 1696. 137
In 1706, a fourth significant smelter operation opened at Crew’s Hole outside
Bristol to access cheap coal and feed growing copper demand. If Tylecote felt the Upper
Redbrook works was a transitional site, then he would have clearly believed that the
Crew’s Hole works demonstrated, by 1725, the first concrete elements of Welsh system.
Not only were its furnaces bigger than the three earlier works, but the smelting process
had evolved more completely. A Crew’s Hole smelter run began by roasting a selection
136
137

Ibid., 143.
Ibid., 141.

89

of high-sulfur ores in a large reverberatory furnace before mixing the ores with higher
grade unroasted ores, lime, silica, and slag from previous runs in a reverberatory melting
furnace. The resultant matte was broken up and furnace-roasted for up to 24 hours before
the temperature was increased to melt the roasted matte. The copper was then slagged,
allowed to cool, and broken up again while some of the rich slag was saved for the next
furnace heat. This process was repeated up to 20 times until the necessary grade of
copper was reached. This copper was then refined in a small reverberatory furnace
fueled in the first part of the heat with coal and then charcoal, before the copper was
poled to reach a high purity. 138
By 1754 the basic elements of the Welsh system had been developed, but as an
industry, it was still in its formative stage. Through the end of the century, new British
copper smelting districts opened, but these failed to fully mature because the cost of fuel
was too high (Cornwall), the cost of ore was too high or ran out (northern Wales), or both
(London). While Cornwall and London never posed much threat to the growing southern
Welsh smelting industry, the Anglesey region in northern Wales did. Controlled by
Thomas Williams, the new Parys Mine Company built or took over several smelting
operations in and around Liverpool in the 1780s, to add to its growing mining interests in
Anglesey. The company also acquired the Upper Banks works in Swansea in 1782.
With the growth of the ship-cladding market for tropical-going naval ships and, later,
merchant vessels, the Parys Mine group developed new smelting procedures for copper
destined for rolling mills, then patented processes for rolling copper sheet and
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manufacturing copper nails and bolts. 139 Just as mine production was beginning to
decline in Anglesey, Williams died, and in 1802 the company began, like many others, to
focus its attention on its Swansea works. Within 12 years it had closed most of its
northern Welsh mines and smelters, maintaining only works in the south. 140
One by one, the major British copper smelting works located outside of southern
Wales either closed altogether, or by 1800, had moved to or purchased additional works
in southern Wales. The English Copper Company bought a Swansea works in 1739, the
Pays Mining Company in 1782, and Bristol Brass in 1793. Appreciating the advantages
of southern Wales, more than 15 separate copper smelting works operated along the
Tawe River in or near Swansea between 1717 and 1928, and over 13 other major
industrial works opened including important steel and tin-plate works. 141 By 1845,
Swansea smelters were producing 55% of the world’s copper and, at its peak in 1860, the
industry operated 600 furnaces in the region. 142 The population of the area also boomed
growing from 900 in the 1540s to 10,117 in 1801 to 152,619 in 1911. 143

Swansea
The River Tawe and its port city Swansea offered significant advantages to
industries relying on shipping-based imports and exports. The river itself provided deep
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water access a significant distance up-stream, allowing works to be built farther up from
the port city. With the growth of industry, the region offered smelter owners and
mangers access to industrial labor and technical expertise. Most important for copper
works, Swansea’s regional coal fields were closer to Cornish and Devon copper deposits
than any other coal region. However, the key to the success of southern Wales lay not
simply in geographical advantages, but in the development of a system of smelting based
on the nuances of local fuels, the importation of new ore from sources from around the
globe, and the creation of new markets for copper.
The growth of capitalism and steam-power were particularly important to
Swansea. Steam-power made the manufacture of smaller market-goods much cheaper.
Inexpensive silver-plated, stamped-copperware, for example, became much more
accessible as a silverware substitute, and stamped copperware pans and other utensils
became affordable to the working classes. The spread of the steam-engine and steamlocomotives and steamships increased the demand for copper boiler plates, copper piping,
and brass cylinders. Cheap copper and the even cheaper Muntz metal (36-45% Zinc)
made copper sheathing for building roofs and ship’s hulls available on a much greater
scale, and the spread of the international slave trade required substantial inputs of copper
trinkets and trade goods—all driving the need for increased copper smelting and
encouraging attempts to improve the industry. 144
The advantages to copper smelters in the Swansea district were manifold,
especially as world demand for copper grew and continental copper production fell. The
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first successful reverberatory smelter to operate in the area ran from 1694 to 1717 in
nearby Neath, home to a short-lived 16th century German smelter works. After the latter
works closed, two of the partners opened a smelter in Landore in 1726, about one mile up
the Tawe from Swansea-proper. The new owners, including John Morris, successfully
operated the site over twenty years, firmly establishing both the smelting district and the
wealth of the Morris Family, who would become one of the dominant Swansea family
firms. 145 In 1734, the Costers opened a Neath smelter to process matte produced at their
Hayle (Cornwall) works. This site was purchased by the English Copper Company in
1739, at the same time the Coster family began constructing the White Rock works in
Swansea.
District growth and continental decline through the 18th century continued, and by
1810, the United Kingdom produced four times the combined copper output of the former
major producers: Germany, Sweden, and Norway. 146 By the mid-19th century, Swansea
and the River Tawe Valley were a congested mass of smelter firms and workers housing
with a substantial pollution problem. (See Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1)
Many of the Welsh smelter works, including those in the Tawe River valley were
ultimately managed by a succession of family firms and partnerships, often for many
generations. The Costers and Clerkes, mentioned above, were two of the earliest. John
Williams of the Parys Mine Company, his son, or a descendant company dominated by
the Pasco Grenfell family owned the Upper and Middle Bank works, Landore II, the Rose
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Figure 3.5 Swansea and the
River Tawe Valley 1840.

Table 3.1 Growth of Copper Smelter
Industry in Swansea (1717-1928)

(After Hughes 2000, 15)

Smelter
Company
Landore I

Start
Date
1717

End
Date
1748

Cambrian Works

1720

1745

White Rock

1737

1928

Forest

1746

1850s

Middle Bank

1755

1924

Upper Bank

1757

1928

Rose

1780

1878

Birmingham

1793

1833

Landore II

1793

1876

Hafod

1810

1924

Nant-rhyd-yVilias
Morfa

1814

1817

1835

1924

Landore III

1853

1855

Little Landore

1863

1896

Llansamlet

1866

1905

From: Swansea, A Short History of the
Hafod Works, page 6-7 inserts.
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works, and the important Mofra works. 147 Similarly, the Morris family or its descendant
companies owned, at one time, Landore I and II, the Forest works, and important copper
battery works. 148
The most visible and probably dominant family in Swansea, however, was made
up of the decadents of smelterman John Vivian. The Hafod Works, founded by Vivian
and his sons in 1810, was owned and controlled by the family-firm for its entire
existence, and the family also purchased the White Rock Works across the river and
opened additional works in Neath. The Vivian’s works became, by the mid-19th century,
the largest smelting operation in the world, challenged in size only by the adjacent Morfa
works. As the largest firm, Hafod became most studied and documented works in the
district and also the primary focus of pollution lawsuits.

Welsh System Smelting
By the mid 19th century, the Hafod works epitomized the Welsh system. Its
smelting furnaces were all reverberatory, but it also used blast furnaces for some
operations, including refining of copper-rich reverberatory furnace slag—an idea
borrowed from the Michigan copper district. Hafod also minimized its use of outside
fluxing agents by employing a variety of ore mixes imported from throughout the world.
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Many metallurgical writers documented the Welsh system as practiced at the
Hafod works in the 1840s and 1850s. The system used two primary types of
reverberatory furnaces. (See Figure 3.6) The larger calcining furnace was used at
temperatures below the ore’s melting point for initial roasting to release sulfur, and the
smaller melting furnace operated at much higher temperatures. The Vivian’s ultimately
used four different furnace types based on the two main designs in their process. 149

Figure 3.6 Typical Welsh calcining and melting reverberatory furnaces.
(After Greenwood 1875, 26, 31, 31)

Another important key in the Welsh system was the complex mix of ores charged
into the furnace to minimize extra materials needed to create slag and maximize the
149
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removal of waste material from the copper. After ores arrived in Swansea, smelters
assayed the rock to determine its copper, iron, sulfur, and silica or quartz content. In
1852, James Napier listed 62 different ores from Cornwall and Devon ranging in content
from 3.6% to 19.1% copper and 37 different ores from Ireland, Wales, Cuba, Chile, New
Zealand, and Australia ranging from 8.2% to 58% copper. 150 Ten years later, Snowden
Piggot described a more formalized classification system used at Hafod to rate ores based
on copper content. 151 (See Table 3.2)
Table 3.2 Ore Classification System used in Swansea in the 1850s.
Ore Class

Description

I

Copper
Content
3-16 %

II

15-25%

Richer copper pyrites

III

12-20% 152

Copper pyrites with little additional iron pyrite

IV

20-30%

Copper oxides and carbonates

V

~80%

Rich Chilean and Australian oxides, silica gangue

Copper pyrites, high silica gangue

The basic Welsh process consisted of six primary steps. (See Figure 3.7 at the
end of this discussion.) In the first step (1), smelters mixed the ores based on assayed
composition. In the 1850s these included yellow ore, iron pyrites, and hematite from
150
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Cornwall; copper and iron pyrites from Devonshire; both high- and low-grade Cuban
pyrites; Irish copper oxides (by-product of acid-making); and red oxide and blue and
green carbonates from Burra-Burra, Australia. This mix was roasted in an oxygen-rich
environment in a large calcining furnace for up to 24 hours mainly to remove a
considerable portion of, but not all, the sulfur, which combined with oxygen to form
sulfur dioxide. The ores were then quenched with water and pushed through holes in the
furnace hearth into bins below. 153
In the next step (2), smelters fused the mix in an “ore furnace.” In general,
smelter operators wanted only 7-9% copper content going into the first furnace to ensure
a high slag volume that would remove much of the iron from the melt and ensure the slag
was largely copper free. 154 Smelters took the calcined ore from step (1) and added fresh
Class III ores and slag recovered from step (4). This mix was melted in the closed “ore
furnace” to keep oxidation down, resulting in a matte output, referred to as “coarse
metal,” nominally 35% copper. The slag from this step was discarded, and the metal was
tapped into a vat of water to granulize it in preparation for step (3). 155
The third step (3) was a second 24-hour calcination process to further remove
sulfur. The fourth step (4) was the first metallic fusion in the “coarse-metal furnace.”
This complex step started with calcined granulated coarse metal and added Class IV
carbonate and Class V oxide ores, as well as rich slags from the roaster (5), fine metal,
153
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and refinery (6) furnaces. The slag produced in this step, which contained some copper,
was returned to the first fusion furnace in step (2), and the metal was drawn off into pigs
of “white-metal” that were 75% copper. 156
The Welsh called the fifth step (5) “roasting,” despite the two calcining (or
roasting) steps already accomplished and the melt that occurred later in this step. Here
the white-metal pigs were placed in a melting furnace with the doors open and allowed to
melt slowly over an eight hour period, fostering oxidation and final sulfur expulsion.
Any slag produced was saved and returned to step (4). After slagging, the metal was
allowed to cool in the furnace to a pasty mass that emitted, according to Percy, a
“frizzling sound” as gases escaped. The furnace temperature was then increased and the
copper, now 95% pure, was melted, slagged, and tapped into pig molds. As it cooled, the
copper continued to off-gas, this time leaving a pock-marked surface from bursting gas
bubbles in the solidifying metal, giving rise to the term “blister copper.” 157
The final step in the basic Welsh process was, as in the Continental system,
refining in a reverberatory furnace. Here the blister copper pigs were melted and held for
15 hours in an oxygen rich environment to encourage any last impurities to oxidize. Slag
was skimmed and sent to step (4). After 15 hours, the molten surface of the copper was
covered with coal or charcoal and poled with a birch or oak log. These carbon sources
combined with any lingering oxygen to form CO2 and purified the metal to 99%. 158
Overall, the process took several days to complete from the first roast to pure metal.
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The primary diversion from this process occurred if the initial mix of ores
entering the calciner or coarse-metal furnace resulted in a copper too rich in iron, usually
16% iron to 57% copper. In this case, the metal had a bluish surface giving rise to its
name, blue metal. Blue metal pigs from the coarse metal furnace were fused a second
time, pulling the additional iron from the copper with the slag. The slag was collected
and returned to the coarse metal furnace (4), and the copper tapped into pigs was
sufficiently iron-free white-metal, ready for the roaster. 159
The 1850s represented the height of the Welsh system, but also saw a significant
shift in world development. Part of the success of the Swansea smelters came from the
inability of remote mining districts to adapt and perfect complex Welsh copper smelting
and refining technologies, thus ensuring a steady ore-import market for southern Wales,
even after local sources began to wane. However, just as Cornish ore deposits began to
diminish, the first transoceanic electric communication cable kicked off a remarkable
increase in demand for copper world wide. This demand would be met largely by new
deposits found in the United States.
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Mixture of copper
and iron pyrites, 1st
and 2nd Class ores,
7-9% copper
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carbonic acid, solid
matter and dusts.”
(Piggot 1858, 297)

1. Calcined (roasted)
in large calcining
furnace
3rd Class
Ore
Rich
Slag

2. Ore Melting
Furnace (first
fusion)

Poor
Slag and
Sulfur
Dioxide
waste

“Coarse Metal”
35% Cu
3. Calcined in
calcining furnace

Rich
Carbonate
and Oxide
ores, 4th and
5th class ores

4. “Coarse Metal
Melting
Furnace”
(second fusion)

Rich Slag
Blue Metal
(if high iron
content)

White Metal
75% copper
5. “Roast.” Metal
roasted, degassed,
and melted in a
fusion furnace

Copper Flow
Waste Flow

Blister
Copper
Carbon
Dioxide

Fine Metal
Melting
Furnace

6. Refined,
polled
Pure
Copper

Figure 3.7 Welsh Copper Smelting Process ca. 1850, all reverberatory
furnaces. (Source: Author)
101

Effects of Copper Smelting in Swansea
“Delightful Hafod, most serene abode! Thou sweet retreat, fit mansion for a god!
Dame Nature, lavish of her gifts we see, And Paradise again restored in thee.” 160
-anonymous poet, 1737
“Landore. A spot rich in the renown of its metal and chemical works, but to the
casual visitor, ugly with all the ugliness of grime, and dust, and mud, and smoke,
and indescribable tastes and odours.” 161
-S.C. Ganwell, 1880
The Welsh were not the first to suffer smelter pollution, but the concentration of
works in South Wales created critical environmental, legal, and technical problems far
greater than any smelter location had previously witnessed. (See Figure 3.8) Although
commentators from Roman times through the 18th century noted unpleasant odors, dead
vegetation, and health problems in areas around smelter works, it was not until chronic
problems associated with the high output of the Welsh system that communities were
forced to address environmental issues of copper smelting. Even Charles Darwin
remarked that while visiting Chilean copper mines, “no smoke, furnaces, or great steamengines, disturb the solitude of the surrounding mountains [as at Swansea].” 162
Smoke was the greatest environmental concern for smelter communities and
nearby farmers. In addition to the chemical composition of the gasses in the smoke
described by Piggot (See Figure 3.7), the dusts and solid matters contained toxins and
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Figure 3.8 Swansea ca. 1860
(After Swansea 2007, 12)

heavy metals, such as copper, lead, silver, antimony, and arsenic, that disbursed with the
smoke and settled over wide areas. While the gaseous chemicals formed sulfurous,
sulfuric, arsenious, carbonic, and hydrofluoric acids after reacting with moisture in the
air, the solids tended to settle on the soil killing plants and being ingested by livestock. 163
Nineteenth-century health complaints by residents living near smelters included,
“a dry sensation in the throat, a bitter, metallic taste in the mouth, loss of appetite,
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shortness of breath, tightness across the chest, smarting eyes, and frayed tempers.” 164 In
1822 Doctors coined the term “metal fume disease” to describe influenza-like symptoms
found in smelter workers. 165 More recent studies have confirmed the risk of acute
respiratory diseases and suggested that increased mortality from non-malignant
respiratory problems existed in populations working in or living near a primary copper
smelter. 166
Reaction to excess smoke, however, was mixed. Some 17th-and 18th-century
British communities initially resorted simply to zoning smelters outside of town or into
an area where prevailing winds would direct the smoke away from population
concentrations. Some companies, under the threat of litigation, sought technological
solutions or simply bought affected land. 167 Individuals, however, often resorted to the
courts and sued the offending sites for nuisance violations. The primary nuisance in
these cases were the “noxious vapors” that caused either injury to property visible in
denuded forests, wilted vegetation, failed crops, and sick or dying livestock, or immediate
or long-term injury to human health. 168
The first noxious vapors case was agued in 1608 between neighbors after one
opened a pig sty on his property leading to the landmark ruling that stated one should
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“use your own (property) so as not to harm another.” 169 Although this case set a
precedent that would stand for 200 years, actual judgments against smelters would
generally prove more difficult. The corporation of Liverpool, however, did win one of
the earliest successful smelter nuisance cases in 1770. It forced the Macclesfield Copper
Company to relocate its smelter outside of town. 170
Only five of twenty recorded cases, however, resulted in judgments against a
smelter company in Britain, mostly in the form of damage awards, although one case
resulted in an injunction against further smelting in that location. 171 One of the more
notable failures was a case brought by a consortium of farmers against Vivian and Son’s
Hafod works in 1834. The farmers claimed that smoke from the smelters destroyed
crops, caused health problems, and sickened and killed their livestock by causing
“Effryddod” or Welsh crippling disease. The farmers ultimately lost the case because
they failed to prove that the Hafod smoke was the primary cause of their problems and
not, as the defendants’ attorneys argued, poor farming. 172 A second suit by the same
group a year later resulted in a partial judgment against Pasco Grenfell of the Middle
Bank smelter works. The judgment acknowledged some damage from smoke, but,
because the plaintiffs could not prove exactly what was damaged specifically by
Grenfell’s smoke, the judge only awarded the farmers a single shilling. 173
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Confusion about the actual health problems associated with copper smoke tended
to complicate lawsuits against smelter firms. In 1842 a royal commission report claimed
that smelter smoke inhalation posed no adverse health affects, and an 1845 commission
reported that smelter smoke had kept Swansea free from the cholera epidemics in the
early 1830s. Morag-Levine suggests that there may be some truth in this latter claim as
the sulfur- and arsenic-laced smoke may have served as a chemical fumigant and
disinfectant. 174 A questionable 1928 British medical report perpetuated confusion,
claiming that smelter smoke was “disinfectant and salutary, although ignorant people
have a prejudice against [it].” 175 Further, a bath in the sulfurous “yellow-scum covered”
quenching water from the first fusion (step 2) of the Welsh smelting process was said to
cure mange in dogs. 176
The smoke also provided a haunting beauty for some. Percy wrote in 1861, “A
dense cloud of white smoke perpetually hangs over the copper-works of Swansea and the
vicinity, and occasionally beautiful effects are produced in the landscape when the rays of
the sun fall upon it, especially towards evening.” 177 Dr. Thomas Williams of Swansea in
an 1854 study titled Report on the Copper-Smoke, its Influence on the Public Health, and
the Industrial Diseases of Copper-men wrote that smelter stacks “emit gracefullygyrating, white, smoky, and fleecy columns, which circlingly and wideningly ascend to
the upper regions of the atmosphere, there to be lost in the purity of invisible air…” 178
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Despite a growing recognition of the potential health threats of smelter smoke,
however, the economic benefits of smelters to local communities and workers and the
general financial gains associated with the copper industry in southern Wales overshadowed environmental and health problems. In 1914, Pyrites, possibly a local
company newspaper, wrote “…its sulphurous canopy has transformed verdant hillsides
into desert wastes…But the mischief done has been more than compensated by the
immense trade “opening” which the copper trade gave to Swansea…But for it the towns
on the Tawe would have remained just a popular little bathing creek with a little
additional identity owing to its porcelain manufacture…” 179 Even more compelling are
selected verses from The Song of the Copper Smoke, published in 1871 (cited by Newell)
that presaged later legal rulings regarding smelter smoke lawsuits in the United States :
I touched the tall tress with my vapoury hand,
And their leaves drop off, like courtiers bland…
You may search the vale and mountain high,
There is not a flower to gladden the eye.
The widow’s lone bosom I thrill with joy,
As I fill the hands of her orphan boy,
The miner I help in the sunless cave,
By me rich merchants their fortunes save,
Barristers, bankers, and even clod-hoppers
Would feel very small if they hadn’t “some coppers.” 180
Thus, not surprisingly, lawsuits brought by individuals or organized groups of
farmers often failed to cross the “public nuisance” threshold applied by juries and courts
more sympathetic to smelting companies and the economic growth of their
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communities. 181 Despite the lack of court-orders to desist or pay damages, many people,
smelter operators included, knew about and acknowledged the health-hazards posed by
copper smoke. Percy quotes John Henry Vivian, of Hafod Works, who stated in the
1820s that the suppression of smelter smoke would be advantageous to the town and
neighborhood. 182 Later, Percy not only acknowledged that all the Swansea smelter
owners lived outside of town beyond the reaches of the smelter smoke, but that
apologists, such as Thomas Williams (quoted above), who did not accept the smoke as an
“unmistakable nuisance [or who] pretend that it is not, must either have a peculiar
constitution or lie under some strange delusion.” 183
Knowing smelter smoke danger and facing few government restrictions, smelters
ultimately handled the nuisance issue in one of three primary ways before going to court.
They either did nothing, settled out of court if a case seemed strong enough, or, under a
more serious threat of lawsuit or, more often, if the prospect of a financial return on byproducts existed, applied or attempted a technological solution. 184
The first attempt at by-product recovery from smelter smoke came in the late 18th
century from a partnership between John Champion and the Macclesfield Copper
Company, the same company that lost the first nuisance judgment against a smelter. John
Champion, a descendant of the 1690s Neath smelting works manager, developed a
system at a northern Welsh mine site to recover sulfur from initial calcining operations by
roasting ore in long kilns, collecting and condensing the smoke, and returning the
181
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“cleaned” ore to the mine for sale. While the market for sulfur had yet to fully develop
by the 18th century, the process improved the ore quality, lessened the destruction of local
vegetation near smelters, and remained a notable component of the Anglesey works in the
late 18th century. 185 Despite this nascent attempt, however, successful and profitable
sulfur recovery was still a century away.
The first technological approach with sulfur-recovery-potential processing came
from Gossage towers that were successfully condensing and recovering hydrogen
chloride from alkali works smoke in the mid 19th century using a cool water spray. The
challenge of adapting this water-spray method to copper smelters, however, was the
difficulty of combining sulfur dioxides with water. 186 John Henry Vivian proposed an
adaptation of this process in response to an 1821 prize for “obviating the inconvenience
arising from the smoke produced by smelting copper ores.” 187 This system used a series
of long flues and chambers with water showers to encourage the condensation of sulfur,
arsenic, and copper. While this system was only moderately successful and not awarded
the prize, the long flue concept, generally combined with a single tall stack, garnered
favor. In this arrangement, some, but not all of the by-product toxins precipitated from
the smoke before reaching the top of the stack, affording a partial recovery of by-product
chemicals. As stack heights increased, precipitate increased, but the taller stacks also
185
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dispersed smoke and particulates over a wider area. Despite a decline in the use of tall
stacks in the 1830s because of fears of lawsuits from a wider population distribution, they
would eventually become a landscape feature synonymous with copper smelters.
Of the available technologies, new furnace designs offered the most promising
systems for solving the problem of smelter smoke. Under the right conditions, smelters
knew that sulfur dioxides could be oxidized to sulfur trioxides, which combine much
easier with water to produce acid in the furnace. The presence of carbon from coal
smoke, however, prevented the right reactions from occurring, requiring new furnace
designs to separate the coal smoke from the copper gases. But, because the separation in
a reverberatory furnace was difficult and expensive, most smelter operators never
attempted to install separators, and those that did ultimately abandoned them because of
limited success. 188 In the 1880s some Swansea smelters attempted using an electrical
current passed through the flue to encourage precipitation. 189 While this technology
proved more successful, it was in many ways too late for the British copper industry,
which had begun a sharp decline in the 1880s as major new copper works opened in the
United States.

Slag
Unlike smelter smoke, smelter slag in Swansea was not considered a health
hazard. Instead it was regarded as a visual nuisance, a production disposal challenge, or,
at best, a minor by-product. Swansea smelters produced copious amounts of “clean
188
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slag,” the copper-free waste of the melting furnaces. After all, smelters preferred only
9% copper content in the initial stages leaving over ninety percent of what they processed
as waste. Waste slag was not entirely a disposal problem, however, and had some
beneficial function. Crushed, it was used for road beds and for new furnace and building
foundations. By the 1860s, molten slag was cast into tiles, slabs, and bricks and used in
smelter-building and worker-housing construction, retaining walls, and culvert linings. 190
Despite some functional uses, slag remained a significant disposal problem as
growing “hills of refuse” moved further and further from the works and, when combined
with the effects of smoke, created a visually powerful landscape setting. 191 The often
quoted Daniel Webb wrote in 1812, “about a mile or two towards Swansea the
appearance is frightful, the smoke of the copper furnaces having entirely destroyed the
herbage; and the vast banks of scoriae surrounding the works, together with the volumes
of smoke arising from the numerous fires, gives the country a volcanic appearance.” 192

As previously described, both the German and Welsh systems for smelting
sulfides required extensive procedures and multiple steps, indicating a much greater
complexity than is often suggested by simple descriptions and diagrams of the system.
Often these processes required several alternate roastings and meltings lasting weeks with
a variety of ores added at critical times to remove specific waste products or recover
valuable by-products before any actual smelting took place to produce matte, black, or
190
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blister copper. Despite this complexity, global demand for the red metal continued to
grow as new industrial uses were introduced and the industry spread beyond its
traditional locales despite early German and later British attempts to control the market.
Because of the use of the coal, which was significantly cheaper and more plentiful than
charcoal, the Welsh process tended to be the most successfully exported technology to
newly developing copper smelting areas around the globe. Although German blast
furnaces were simpler to build and operate, they tended to be relegated to slag remelting
until technological developments significantly increased their productivity. By the start
of large-scale American copper production, coinciding with growing industrial demands,
the Welsh system reverberatory furnace had come to dominate copper smelting, and most
new smelting ventures implemented some version of it.
In many ways the Welsh system developed in Swansea was a transitional
industrial one. Lying at the end of 5000 years of traditional production and traditional
markets, it turned copper into a global commodity before giving way to modern demand
and ever increasing technological sophistication. Its technological systems were new, but
its markets, at least initially, were not. On the world stage, it only lasted a short time and
only a few key features persisted. Soon the complex ore mixes and multiple furnace
types were gone, especially as new techniques were developed to handle very low-grade
porphyry ores first in the United States, then around the world. But the elements that
persisted included the reverberatory furnace, the tall smoke stack, and environmental
degradation.
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Pollution problems associated with southern Welsh smelting highlighted the
potential dangers to human health and property. The idea of environmental degradation
became codified in contemporary literature describing the Welsh system, and in many
ways, was transferred with Welsh technology and practices to developing copper regions
around the world. Initially, as in Wales, the economic benefits of copper smelters often
overshadowed their environmental problems. In the United States, for instance, most
early large-scale copper mining and smelting occurred in the remote, sparsely populated,
and largely “under-regulated” West. Attempts to limit pollution did not occur until
lawsuits forced the issue, and then the primary solution was for smelter-operating
companies to simply purchase the affected land. It would take the 1970 Clean Air Act to
formally set legal standards for smelter air emissions. That act occurred too late,
however, to prevent much of the damage. Growing recognition that smoke, slag, and
other chemical releases caused long-term environmental problems forced the United
States to “rethink” environmental response and, under the aegis of the federal Superfund
program, attempt to clean or at least mitigate the damage caused by smelting among other
industrial activities.
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CHAPTER 4. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
The continued success of the south Wales smelters stemmed from their ability to
tap the increasing supply of ore from a widespread group of overseas
producers…Indeed, the smelters played a key demand-side role in the growth of
copper mining industries in Latin America, Australia, southern Africa, North
America, and elsewhere. However, it was the development of smelting and
refining in these…regions which led to a relative decline in British copper
production from the 1860s, and an absolute decline from the late 1890s.
- Edmund Newell, 1990 (Copperopolis, 75)
While the principals of the various smelting and leaching processes are for the
most part of European origin, and have long been known, modern practice is
essentially American and was evolved on this side of the Atlantic.
-Frederick Laist, 1947 (Seventy-five Years of Progress, 126)
There was never a truly American system of copper smelting. After the decline of
British copper production and the very short dominance of Chile, the United States
became the world’s largest copper producer (and consumer) and maintained that lead for
nearly a century. Two primary factors drove this ascendancy: the discovery of significant
American copper deposits and the adoption and modification of existing European
technologies to fit the new deposits. The “Americanization” of the smelting industry was
further propelled by the persistent need to overcome high labor costs with automation and
by the general growth of large-scale corporations with available capital to foster
technological improvements and create significant economies of scale. The scale of
operations became increasingly important as rich copper deposits declined and very large
deposits of exceptionally lean ores remained or were discovered. These lean ore bodies
often contained as little as 0.5% copper and required ever greater technological
improvements to eliminate up to 99.5% waste and further reduce labor and processing
costs to make the extraction and production of such lean copper ores economically viable.
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In fact, complex copper smelting would only succeed when enough capital existed to
invest heavily in technologies and adapt those processes to the local geology. Both of
these conditions coalesced in the late 19th century as very large American copper deposits
opened, demand significantly increased, and, to disseminate information and encourage
innovation, a technical community developed from expanding mining colleges, mining
journals, and industry-wide conferences. While technological improvements often led to
ever increased production, few engineers at the time considered the lasting environmental
effects of such successful metallurgical applications on such lean ores. The elimination
of such a high proportion of gangue, or waste rock, on such a massive scale posed not
simply a short-term disposal problem for mining companies, but a significant long-term
pollution problem for the United States.
This chapter will examine these broad historical and technological trends in
American smelting leading to the successful development of mining districts in
Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana, and the evolutionary technological and economic
changes in smelting required to maintain profitability as ore bodies diminished. It will
then look more closely at the three individual regions chronologically and the specific
smelting technologies used to exploit their particular copper deposits and then introduce
the environmental histories and consequences of their respective smelting technologies.

Smelting USA
By the late 19th century, the Welsh system in Britain had evolved into a somewhat
inflexible process as the availability of regional copper diminished. As we have seen, at
the zenith of copper production in Swansea, smelters relied on a variety of ore-inputs to
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maximize the productivity of existing equipment and technologies, but the Welsh
industry ultimately failed to adapt new technology to new ore-types as global supplies
changed. Several British authors have argued that this inflexibility was at the core of the
decline in British copper smelting. Tylecote suggested that Swansea profit margins were
so high for the “monopolistic” smelters who set the price for imported ores from
underdeveloped nations, that they had no incentive to change their system until it was too
late and their own workers had been recruited by those very underdeveloped nations to
create a rival smelting industry. 193 Newell argues that new technologies, specifically in
America, significantly reduced the fuel-to-ore ratio, reversing the economies Swansea
reaped from its nearby coal fields. 194 Smelting at or near the source of ore became the
dominant regional organization in the industry.
As available ores and the borrowing potential of future growth dried up in
Swansea, so did capital to reinvest into new equipment and processes. By the middle of
the 19th century, copper mines in Cornwall and Devon had reached the ends of their
productivity, and the international regions providing Swansea’s other ores, namely Chile
and Australia, had adapted matte-smelting and late-refining technologies in an effort to
retain a greater portion of the capital earned from copper production. 195 While the
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Swansea industry continued refining some foreign copper matte through the 1960s and
became a primary British zinc producer, 196 ores in general stayed much closer to mines.
Further complicating Swansea’s dwindling supplies, early and mid-19th century smelting
technologies and business models crossed the Atlantic to the United States where East
Coast smelters created a local industry and began competing directly with Britain for
South American, Central America, and Cuban ores.
In many ways, American dominance in copper smelting began with the opening
of Montana copper mines and smelters in the 1880s. The earlier Michigan mines
produced relatively pure copper and, although its smelters based their methods on
Cornish and Welsh models, 197 they did not advance the practice mainly because they
didn’t have to. In fact, Michigan smelters would ultimately adopt new technologies, such
as electrolytic refining, only after they had been successfully implemented elsewhere and
the economics of local smelting justified it. Tennessee, which also began mining in the
1840s, imported smelting technology based primarily on German rather than Welsh
models, but like Michigan did so without significantly contributing to new methods until
the turn of the century when radical changes to smelting practice had begun elsewhere
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and local environmental and political conditions warranted it. It was not until the 1880s
when Montana smelters imported labor-intensive Welsh and German practices and found
them costly and impractical for their labor pool and ore-type, that smelter practice
significantly changed in the United States. Further, the scale of production with
traditional-sized furnaces proved too small for the demands of a rapidly expanding
electrical industry and, as richer ores gave way to leaner ones, improved efficiencies had
to be reached in order to produce copper economically and meet consumption needs.

Beginnings
Although the Americanization of copper smelting began in the 1880s, attempts to
create and sustain an American copper industry began as early as 1648. Gary W. Van
Lingen, in his 2002 master’s thesis, compiled a near-complete list of documented copper
smelters operating in the United States from the mid 17th to the mid 19th century. Most of
these smelters were located in or near mining regions in Vermont, Connecticut, New
Jersey, and Maryland, smelted mostly under contract, and were short-lived or relatively
marginal producers due to a lack of sustained ore, difficult transportation, or limited
capital. 198 More successful and heavily capitalized copper smelting emerged first at two
Revere Copper Company works in the Boston area, then at the Baltimore and Cuba and
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Baltimore Copper companies in Maryland, and then in some capacity in Belleville, New
Jersey, in the mid 19th century. 199
The pivotal event in the early success of the Boston, Baltimore, and Belleville
smelters was the ill-timed formation of the Swansea Smelter Association in 1840 to pool
ore purchases to force prices down and control the sale of copper on the open market. 200
This action, accompanied by a new British tariff on imported ores and American
transportation improvements to anthracite coal fields, effectively created an opening in
the global market for American smelters who emulated Welsh business models and
imported ores from South American, Central American, and Cuban mines to process and
sell to a growing U.S. market. Although these were three of the largest non-ferrous
smelters operating in the United States in 1860s, between 1866 and 1872 they were all
forced out of the smelting business as mine owners in the rapidly expanding Michigan
copper district used their political clout, with support from Tennessee mine owners, to
obtain tariff protection from the imported ores on which the Maryland and Massachusetts
smelters depended. 201
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The American Century
These early East Coast copper mining and smelting efforts in the U.S., based on
emulating European business and technological models, were superseded when
significant ore discoveries were made in Michigan and Tennessee in the 1840s, Montana
in the 1870s, and Arizona and Utah in the 1890s. From 1883 until the 1980s, the United
States led all other nations in copper production and consumption as the rapid
development of electricity and electrical applications around the globe coincided with
increased capacity in American copper production. In many ways copper smelting in the
late 19th and 20th centuries, though dominated by American companies, was an
international technology borrowing successful devices and techniques from earlier copper
and other metallurgical applications and adapting them to new conditions and new
deposits. If the original German and Welsh processes were focused on perfecting a
single technological system that could accept varied ore types, the new methods were
much more focused on adapting technology to fit the ore. The American system was
defined by a much greater technological flexibility, especially as the quality and quantity
of the ore changed.
Driving the “Americanization” of smelting technology was the need to both
overcome critical skilled labor shortages and profitably process the vast fields of low
grade ores once the relatively small, high grade deposits had been exhausted. Lasky’s
Law stated that each 0.1% decrease in (copper) ore grade yielded an 18% increase in
reserve size. 202 After the 1880s, the most significant new ore bodies consisted of very
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large deposits of very low grade porphyries, often less than one percent copper. Even the
rich Montana ores, which in the early 1880s averaged from 25-60% copper, dwindled to
less than 8% by 1910, and the pure Michigan multi-ton copper masses gave way to 2-5%
conglomerate and amygdaloid lodes. As the richness of mined ore dropped,
technological improvements sustained production until the ore bodies became too lean to
mine and process profitably.
The demand-side of this evolution included a relatively new technology:
electricity transmitted through copper wires to generate power, illuminate, and
communicate. American demand for electricity and copper exploded in the late 19th
century, driving the need to find and exploit greater and greater copper deposits.
American demand grew so fast in the 19th century that much of the output of the
expanding U.S. mines and smelters remained in the country, effectively creating a second
global market able to set prices separate from the London Metal Exchange, which had
been the prime market for copper traded across the world for centuries. (See Figure 4.1)
Figure 4.1. United
States Copper
Production and
Consumption 18801933. With the
exception of short
periods in 1880, 1921,
and 1933, the U.S.
maintained a
substantial trade
surplus in copper on the
global market. (After,
Gates 1950, 201.)

122

American Smelting Technology
Technology was the key to both increased demand (electricity) and dramatically
increased supply. Most early attempts to adapt European smelting technology in the
United States were decidedly German, focusing on the blast, shaft, or cupola furnace. 203
(See Figure 4.2) The blast furnace held several advantages over the reverberatory. Not
only did the blast furnace consume less fuel, it was simpler to operate and construct,
required fewer laborers, could be run nearly continuously, and operated very similar to
furnaces in the substantially larger American iron industry. The blast furnace could
handle large chunks of ore, too big for efficient reverberatory smelting, and often
required fewer steps to produce copper than the reverberatory. Further, its requirement
for cleaner burning fuels than coal because of the direct contact between ore and fuel, a
problem for the British copper industry, was easily met by the United States charcoal
industry until the adaptation and diffusion of coke. 204 In addition, cupola-styled blast
furnaces were largely portable, could be ordered directly out of a catalog, and were
considerably less expensive to operate than reverberatory furnaces.
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Figure 4.2 Three blast furnace types used in the United States to process copper.
Including (from the left) a typical bottom-dropping cupola furnace, an oval Herrshoff
furnace that became the prime pyritic smelter in Tennessee after 1900, and an
advertisement for a rectangular blast furnace that became the standard blast furnace
style used in Michigan and Montana until the 1920s. (After Peters (1908) 267, 265, and
advertisement page X.)

The two primary disadvantages to the blast furnace were that it needed to be
charged with larger pieces of high-grade ore, and until the late 19th century, it was
relatively limited in size which limited its output. As the richness of American ores
diminished in mining districts, ore concentration required finer crushing and flotation to
recover metals. At this point, blast furnaces became less effective because the dust-sized
pieces of ore slipped down though the fuel charge, clogging the hearth, or blew out the
stack with the blast. Additionally, wet flotation-concentrated ores reduced the efficiency
of blast furnace heat, but had less effect in a reverberatory where the fire was separate
from the ores and the hearth was much larger. Briquetting, a process of binding fine ore
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materials into sizes adequate for blast furnaces, often required an additional plant, thus
obviating the economic advantage of blast furnace smelting.
Copper blast furnaces were also limited in size. Through the end of the 19th
century, the furnaces could not be constructed with a bosh (the furnace hearth where air is
added to the heat) wider than 36” and still maintain adequate air pressure and
temperatures required for efficient smelting. Air blasted into the bosh from tuyeres
needed to penetrate the mass of materials collecting in the furnace hearth. Too little air
and the center of the hearth received less heat, altering the fusion process and at times
allowing a set mass to clog up the furnace. Too much air and the temperature nearest the
tuyeres would be too high to effect an efficient fusion resulting in greater copper losses in
the slag. This deficiency created bottlenecks in production as greater throughput became
necessary to maintain economies of scale.
Despite the disadvantages of the 19th-century blast furnace, most initial attempts
to smelt copper in the United States focused on cost and simplicity and used that furnace
type. Of the thirty-two sites Van Lingen identified, he found evidence that, at a
minimum, fifteen used or attempted to adopt Continental process blast furnaces. Four
used Welsh system reverberatory furnaces, one likely used a crucible furnace, and twelve
used unidentified processes. 205 Van Lingen argued that, in addition to the simpler and
less expensive operations of a blast furnace in the early 19th century, experienced German
smelter workers were more desirable than British for patriotic reasons, and that they
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were, until the mid-19th century, easier to recruit as the German and Swedish copper
industries peaked and declined a century earlier than the British industry. 206 Whatever
the choice of smelting method, with the exception of works in New Jersey, Baltimore,
and Boston, copper smelters through mid-century usually did not survive more than a few
years or make much of an impact on U.S. copper supplies.
While the blast furnace may have been the initial choice of most small-scale
copper smelters through the mid-19th century, the explosion of American copper demand
and production in the following decades compounded the need for technological
adaptation and advancement using both the Welsh and Continental styles of smelting. To
combat the problem of blast furnace throughput, very large and heavily capitalized turnof-the-century American smelters introduced rectangular furnaces with 8’-87’ long
opposing banks of tuyeres, never reaching distances greater than 57” apart, to get
significantly increased capacity while maintaining proper air flow. (See Figure 4.2)
Further, relatively cheap and abundant coke from the vast American coal fields replaced
charcoal fuel in the blast furnace in the late 19th century, and large, enclosed, roasting
furnaces capable of burning off sulfur rapidly reduced the ore roasting step from weeks
and months to just a few hours.
In Welsh style smelting, a Detroit reverberatory furnace smelting Michigan
copper in the 1870s operated at a capacity of 10 tons per day, and an early 1880s
reverberatory furnace in Butte produced 15-18 tons of copper per day. By 1901,
however, the daily output of a single enlarged and improved reverberatory furnace in
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Montana had reached 100 tons per day, and by 1904, 250 tons per day. Early 20th
century improvements further increased single-furnace production in Arizona to 600 tons
per day. By the 1930s, Arizona reverberatory output had increased to 1600 tons per day
per furnace, and by 1949 Canadian furnaces had reached 2000 tons per day. To remain
economically viable, each furnace expansion required increased automation and handling
controls, but generated considerable fuel economy with no relative increase in labor
cost. 207 (See Figure 4.3)
Figure 4.3 The
evolution of the
reverberatory
furnace, 1800-1924.
Advances made after
1878 occurred in
American mining
districts. (After

Hofman 1924, 178)
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Michigan Smelting with Simplified Welsh Technologies
Historians have argued that processing pure Michigan copper into a molten state
should be considered more of a melting process than a smelting process. However, the
act of melting pure copper with its attached waste rock in the presence of air tended to
change the chemical affinity of the copper for other elements, resulting in a copper-oxide
rich compound that required, like all traditionally smelted ores, additional processing to
return it to a pure state. Ironically, Michigan copper initially became more contaminated
because of the smelting process. Smelting the pure native copper of Michigan’s Copper
Country, located on the Keweenaw Peninsula, however, would still be a fairly simple
process. (See Figure 4.4) After early attempts to adapt Continental style blast and cupola
furnaces with poor results, regional smelters successfully modified Welsh reverberatory
furnaces to first melt large pieces of mass copper, then adapted the systems to handle
much smaller copper particles as the large mass-copper deposits declined. Later, as the
copper content of the later ores diminished further, Michigan smelters began
incorporating technological advances developed in the Western United States for lowgrade ores.
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Figure 4.4 Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula Copper Country (Source: Author)
Mining companies first attempted smelting in Michigan very shortly after the opening of
the district in 1844. The region’s remoteness and navigational barriers at Sault Ste. Marie
created a critical need to establish some sort of localized smelting capability. Not only
was shipping on the upper Great Lakes limited to the ice-free months from April to
December, but the impassable falls at the Sault required all upcoming goods to be
offloaded from a lower-lakes vessel, transported above the falls, and loaded onto one of
the few upper-lakes vessels, with the process reversed for copper and south bound
travelers. The resultant cost of shipping copper ore from the Keweenaw to Boston
smelters in the late 1840s ran between $18 and $20 per ton. The cost to ship one ton of
ore from Chile to Boston, however, was only $15, and just $6 to ship the same ton from
129

Cuba to Baltimore. 208 To reduce some of the expense, mines usually built mills to
concentrate the rock and remove as much waste material as possible. While in some
cases they were able to achieve fairly high rates of concentration, in general the mines
still sent considerable gangue south. Despite the high cost of transporting copper rock
and waste from the Upper Peninsula, only four documented attempts to smelt ore and
fully eliminate excess shipping costs occurred locally before 1860, and each failed
largely because their associated mines failed to produce enough copper or generate
enough capital to justify further investment. 209 Of those four smelters, however, little
was recorded beyond rudimentary descriptions of their attempts because neither the
smelters nor the mines associated with them developed beyond a season or two. 210
Meanwhile, the more successful mines sought a smelting outlet for their copper
externally. Initially, they shipped large copper masses to the Baltimore and Cuba
Company and Boston’s Point Shirley Works. To handle the unique multi-ton masses
produced by the early Michigan mines, the Baltimore smelter installed a side door on one
of its reverberatory furnaces to load large pieces but damaged the lining so much while
dragging the copper that the resultant repair costs forced them to withdraw after several
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trials. 211 The Point Shirley works discovered it needed to cut the large mass pieces, an
expensive and time consuming task, before charging them into its blast furnace. The
extra labor generated a smelting fee of an astonishing $80 per ton. 212 Just a few years
later, Detroit smelters would charge less than $19 per ton. 213
Prompted by the failure of early Keweenaw smelters and the expense of East
Coast smelting, two individuals affiliated with Michigan copper mining successfully
developed refining methods a little closer to the Keweenaw using reverberatory furnaces.
The first was C.G. Hussey, a Pittsburgh doctor and partner in the Pittsburgh and Boston’s
Cliff, the first profitable copper mine in Michigan. Hussey, first successfully smelted a
charge in a reverberatory-like “canon furnace” at the Fort Pitt Foundry in 1848, by taking
down the side, loading the furnace, and rebuilding the wall. The smelting worked, but
was expensive and left a considerable amount of copper inside. Hussey’s second
experiment, to suspended a copper mass inside a shaft furnace by chain, failed when the
chain broke because of the heat and dropped the mass to the furnace bottom, destroying
it. 214 Later in 1848, after hearing reports of a German silver reverberatory smelter with a
removable roof, Hussey hired Welsh smelters to build two reverberatory furnaces with
removable roofs in Pittsburgh to lower mass pieces in for melting. (See Figure 4.5)
Egleston reported in 1881 that the results of the first casts from the new (1848) furnace
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were “in every respect as good as those now made” thirty years later. 215 Curiously, the
second part of the Hussey system, a cupola furnace, resulted from a clandestine operation

Figure 4.5 Michigan Removable-Top Furnace (After Eggleston (1881) Plate II)
in 1851. One night, according to Egleston, a Pittsburgh native absconded with a boat
load of slag from one of Hussey’s waste piles. After taking it back to an experimental
furnace he’d built, the “thief” discovered a significant quantity of oxidized copper
remaining in the slag and made an offer to purchase all the waste-material. Although the
person ultimately won a short-term contract to treat the slag in a cupola, Hussey, now
aware of the process and its simplicity, erected his own cupola at his site that same year
and thereafter treated his slags in-house.
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Hussey’s successful furnace arrangement, including a cupola furnace to treat
reverberatory slag, was ultimately copied in Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, and even
Baltimore. 216 Not only did the model of a reverberatory furnace for primary smelting and
a cupola for slag remelting become the prominent form of processing all Michigan ores
for 75 years, but the cupola practice was adopted in Swansea almost a decade after it was
implemented in the United States. 217 Although the Cliff Mine and Hussey’s other
Michigan investments eventually closed, the smelter company he created in Pittsburgh
expanded into copper and other metal fabricating and still operated in 2009. 218
The second and ultimately more successful smelter operation began in Detroit in
1850. While Hussey succeeded in creating a vertical operation investing in mines, mills,
smelters, and eventually rolling and fabrication mills, the Detroit and Waterbury works,
under the direction of John Grout, became the leading contract smelter, processing most
of the copper from Michigan mines not owned by Hussey’s Pittsburgh and Boston
Company. Detroit sat in an ideal location on the primary transportation route from the
east coast to the Keweenaw in “a position by which all travel and business to and from
the mines must of necessity pass.” 219 In fact all the copper rock shipped out of the
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Keweenaw until 1850 sailed right past Detroit en route to smelters in Baltimore, Boston,
or Pittsburgh.
Like Hussey, John Grout’s first copper smelting experiments began in 1848 with
a failed attempt to work a cupola furnace. While the details of this test and the next two
years of Grout’s work are unknown, existing accounts of cupola smelting demonstrated
the particular difficulty of working large copper rock pieces in such a furnace while
reverberatory smelting was proving successful. Grout eventually opened the Detroit
works in 1850 with financial backing from Waterbury, Connecticut, home to several
large brass works having trouble securing a consistent supply of high quality copper
The new Detroit smelting works looked remarkably similar to the Hussey works
in Pittsburgh and began smelting Lake Superior copper in the fall of 1850. 220 Both ran
removable-roof reverberatory furnaces for the primary melt and cupola furnaces for
refining copper-rich slag, and both groups hired experienced Welsh smelter workers to
run their works. 221 In the early years, the Detroit smelter operated only seasonally and
on a contract basis for many of the smaller mines. One month prior to the opening of
navigation, workers would start repair and preparation work on the furnaces so that by
the time the first vessel of the season arrived, the works would be prepared. 222 Initially,
the Detroit works operated a single reverberatory furnace and one cupola, but doubled in
size by 1853. 223
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The three new smelting works on or near the lower Great Lakes in the early
1850s, including a Cleveland site operated by Hussey’s brother, proved pivotal to
handling the growth of the copper industry that decade. Michigan copper production
increased dramatically from 1850 to 1860 rising almost 1000%, then nearly doubling
every decade until the turn of the century. (See Table 4.1) However, with the two
Hussey sites dedicated to only a couple of mines and the new Park McCurdy smelter in
Pittsburgh, and the Baltimore and Boston works securing only modest amounts of
Michigan ores, the Detroit works held a virtual
Table 4.1
Michigan Copper Production
(After Gates (1951) Table 6, 197198)

Year
1850
1855
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1946

Production
(tons smelted)
641
2,904
6,035
12,311
24,869
50,705
72,731
110,882
80,672
84,691
45,198
21,663

% of
US
88
86
75
87
82
39
24
20
13
12
5
3.6

monopoly on Lake Superior copper smelting.
During that time, it earned a reputation for
innovation. Egleston reported: “Almost all the
experiments and improvements which have been
made in copper refining in the United States since
the method was first started in Pittsburg, have been
made there.” 224 By 1861, the Detroit works had
expanded to a capacity of nearly 3000 tons
annually, capable of smelting roughly half of all
Michigan copper and nearly 40% of all U.S.
production. 225
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Through much of the 1850s copper mining in Michigan centered on the
Keweenaw County mass copper mines with primary shipping out of Eagle River.
However by 1860, copper mining had begun shifting on the peninsula. Reflecting
Laskey’s Law, as productivity in the mines producing the large mass copper pieces began
slowing down, mining efforts significantly increased on the much larger amygdaloid and
conglomerate lodes, with copper contents of only 2% to 5%, found in the areas
surrounding Portage Lake in Houghton County, 30 miles south of Eagle River. The
companies working the new lodes would ultimately become some of the wealthiest
mining corporations of the 19th century. Reflecting the opening of new lodes and
transportation routes through the Sault, Michigan production doubled from 1855 to 1860,
then doubled again from 1860 to 1870. 226 (See Table 4.1)
The success of the Hussey system implemented in Detroit changed the economics
of smelting, especially when coupled with improved transportation and a significant
increase in copper production from mines that would ultimately become very stable
producers. There was now enough production from the new mines to warrant the capital
expense of establishing a local smelter and, with a proven smelting system and much less
expensive transportation to import fuel thanks to the opening of the Sault canal and
navigation improvements on the Keweenaw, the Portage Lake Smelter at Hancock
opened in 1860 with four reverberatory furnaces and two cupolas. 227

From 1860 until

1867, the Portage Lake Smelter competed with the Waterbury and Detroit for all copper
smelting outside of the mines associated with Hussey despite two very short-lived
226
227

Ibid., 197.
Cooper, "Historical Sketch of Smelting and Refining Lake Copper,” 46.

136

attempts to establish other regional smelting works at Lac La Belle and Ontonagon,
Michigan.
In 1867, a significant consolidation occurred in the industry. The Lac La Belle,
Ontonagon, Park-McCurdy, Baltimore and Cuba, and Cleveland works had all closed
while Hussey’s Pittsburgh works slowed as the output of its associated mines declined.
At the same time, the two other working smelters, the Portage Lake and the Waterbury
and Detroit, merged forming the Detroit and Lake Superior Copper Company (D&LS)
which held a virtual monopoly on Michigan copper smelting for the next twenty years.
(See Table 4.2) Despite early economics that favored Detroit because of cheaper labor,
fuel, and transportation costs, the Hancock works expanded as its costs decreased. 228 By
1875, the Hancock smelter operated eight reverberatory furnaces with three cupolas and
processed nearly 80% of the company’s work, while the Detroit works operated only four
reverberatory furnaces and two cupolas and processed the remaining. 229

Early Michigan Smelting Technology
All of the successful smelters processing Michigan copper from 1850 to the 1920s
followed a system similar to Hussey’s original plan. (See Table 4.2) Mass mines
shipped large pieces of copper as single pieces (requiring a removable roof smelter) and
smaller copper pieces, called barrel work, packed in barrels for shipping to smelters. The
growing mines nearer Portage Lake shipped smaller, non-mass copper from
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Table 4.2
Michigan Native-Copper Smelters 1844-1971
Unsuccessful, Small, or Short-lived Michigan-Copper Smelters*
Start Year Company
Location
Closed
Notes
Pittsburgh
and
Boston
Copper
Harbor,
MI
1844
Unconfirmed
1844
Baltimore and Cuba
Locust Point,
1866
Primary ore
1845
1845

Revere and Sons

1846

Albion Copper
Company
Suffolk Mine
Ohio and Isle Royal
Mine
Baltimore Copper

1847
1848
1850
1858
1863
1865
1880

Park, McCurdy, and Co.
Ontonagon
Lac La Belle
Lake Superior Native
Copper Works/
Houghton Rolling Mills

Baltimore, MD
Point Shirley,
Boston, MA
Gratiot River, MI

1847

imported
Primary ore
imported
Unsuccessful

Eagle River, MI
Isle Royal, MI

1848
1850

Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful

Canton,
Baltimore, MD
Pittsburgh, PA
Ontonagon, MI
Lac La Belle, MI
Houghton, MI

1892

Primary ore
imported
Short-lived
Short-lived
Unsuccessful
Small, Short-lived

1872

1862
1867
1865
1890s

Successful, long-run, Michigan Native-Copper Smelters**
Start Year Company
Location
Closed
Notes
Pittsburgh
and
Boston
Pittsburgh,
PA
1890s
C. G. Hussey
1848
Pittsburgh and Boston
Cleveland, OH
1867
J. G. Hussey
1850
Waterbury and Detroit
Detroit, MI
1887
Became D &SL in
1850
1860

Portage Lake Smelter

1886

1898

Calumet & Hecla
Smelter
Dollar Bay Smelting
Wks
Calumet & Hecla
Buffalo Smelter
Quincy Smelter

1903

Michigan Smelter

1889
1891

Hancock, MI
Hubbell, MI

1908
1969

Dollar Bay, MI

1919

Buffalo, NY

1914

Ripley, MI

1971

Houghton, MI

1954

*

1867
Became D &SL in
1867
Initial D&LS
partner
D&LS partner in
1891
Calumet and Hecla
Quincy Mining
Company
Copper Range
Mining Company

See Chaput (1971), Conant (1911), Cooper (1901), Egleston (1881), Hyde (1996), Jackson (1849),
Martin (1986), and Wilson (2008).
**
Each of these successful smelters initially emulated the Hussey reverberatory-cupola system. See
Brignola (2006), Chaput (1971), Conant (1911), Cooper (1901), Egleston (1881), Hyde (1996),
Trepal (2006), and Wilson (2008). The White Pine copper smelter operated from 1955 to 1997, but
processed sulfide ores and resembled more traditional smelting systems outside of Michigan.
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conglomerate and amygdaloid lodes which as fine, milled, or mechanically crushed ore,
70-75% copper. 230 The significant impurities in Michigan copper at the time included
iron from milling equipment such as stamp shoes, and geologic inclusions of nickel,
silver, cobalt, zinc, and lead and eventually arsenic that existed in veins that cross cut
later copper lodes. 231
Mines usually installed milling, or concentrating, equipment almost immediately
after they started mining in an attempt to reduce the waste material they would need to
transport to smelters. Michigan milling consisted primarily of Cornish stamp mills and
rollers that crushed and ground the hard rock and some sort of intensive water-washing to
separate the heavier metal pieces from the lighter gangue, resulting in wastes called
stamp sands in Michigan and tailings in other parts of the county. In general for the
Michigan mines, whose most productive copper ores averaged around 2% copper, the
mechanical concentration process improved the ore’s richness in some cases up to
75%. 232 Stamp mills were generally located on waterways for two important reasons.
First, they required a significant quantity of water to wash, separate, and transport
crushed rock through the mill and second, the waterways provided a convenient sink to
dump the considerable amount of stamp sands generated after recovering only 25% of the
materials contained in them, of which only 2% was copper.
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Following milling, the concentrated rock traveled to one of the contract smelters
through the 1880s and 1890s, but in the 20th century it was likely to go to a captive
smelter of one of the mining companies. Initially smelters fired reverberatory furnaces
with wood, but by the 1880s, like the Welsh, they used bituminous coal shipped in on
vessels that would ship out finished copper. However, unlike the traditional Welsh
process that included multiple reductions and fusions, and refining, the Michigan process
only required a single fusion in the melt stage and a single reduction during the refining
stage. Most of the conglomerate and amygdaloid smelters were side charged with ore
and rich slag between 12 and 30% copper, limestone flux, and black copper (oxide)
obtained from the cupola furnace. Slag, mostly removed during the fusion stage,
included the limestone, ore gangue, portions of the firebrick lining, impurities that could
include nickel, silver, cobalt, zinc, lead , iron, and up to 30% copper oxide.
After slagging, smelters rabbled the molten bath with 20 foot long iron paddles.
Rabbling, essentially the splashing of molten copper inside the hearth with the furnace
doors open, encouraged air flow, oxygen absorption, and the oxidation of any remaining
impurities that could then be skimmed off the surface as new slag. Unfortunately, molten
copper also had an affinity for oxygen, and any time the bath was exposed to air, such as
during slagging and rabbling, copper oxides tended to form too. Smelters often coated
the copper’s surface with charcoal, a pure carbon, to encourage the breakdown of copper
oxides by the formation of carbon dioxide.
The final stage, also the reduction stage, involved treating the copper bath with a
10 inch diameter, 15-20 foot green, hardwood pole in the same furnace. The rapid
140

combustion of the pole with the furnace doors closed pulled the remaining oxygen out of
the copper oxide, leaving behind a pure metal and vented carbon dioxide. Smelters then
cast the copper into either ingots for remelting or brass/alloy production, large cakes for
rolling into sheets, or rectangular bars for wire and rod manufacture. The rich slag
removed from the reverberatory furnace was charged into a cupola, which by the 1880s
was fired with coke, and smelted. Workers tapped the cupola slag and discarded it,
while the copper that converted to a black oxide in the furnace, was tapped, cooled, and
recharged into a later reverberatory heat. 233 (See Figure 4.6)

Captive Smelting
Although the general technological system for smelting Michigan coppers would
remain largely unchanged through the 20th century, except for expanded-capacity
furnaces, advanced coal use, and the addition of electrolytic refining, the system of
smelting under contract for mining companies or purchasing ores outright began to
change in 1886. Out west, Montana mining firms were erecting their own smelters very
near mine sites, and the iron and steel, railroad, and oil industries began vertically
integrating by purchasing all the components of production. While some contract
smelting would continue on the Keweenaw after the turn of the century, the general trend
was for mining companies to establish their own smelting works and control the entire
process from mining and milling to smelting and refining.
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Figure 4.6 Native Copper Smelting Practice on the Keweenaw Peninsula ca.
1910 (source: Author)
The Calumet and Hecla (C&H), which began mining as two separate companies
on the richest lode in the region in 1865, established the first captive smelter in the area at
Hubbell on Torch Lake in 1886. (See Figure 4.4) Constructed initially as a joint venture
with the Detroit and Lake Superior smelter, the capacity of the new works ultimately
forced the closure of the D&LS Detroit works in 1887. By 1892, C&H had bought out
the remaining D&LS joint-venture shares, taking full operational and business control of
the Hubbell smelter. With five years smelting experience, C&H opened a second works
in Buffalo, New York, to take advantage of lower regional fuel costs and greater
electrical capacity. 234
The Tamarack and Osceola Copper company established the second captive
smelter in Dollar Bay, Michigan, in 1889. This small smelter merged with the Detroit
234
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and Lake Superior in 1891, forming the Lake Superior Smelting Company (LSSC),
controlled by the Tamarack, Osceola Consolidated, Isle Royal, and Ahmeek mining
companies. LSSC operated its Hancock and Dollar Bay smelters full time through 1903,
when the Copper Range Consolidated Copper Company opened the Michigan smelter.
By 1908, LSSC had closed its Hancock works, which it had used only provisionally since
1903. Ultimately C&H took control of the Osceola Consolidated and Ahmeek mines and
became the majority owner in the Lake Superior Smelting Company in 1907. The
mining company used the Dollar Bay works to smelt the copper of its subsidiary mining
interests through 1919 and to experiment with new techniques emerging from the
West. 235
The Quincy Mining Company (QMC), formed in 1846, prospered from 1856
when it discovered the Pewabic lode on its property. It paid dividends to stock-holders in
1862-1864 and then every year from 1867-1920. 236 By 1910, it had expanded control
over the Pewabic lode by purchasing the adjoining Pewabic, Franklin, Mesnard, Pontiac,
and Arcadian mines. 237 The 1891 Pewabic mine purchase included a stamp mill on the
shore of Portage Lake and its associated stamp sand dump that stretched several hundred
yards into the lake. The Franklin Mine, which Quincy purchased in 1908, operated an
adjacent mill and Portage Lake-tailings dump. 238
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Until 1898, Quincy contracted with the Waterbury and Detroit or one of its
subsequent incarnations for all of its mineral reduction. In 1898, after years of
discussion, the firm constructed a smelter on land formed by the waste tailings of the
Pewabic mill and the recently burned Franklin mill. 239 Initially, the site included three
reverberatory furnaces, a cupola building, and ancillary structures, but shortly thereafter
Quincy added a fourth reverberatory furnace. By 1904, a fifth reverberatory furnace with
a greater capacity operated on low grade ores in a building attached to the primary
reverberatory house. The smelter works was so successful that between 1887 and 1901,
Quincy’s per-ton smelting charge dropped from $15.30 to $10.06, resulting in a $50,000
savings in just two years of operation, roughly equivalent to one-third of the smelterconstruction costs. 240
Quincy Mining Company production peaked between 1909 and 1911 and, despite
high profits during WWI, the firm never fully recovered. Through the post-war
economic decline and the 1920s, the firm lost money, eventually closing its mines and
smelter operations in 1931during the Great Depression. By 1937, the firm had begun
processing copper again, and through WWII, with government-set prices, began to see a
profit, especially with reclamation efforts, modeled after a C&H program, to recover
copper wasted from earlier, inefficient stamp milling practices with a dredge, fine
crushing, and flotation or leaching concentration. Despite an end to Quincy mining in
1945, the smelter continued to process recovered copper until the company’s stamp sands
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were exhausted in 1967, and its contract work, that came after the Michigan Smelter
closed in 1948, ended. In 1968, the large number 5 furnace was fitted with natural gas
burners and used to melt scrap copper until 1971, when the Quincy chose to shut down
rather than abide by new state directives to install pollution controls. 241
In 1903, Copper Range mining company, with a growing concern about emission
controls, hired a Montana firm (with former Michigander Frank Klepetko consulting just
after completing the Washoe smelter in Anaconda, Montana) to design an advanced new
smelter with a single flue system to vent smoke and gases from the all of its furnaces.
While the Quincy smelter largely developed out of a fifty-year smelting tradition on the
Keweenaw, the Copper Range adopted a much more contemporary practice and hired
outside designers to implement its works. The designers, following a pattern very similar
to Montana smelters, arranged buildings on a hillside to take advantage of gravity and
eliminate as much labor as possible, and placed the stack at the top of the hill to
consolidate smoke effluent. The single stack vented smoke higher in the atmosphere,
presumably away from air currents that led into living areas, and allowed for a single dust
collection system. The routing of hot gases away from the furnaces also permitted the
construction of waste-heat boilers to recover some lost heat, which was often used to
create steam to run electrical generators. 242 This practice was also adopted at Quincy and
C&H. Copper Range operated the Michigan Smelter until the post-war economic decline
241
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forced its closure in 1948. While the mining company’s attention began to focus on a
copper sulfide ore lode in Ontonagon County, it continued to mine native copper until
1967, and contracted with Quincy for smelting.
The formation of the Lake Superior Smelting Company in 1891 largely ended the
era of private contract smelting in Michigan. Although the Hancock works continued to
smelt copper under contract through most of the 1890s and the privately-held Lake
Superior Native Copper Works smelted smaller mine batches intermittently through some
point in the late 1890s, 243 the construction of the C&H Buffalo works in 1892, the
Quincy Smelter in 1898, and the Michigan Smelter in 1903, and the acquisition and later
legal consolidation of many of the smaller mines into either the Calumet and Hecla,
Quincy, or Copper Range Consolidated Copper companies effectively dealt a death blow
to the independent contract smelter. The three consolidated companies came to dominate
particular micro regions of the mining district, with each relying on a single regional
smelting operation to process its entire copper mineral after C&H closed its Buffalo
works in 1914 and the Dollar Bay works in 1919. While a few smaller smelters
continued past 1914, by the end of the decade the mines controlling them would be
absorbed by one of the big three and their respective smelting operations shut down.

Captive Smelting Technology
In general, Michigan copper smelting largely continued to use coal-fired
reverberatory furnaces for primary smelting and refining through the end of mining.
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While Quincy remained a fairly conservative company and made few operational
changes to its smelter, Copper Range, C&H, and LSSC all made substantial changes to
their smelting operations to maximize efficiency and take advantage of advancing
smelting techniques.
In 1894 C&H constructed an electrolytic plant and smelter in Buffalo, likely to
take advantage of cheaper Niagara electricity to reprocess rich smelter slags and recover
silver from the ore. 244 The electrolytic process, developed in Europe, involved applying
a negative charge to a series of thin pure-copper cathode sheets that then attracted
individual copper molecules dissolving off a series of thick, positive-charged 90-99%
matte or blister copper anodes in an acidic bath, resulting in a thick, 99.95% pure metal
cathode. Non-copper materials eventually settled to the bottom of the tank and, if they
had value such as silver, could be recovered by processing the “tank-mud.” 245 Although
the English and German developers attempted to keep their electrolytic processes secret,
they had been adopted in the US by 1883, and three successful electrolytic copper plants
operated in Baltimore, and Great Fall and Anaconda, Montana by 1894. 246 In 1914,
C&H closed its Buffalo smelter plant and moved its equipment and electrolytic works to
its Hubbell Smelter. For many copper smelters, especially ones working already pure
copper, silver extraction often justified the expense of constructing and operating an
electrolytic plant and when the silver content of its ores declined, C&H closed its Hubbell
site in 1923 and ended the only Michigan copper electrolysis refining system.
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At the Dollar Bay works in 1898, LSSC constructed a large-capacity
reverberatory furnace to handle its low-grade ores, but kept its smaller furnaces. It
tapped the copper from the melt stage directly into the one of smaller furnaces it now
used solely for refining. Ultimately, this sped production, allowing the two processes of
melting and refining to continue simultaneously in linked dedicated furnaces. This
arrangement was copied by C&H in Buffalo in 1900 and Hubbell in the 1920s, by Quincy
by 1920, and formed the basic arrangement for the Michigan Smelter design in 1903. 247
Two coal-based advances appeared on the Keweenaw during the 1910s and
1920s. The first, the use of pulverized coal fuel was the second critical smelter
innovation to come out of Dollar Bay. In 1914, based on successes in the cement
industry and Canadian copper smelters, LSSC discovered that pulverized coal sped the
melting process and resulted in a higher grade of refined copper. 248 Following the
company’s lead, the Michigan Smelter constructed a pulverized coal plant in 1921 and
C&H, in 1923. 249 Curiously, the Quincy apparently chose not to use pulverized coal,
which required on-site production and quick-use to retain the coal’s volatility perhaps
because the company had little capital to spare for a pulverization plant in the 1920s.
The second and more significant coal-innovation called for adding coal or coke to
the reverberatory charge to create a “slight” reducing atmosphere during the initial
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melt. 250 While the gangues oxidized in the furnace and formed slag during the melt
stage, the coal retarded the copper from oxidizing and joining the slag. 251 The now
“clean” slag came out of the reverberatory furnace without copper oxides and needed no
further treatment and the smelters could eliminate their blast furnaces. While it is unclear
when or where this process developed, the Michigan Smelter discontinued operating its
blast furnace in 1922 and C&H by the late 1920s. 252 Quincy also considered eliminating
its blast furnace in the 1920s, but company records indicate that instead of eliminating
copper oxide formation with coke additions, it simply reprocessed its copper-rich slag in
a reverberatory furnace rather than change processes, and eliminated its blast furnaces. 253
Quincy tended to keep its smelting processes relatively consistent, but it did
increase efficiencies with significant improvements in materials and materials handling.
In 1906, Quincy constructed a briquetting plant to combine crushed limestone with low
grade ore in a large enough size for smelting in its blast furnace. While this type of
process was a critical factor in the continued use of western blast furnaces, it only proved
a modest success on the Keweenaw and was largely abandoned within a few years. 254
More successful was Quincy’s addition of a Walker Casting machine in 1920. Until
1920, all copper was hand-ladled out of the furnaces and poured into ingot, cake, or bar
molds. The Walker Caster, invented in 1897, permitted Quincy smelter workers to place
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a variety of empty molds on a rotating turnstile that directed the molds under the tapspout of the Number Five furnace. As the turnstile rotated further, the machine dumped
the chilling copper into a water-filled chamber where an electric conveyor transported the
copper bars, ingots, or cakes to pick-up areas where workers would deliver them to
storage sheds. 255

A Word about Stamp Sands
The waste streams from Michigan copper, as with all other significant copper
districts, were immense. However, its smelters did not produce excessive sulfur smoke
because its ores were relatively clean and did not require extensive chemical processing
to recover its metal. Few, if any, lawsuits were filed because of damage to properties, but
mill-tailings proved to be a major problem. Ores with copper contents averaging 2-3%
during the peak periods of production meant miners hauled 97-98% waste up from
underground. Milling enriched the 2-3% copper rock to 60-80% copper concentrate, with
copper companies dumping about 95% of mine haulings directly into a lake. Later, they
recovered it, reclaimed any copper remaining in the tailings, and dumped the now finer
sands right back into the lake. This volume does not include poor rock, which is the
valueless material that had to be tunneled through underground to get to the ore veins and
which was disposed on the surface. Two percent of what was originally mined remained
with the copper in the concentrate and was eventually removed from the smelting process
as slag. In brief, for every ton of copper produced, 32 tons of tailings and two-thirds of a

255

H. O. Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924), 276.

150

ton of slag, on average, were left in the local environment. In 1916, the single year of
greatest production, Michigan’s copper country produced 13,342 tons of copper, 427,000
tons of tailings, and 8,900 tons of slag. For the period from 1845-1946, the entire
Michigan District produced 9.65 million tons of copper, 309 million tons of tailings, and
6.43 million tons of slag, based on an average copper content of 3%. 256 A small portion
of the total slag resided near smelters in Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and
Detroit, and the tailings numbers do not account for failed mining ventures.

Copper Basin, Tennessee
Unlike the rather continuous development in Michigan copper, external political
conflicts and slack economic development marred and disrupted production in isolated
southeast Tennessee through the late-19th century. The Civil War ended the first phase of
regional mining and smelting, and post-war transportation problems ended the second
before railroads finally opened the region to large-scale development in the third phase
and by-product production propelled the district’s growth in the 20th century.

Phase I and II Mining and Smelting
With the forced removal of the Cherokee Nation in the 1830s, partially initiated
by the Cherokee refusal to cede Georgia gold lands to the government, the northGeorgia, east-Tennessee, and western-North Carolina region opened for mineral
256
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speculation and land development. In 1843 prospectors, broadening their search north of
the recent gold rush in Dahlonega, Georgia, stumbled onto cuprite crystals in south east
Tennessee they initially mistook for gold. 257 Four years later, a German miner made the
first copper ore shipments out of the region to the Point Shirley Works in Boston. 258
Appalachian copper deposits stretched from Georgia to Vermont but were most
prominent and profitable across seven accessible veins in the Ducktown district of
southeast Tennessee, also known by the more geologically specific term, Copper Basin.
(See Figure 4.7)

Figure 4.7 Tennessee Copper Basin (Source: Author)
The Ducktown deposits had a traditional sulfide profile with an iron-rich gossan
layer covering an enriched oxide layer up to 60% copper, above a secondary enriched 1020% oxide layer, all sitting over massive 2-3% iron pyrite (FeS2) and chalcopyrite
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(CuFeS2 ) sulfide layers. Early miners shipped the rich oxide ores to Swansea and Boston
smelters profitably, but the secondary layer required an initial local smelting to a 40-50%
copper matte to make the trip out of the district profitable, and the 2-3% copper massive
sulfides would need to be fully smelted and refined locally. 259
The remote district became accessible when, in 1850, a railroad passed through
Cleveland, Tennessee, 33 miles west and investors funded the Ocoee Toll and Plank
Road, better known as the Copper Road, from Ducktown to Cleveland in 1853. In 1850,
the Hiwassee Company officially started mining. By 1852, three other mines operated in
the district and by 1854, fourteen. 260 Despite the arduous and expensive two-day ox-cart
journey to transport copper ores and mattes out of the district, the region developed, and
by 1860 seven smelters operated in the basin. 261
The few references to Ducktown smelting in the 1850s indicate primarily
charcoal-fired, German-based blast furnaces augmented by reverberatory calcining
furnaces and occasional “Welsh or Swansea pattern” smelters. 262 Despite the
consolidation of the 14 active mines into two major corporations following the economic
panic of 1857, and an 1860 rolling mill opening in Cleveland, Tennessee, the district
could not weather the loss of personnel during the Civil War as young Southerners joined
the Confederacy, Northern workers returned home, and investors withdrew operating
capital for the duration. From 1861-1863, the Confederacy bought all the copper the few
259
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open mines produced until the Union Army destroyed the Cleveland Rolling Mill and
effectively ended copper production in the district. 263
In 1866, the two pre-war consolidated companies, the Burra-Burra, named for the
recently organized Australian copper district, and the Union Consolidated both reopened
with German miner J.E. Raht at the helm of both. Raht also supervised the only
remaining independent mine, the Polk County, for a few years after the war before it
closed. 264 Raht hired his brother August to run the smelting complexes that reopened at
the Burra-Burra’s Isabella and Tennessee mines and at the Polk County mine. At some
point in the late 1860s smelting at the Tennessee and Polk slowed down or stopped
altogether, and J. E. Raht made a significant investment at Isabella. Not only did Raht
build a new refinery in 1871, but he had funded experiments and designs based on an
1866 patent taken out by his other brother William for a Bessemer-style refining process
for copper matte. 265
With dwindling ore quality, climbing fuel prices, and poor/expensive plank road
transportation out of the district, neither the Polk County nor the Burra-Burra mine
remained viable past 1872. 266 This left the Union Consolidated in control of the entire
output of copper and the only smelter and refining complex at Isabella. Pressing on
under Raht, however, the company invested in mining equipment and smelting upgrades,
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ultimately settling on a standard of practice closely resembling the German system with
American-modified Welsh refining.

Phase I and II Smelting Technology
Like the Continental system, Tennessee practice used a first roast to expel sulfur.
This occurred on an open cordwood bed and, according to one source, produced up to
one million pounds of yellow gas per roast. 267 The first reduction to produce matte took
place in “small square blast furnaces” with two tuyeres entering the back wall. The
second roast was carried out up to five times to expel sulfur and was followed by a
second reduction, this time for black copper. The final reduction occurred in a
reverberatory furnace for blister copper, followed by a refining stage in a second
reverberatory furnace. All Union Consolidated furnaces used charcoal fuel, but by 1876
both blister and refining reverberatory furnaces were fired with gas, and Raht
implemented a compressed air blast into the molten refinery bath to oxidize impurities,
emulating the Bessemer process developed by his brother. 268 (See Figure 4.8)
Part of the reason for the conversion to gas was the enormous quantity of wood
consumed for mining, roasting, and smelting in Tennessee. An 1872 visitor to the region
reported in the Cherokee Scout (NC) that the fuel consumed by the Isabella smelter
reached 60,000 bushels of charcoal per month. 269 According to a Department of
267
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Figure 4.8 Tennessee Copper Smelting Practice (Source: Author)
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Agriculture report in 1875, Tennessee forests averaged between 30 and 70 cords per acre
although some dense, old-growth forests could reach as many as 700. 270 Assuming a
charcoal production rate estimated by Gordon and Malone at 50 bushels per cord, a
conservative average charcoal consumption of 45,000 bushels per smelter-month, and a
typical forest yield of 50 cords per acre, the likely monthly wood consumption per
smelter roughly equaled 18 acres of forest land. 271 Further, estimating the number of
smelters running, the district had operated 63 smelter-years by 1878. 272 At 18 acres per
smelter-month, smelting likely consumed a total of 13,600 forested acres or 21 square
miles by 1878. With the basin’s size of 36 square miles, not all of which was forested,
the region’s smelters consumed a significant quantity of available wood which, when
coupled with open-heap roasting, mine timbering, building construction, plank-road
construction and repair, home heating, and boiler operation, ultimately led to severe
timber shortages. Related consumption estimates suggested that mining in total stripped
between 47 and 50 square miles of the region for fuel and other uses by 1879. 273
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Phase III Mining and Smelting
When we consider what may yet be peering into the possibilities of the future
when the locomotive shall appear in their midst, bringing in its trains of coal from
Chattanooga or Knoxville, and whilst they are amazed at the timidness of capital
which fails to see a golden opportunity, they are yet buoyed up with the hope that
ere long their best hopes in this direction will be fully realized. Without a railroad
we fear that Ichabod is written upon their unequalled and inexhaustible mineral
deposits. 274
This quote from an 1872 Cherokee Scout article appeared the same year the Burra-Burra
mine closed and four years after the Polk County Mine closed. While the Union
Consolidated would have its best year in 1878, it too could not sustain production with
the increasing wood-fuel shortages. Despite attempts to lower fuel costs, the Union
Consolidated could not continue to operate profitably and, with Michigan production
reaching new heights and a greater than 50% drop in the price of copper since 1872, the
Union Consolidated closed in 1878, ending all copper production in the district. 275
In 1890, after more than a decade without copper mining, the north-bound
Marietta and North Georgia Railroad built a line to the Copper Basin, meeting the new
Knoxville Southern Railroad. With copper prices on the rise since 1885, 276 coal fuel now
available, and cheap transportation, copper mining and smelting returned to the district
with the incorporation of the Ducktown Sulpher, Copper, and Iron Company (DSCI) in
London, England, in 1891 and the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) in New York in
1899. 277 DSCI began with the holdings of the former Union Consolidated mining
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company that included the Isabella mine and smelter complex, and TCC bought the
former Burra-Burra, Polk County, and independent mine holdings.
Shortly after reopening the Mary Mine and the Isabella Smelter, DSCI installed a
100-ton/day coke-fired Herreshoff blast furnace. 278 (See Figure 4.2) In 1893, it installed
a second Herreshoff and by 1901 operated four furnaces and was producing three million
pounds of copper annually. 279 Despite new fuels and equipment, DSCI continued the old
practice of open-heap roasting that ultimately posed several significant problems. First,
heap roasting methods required several weeks to process an amount of ore that the new
blast furnaces smelted in only a few days, creating a significant bottleneck in
production. 280 Second, the sulfuric waste gases from the process quickly dispersed in the
basin and killed vegetation in much the same way Swansea smelters did earlier in the
century. The Tennessee situation, however, was exacerbated by several decades of
rampant timber-harvesting leading to very distinctive, lunar landscape. (See Figure 4.9
and 4.10)
TCC similarly started operations with mining, smelting, and open-heap roasting
at the McPherson and Polk County mines near Ducktown in 1901, and by 1903 operated
three blast furnaces and more than 150 roasting sheds. By 1906, TCC had consolidated
its smelting operations at Copperhill (likely in 1904), operated a five-mile railroad
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Figure 4.9 Open heap roasting in the Ducktown District ca. 1900.
Large heaps of sulfur-rich copper ores, partially covered, were ignited on a
bed of wood and allowed to burn for several weeks as most of the
combustible sulfur burns off. (With permission of the Edward Oscar Boak

collection, Ducktown Basin Museum.)

Figure 4.10 Isabella, Tennessee ca. 1920. Effects of several decades of
timber harvesting and open-heap roasting have left this once heavily
wooded southern landscape completely denuded of any vegetation. (With

permission of Ducktown Basin Museum)
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between its smelter and Ducktown mines, and smelted in seven blast furnaces. 281
Continued open-heap roasting, however, now significantly increased by TCC, proved
problematic for local farmers.

Environmental Consequences and Technological Solutions
Although the issue of smelter smoke had been largely settled in the United
Kingdom by the mid 19th century, the impact of expanding American smelter capacity
generated new nuisance conflicts between agriculture interests and mining companies in
this country. In the first decade of the 20th century, farmers and ranchers filed several
lawsuits against Montana, California, Utah, and Tennessee copper smelters. Although R.
E. Barclay claimed the State of Georgia brought suit against DSCI as early as 1895, the
first well documented court cases began in 1903 and 1904. In both the consolidated
Swain v. the TCC & Cole v. DSCI (1903) case and the Madison v. DSCI (1904) case,
landowners lost their attempts to legally end open heap roasting when Tennessee state
courts ruled that the mining companies’ benefit to the county outweighed their
damages. 282 In the Madison case, the ruling cited 12,000 jobs and a full half of the
county’s tax income generated by two companies. 283 In 1906, however, in a much more
significant case, the State of Georgia sued TCC and DSCI in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court, arguing that its sovereignty over its own land and air was compromised by smoke
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from Tennessee open heap roasting which killed its farmers’ crops. The court ultimately
declared an injunction against smoke releases. 284
Concurrent with mounting environmental protests, both companies sought control
over the open-heap roasting problem which, for them, was more of a production flow
problem than an environmental nuisance. As early as 1899, DSCI experimented with
pyritic smelting, the direct charging of green (unroasted) ores into its Herreshoff blast
furnace and using the heat of sulfur and iron oxidation to reduce the ore to a matte,
thereby executing two smelting steps in one phase. Since sulfur was flammable and
sulfur and iron oxidation generated significant heat, roasting could be sped up in a selfcontained blast furnace by charging smaller amounts and igniting the charge. The
combination of retained heat in the furnace and added heat from oxidation and reduction
processes in a partial pyritic process meant minimal new fuel was needed. Slag removed
the iron oxide, leaving a 10-20% copper first fusion copper matte which would be cooled,
broken up, and re-charged with new ore and flux into a second furnace resulting in a 3550% matte that would be sent to refining. 285
In 1902 DSCI successfully arrived at a workable ore-flux formula and in October,
1903, ended heap roasting altogether and fully implemented partial pyritic smelting of all
its ores. 286 By 1905, a short time after luring a smelting manager away from DSCI’s
Isabella works, TCC transitioned completely to pyritic smelting, abandoned all open-heap
roasting, and constructed a 325-foot stack to disperse smoke over a wider area. 287 Like
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most American smelting innovations, pyritic smelting had its roots in Europe. Sticht
reports in Peter’s Modern Copper Smelting (1898) that experiments in pyritic smelting
dated back to the 1860s in Russia, with significant advances by Englishman John
Hollway at Rio Tinto, Spain, in 1878. 288 Hofman reported successful applications in
Montana, Colorado, and Tasmania by 1895. 289 (See Figure 4.8)
Despite the end of production bottle necks and a symbolic end to open heap
roasting, the new methods did not entirely alleviate the smoke problem. In fact,
according to Barclay, the problem was exacerbated by an increased density in sulfur
dioxide gas, increased output, and new tall stacks that, like Swansea, eliminated smoke
locally but with higher air currents, disbursed smoke regionally, ultimately leading to
much wider ranging impacts and more distant lawsuits. 290 In summarizing the majority
opinion in the State of Georgia v. TCC, Justice Holmes wrote that Georgia wished:
to enjoin the defendant Copper Companies from discharging noxious gas from
their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff's territory. It alleges that in
consequence of such a discharge a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards and
crops is going on, and other injuries are done and threatened in five counties of
the State…But the plaintiff now finds, or thinks that it finds, that the tall chimneys
in present use cause the poisonous gases to be carried to greater distances than
ever before and that the evil has not been helped. 291
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The Supreme Court issued an injunction but postponed enforcement pending the
completion of auxiliary sulfuric acid production plants at the smelters that would, in
theory, eliminate all sulfur and other poisons from the smoke. As early as 1872, August
Raht observed that Ducktown needed an acid recovery plant to stay viable, but sufficient
technology did not exist that early. 292 By the turn of the century, however, several
proven European technologies existed, and in the midst of the Georgia lawsuit, DSCI
built an experimental, but failed, contact acid plant. By 1909, however, both DSCI and
TCC successfully operated chamber acid plants.
Chamber sulfuric acid is produced by the oxidation of sulfur dioxide, obtained in
this case by burning sulfide ores in the presence of oxygen, its conversion into sulfur
trioxide, and the chemical combination of sulfur trioxide and water to form sulfuric acid
(H2SO4). In the three-phase chamber process that includes Glover Towers, Acid
Chambers, and Gay-Lussac Towers, nitrogen compounds are used to induce sulfur
oxidation through intermediate compounds of nitrogen, sulfur, hydrogen, and oxygen and
the subsequent removal of nitrogen compounds from exhaust gases. 293 Throughout the
process, sulfur dioxides are gradually oxidized and eliminated by nitrogen compounds,
forming sulfur trioxide and nitrogen-rich gas.
In 1908, TCC built a successful chamber acid plant at Copper Hill, which Stevens
claimed was the largest ever built. The system routed blast furnace gases through dust
chambers to a “nitrate apparatus” where nitrogen oxides were introduced into the hot gas.
The nitrogen enriched gas passed into the bottom of one of two octagonal, 30’ diameter
292
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by 50’ high Glover Towers where it encountered a combination of chamber acid and
nitrous vitriol, an acid from the Gay-Lussac towers, trickling down from the top. The
Glover tower encouraged nitrogen from the nitrous vitriol and steam from both acids to
pass into the hot flue gas, thereby concentrating the chamber acid and de-nitrated nitrous
vitriol. The combination, now essentially a simple concentrated sulfuric acid, was
collected from the tower bottom and reused in the Gay-Lussac Tower. 294
The partially oxidized sulfur dioxide flue gas, nitrogen compounds, and some
sulfur trioxide passed from the Glover Tower through lead-lined flues to a 4.6 million
square foot chamber for further oxidizing, hydrating, and condensing. Through the
process, the quantity of sulfur dioxide gradually lessened from 7%, as the gases passed
through several separate chambers converting to sulfur trioxide, to less than 0.1% at the
Gay-Lussac tower. Water mist was introduced into the chamber top and combined easily
with the sulfur trioxide, forming sulfuric acid that condensed on lead sheets and was
collected in pans below the chamber and sold. The nitrogen-rich, de-sulfured gases
passed from the chambers to one of ten Gay-Lussac Towers that trickled concentrated denitrated sulfuric acid from the Glover Tower downward absorbing up to 86% of the
remaining nitrogen in the up-flowing de-sulfured gas. The now nitrogen-rich sulfuric
acid, or nitrous vitriol, was collected from the bottom of the Gay-Lussac towers and used
in the Glover Tower to introduce nitrogen compounds to the flue gases. The de-sulfured
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and now mostly de-nitrated gases passed from the system and were vented into the
atmosphere. 295 (See Figure 4.11 and 4.12)

Figure 4.11 Tennessee Copper Company Chamber Acid Plant showing
acid-forming chamber facility on the hilltop with acid storage tanks and rail
cars in the middle ground ca. 1920. (With permission of Ducktown Basin Museum.)

Figure 4.12 Chamber Acid Process for sulfuric acid production as
used in Tennessee from the 1910s to 2000. (Source: Author)
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Although the TCC acid plant was the largest in the world at the time, none of the prime
processes had American roots. French chemist Joseph-Louis Gay-Lussac invented the
Gay-Lussac tower in 1823 but found little use for his device until it was paired with the
Glover tower, invented by Englishman John Glover in 1859. 296 Both sets of towers were
lead-lined structures to keep the acid from deteriorating any structural elements, then
lined with fire-brick and packed with flint, coke, broken wine bottles, or any other
chemically neutral barrier to slow the ascent of smoke and the descent of acid. 297 Small
lead chambers were first created in England in 1746 for sulfuric acid production with
improvements in the late 18th century. 298 Contact acid production developed in Britain in
1831 for converting SO2 into SO3 by drawing sulfur dioxide and air into a tube filled with
heated platinum or later vanadium oxide and causing the oxygen molecules to join the
sulfur. 299
As soon as DSCI’s chamber acid plant went into operation, the company made
more money from sulfur recovery and acid production than copper, relegating copper to a
by-product of acid production. 300 As soon as TCC’s plant went on line, TCC signed a
10- year contract with International Agriculture Corporation for TCC’s entire output of
sulfuric acid. 301 In 1909, 53% of all sulfuric acid was used in agriculture fertilizers,
which dropped to 28% in 1918 when explosives took 36% and the steel, petroleum
refining, and chemical/drug industries used about 9% each. Through the mid-1930s, the
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fertilizer, petroleum, chemicals, coal, and steel industries were the top five users in that
order. 302

Other Smelting Technologies
Completing the smelting process, TCC by 1911 and DSCI by 1920, adopted
Bessemer-style converters for the final refining of pyritic-smelted copper matte. Until
1920, DSCI sold all of its copper as high-grade matte, but TCC, with its new high
capacity Copperhill smelter works, likely installed its first converters in 1904. 303 By
1911 the company operated 4 converter stands with 15 shells that produced a 99.4% pure
copper that TCC sold mainly in Europe as blister copper, although some blister copper
pigs were sold to Baltimore Copper Smelting and Rolling Co, a latter incarnation of the
1860 Baltimore Copper Company, for electrolytic converting. 304
Although historian Barclay and engineers Hofman and Charles Christensen
recognize August Raht’s contributions to the copper industry by using forced air to
oxidize iron and sulfur, most credit M. Manhès work in Lyon, France, for successfully
creating Bessemer blister copper from matte in 1880. 305 Franklin Ferrel built the first
U.S. Bessemer copper plant at the Parrot Smelter in Butte Montana in 1883. By 1885,
the refining process involved charging a Bessemer converter with molten 40-50% copper
matte and blowing air through tuyeres into the copper bath, oxidizing the last iron that, in

302

Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture, 20.
Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 9.
304
Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 1664.
305
Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time, 149; Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper, 203; and Charles
Christensen, "History of Converting," The Mining World 33 (1910), 1037.
303

168

combination with siliceous materials in the converter lining, formed slag. Any remaining
sulfur in the copper was oxidized and vented. 306
The only other significant smelting developments in the Tennessee copper basin
occurred in the early 1930s, when both companies began phasing out their blast furnaces.
By the 1920s the copper content of the region’s ores had dropped, contributing to a
significant need for enhanced concentration before the materials could be smelted. In
1920, the same year it installed its first converter, DSCI built the first flotation plant in
the district. Unfortunately, flotation-concentrated ore is not smeltable in a blast furnace,
and the company sold this copper simply as high-grade concentrate. In 1925, DSCI
reorganized as the Ducktown Chemical and Iron Company (DCI), and after adding a
second flotation plant in 1927, it built an iron sinter plant, which permitted the recovery
of significant quantities of iron from its ores. For the first time in thirty-six years of
calling itself an “iron” company, DCI actually sold iron. 307 In 1931, DCI officially ended
blast furnace operations, and all recovered copper was sold as concentrate while the acid
plant produced acid from the sulfur-rich sinter plant gases. 308 By 1936, the company’s
raw materials were dwindling, and it could not compete economically with its much
larger neighbor and sold out, leaving TCC the sole producer in the area.
In the 1920s TCC also began a program to eliminate its blast furnaces. Called the
“all-milling” plan, the company built a flotation plant and a four-roaster iron sinter plant
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in 1923. By the mid-30s TCC had completed its transition, which included the
incorporation of the already “all-milling” DCI. With a second acid plant built at the start
WWI, new iron sinter plants constructed in the early 1930s, and a U.S. Government-built
acid plant on its property in WWII, TCC had successfully diversified. It now sold
copper, different grades of acid, iron sinter, copper sulfates, fungicides, insecticides, zinc
concentrates, organic chemicals, sodium hydroxide, ferric sulfate, and granulated slag. 309
Despite the apparent success of the “all-milling” program, TCC built a reverberatory
furnace at its smelter in 1940 and returned to smelting and refining copper. 310

Montana-Richest Hill and Biggest Smelter on Earth
The Michigan copper smelting industry experimented with advanced techniques
but in the end, by and large, smelted its copper in basically the same way it had at the
beginning because Michigan ores neither warranted nor permitted great infusions of new
technology. Tennessee’s high-sulfur, high-iron ores led to the early 20th-century adoption
of pyritic smelting and colossal acid plants. Montana, on the other hand, advanced not
only the scale of smelting, but also developed and refined existing European
technologies, many of which made their way back to Tennessee or burgeoning new
districts in Utah and Arizona.
Like Ducktown, gold prospectors first explored the Butte area. Unlike the
Tennessee district, however, Montana prospectors discovered placer gold deposits often
interlaced with copper. They established a mining camp in 1864 and built the first
309
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regional smelter in 1866. Despite constructing a second furnace in 1868, most of the
gold-copper placers were worked out by 1869. 311 Although a few quartz mines and mills
remained open, Butte was practically abandoned until 1875 when miners discovered
silver ore lodes several hundred feet below the surface. Silver proved to be a slightly
longer-lasting metal in the district than gold, and 12 mines operated in 1877. 312 Silver
mining, however, led to significant changes in the region. The burgeoning industry
required a metallurgical infrastructure, and many mines built mills and smelters, before
the railroad reached the region in 1881. More important, 100 feet below the silver lodes,
sat the richest copper veins in the world. 313 (See Figure 4.13) Although copper was
continually recovered in small quantities from the 1860s, the district remained primarily a
precious metal mining camp through the early 1880s.
Initially all Montana copper ores were simply concentrated. The mines tried to
import Cornish stamps used in Michigan, but the hard chalcocite (Cu2S), the primarily
ore, was ultimately too brittle for stamping and led to significant milling losses. 314
Eventually the region settled on rollers, crushers, and water separation to process the ore
and eliminate gangue, and sent concentrates and high-content ores to Swansea, Freiberg
(Germany), and Baltimore for smelting and refining. 315 However, like all other copper
districts, as the rich ore gave way to poorer ores, and mining companies introduced matte
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Figure 4.13 Butte-Anaconda Copper District Montana (Source: Author)
smelting and sent partially smelted copper to Baltimore, Swansea, or Black Hawk,
Colorado, for finishing and refining. Most of the early 1880s smelters operated on Welsh
principles with some combination of 45’ “long-hearth,” hand-rabbled reverberatory
roasters and 18’reverberatory matting furnaces. 316
William Clark’s Colorado and Montana Smelter, in partnership with the Boston
and Colorado Smelting company from Black Hawk, Colorado, opened the first dedicated
copper smelter in Butte in 1879. Following the opening of the next smelter, the Montana
Copper Company’s Colusa Smelter in 1880, came the Parrot Smelter in 1881. Sometime
after 1881, the founder of the original Colusa smelter opened the Bell Smelter, featuring
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the first successful blast furnaces in the district for copper matte smelting. 317 In 1884,
William Clark built a second smelter, this one called Clark’s Colusa Smelter to
distinguish it from the Montana Company’s. 318
In 1887 a Boston capitalist formed the Boston and Montana Copper and Silver
Mining Company and bought several properties from William Clark including “Clarks
Colusa” mine and its smelter which was renamed the “Lower Works” by the company.
In 1888 Boston and Montana purchased Montana Copper Company’s Colusa smelter, and
renamed it the “Upper Works,” and ran both sites until it opened the Great Falls
Reduction Works, 150 miles north of Butte in 1893 and closed its local smelters. A
second Boston group formed the Boston and Butte Mining Company in 1888 to develop
several mines and opened a smelter that same year. In 1890, the Boston and Butte
smelter successfully expanded its reverberatory matting furnaces to 50’ long. In 1887
William Clark bought the 1883 Butte Reduction Works that he operated until 1910, when
it, like the Colorado and Montana, Parrot, and 1892 Montana Ore Purchasing Co., were
purchased by the expanding Anaconda Copper Company and closed. 319
In 1881, the second year Marcus Daly ran the Anaconda Mine in Butte, he
returned a short-lived profit from silver mining. In 1882, just as the Anaconda’s silver
lode ran out, a narrow, but promising, copper vein appeared. 320 By 1883, Daly was
working one of the richest copper sulfide veins in the world, measuring between 50 and
317

Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,” 6-8.
Hyde, Copper for America, 85.
319
Ibid., 85-86, Brian Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited: An Overview of Early-Day Mining and
Smelting in Montana, Special Publication 99 (Butte, Montana: Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology;
Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology, 1991), 40, and Smith, "History of the Early
Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,” 6-8.
320
Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,” 7.
318

173

100 feet wide and assaying between 12 and 50%. In addition to encouraging significant
improvements and expansions in the mine, Daly convinced his investors to build a
smelter, not in Butte, where he believed land was too expensive and water too difficult to
come by, but at a site on Warm Spring Creek, 26 miles west, that would eventually be
named after the company. 321
The first Anaconda smelter, opened in 1884, included the world’s largest
concentrating mill, thirty-four hand-rabbled long-hearth reverberatory roasters, twentysix matting furnaces, two seventy-ton blast furnaces, and two large 115- and 175-foot tall
smoke stacks, with a total site capacity of 450 tons of processed ore per day, with all
matte initially shipped to England for refining. 322 By 1886, the capacity of the smelter
complex had increased to 1000 tons of ore per day, and Daly replaced the labor intensive
hand-rabbled reverberatory furnaces with forty new Bruckner Roasters. In 1887, due to
technological and space limitations of the works, Daly built a second smelter, designated
the “Lower Works” and renamed the original site the “Upper Works” just like the Boston
and Montana smelters is Butte.
Although the Lower Works burned in 1889, Daly rebuilt it, increased its capacity
to 3000 tons of ore per day, and added ninety-six Bruckner roasters, twenty-eight matting
furnaces, four Wethey roasters, eight McDougall roasters, six 8’ blast furnaces, and three
tall stacks to vent the works. In a move to further retain all capital from copper
production and complete refining in Anaconda, he installed a fifteen-stall upright
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Bessemer converter plant at the Upper Works, built the nation’s third electrolytic refining
plant between the two works, and added a converter plant to the Lower Works. 323 The
combined capacity of both works reached 4000 tons of ore per day. 324 (See Figure 4.14)
With the new converters and refiners, copper shipped from Anaconda left at 99.97% pure
and finally challenged the purity of Michigan Lake copper.

Figure 4.14 Anaconda Upper Works Smelter with Lower Works stacks in the
background and electrolytic plant in the middle ground off to the right ca. 1895.
(With permission of Butte-Silver Bow Archives.)
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Although electrolysis was discussed above in conjunction with Calumet and
Hecla’s Buffalo Smelter, and Bessemer converting with the Tennessee Copper Company
plant, both processes were refined in Montana before they were installed in Michigan or
Tennessee. As noted above, the first U.S. electrolysis plant was in Baltimore and the
fourth in Buffalo, but the first plant directly associated with a copper mine was developed
by Michigander Frank Klepetko of the Boston and Montana smelting company at Great
Falls in 1893. Similar to the Buffalo site, Great Falls with its new hydroelectric plants
offered great potential for inexpensive electricity and, with increasing consternation over
smelter smoke in Butte, the Boston and Montana Company built a large smelter and
refinery at the falls and closed its Upper and Lower Butte works. 325
The new 1893 Great Falls smelter included twenty-four Bruckner roasters, eight
reverberatory matte furnaces, and two five-ton upright converters. By 1902 the site
included eighteen 6-hearth McDougall-Evans-Klepetko roasters, five gas-fueled matting
furnaces, five blast-furnaces, twelve upright converters, one anode-casting reverberatory
furnace with a Walker Caster, a 312-tank electrolytic plant, and four reverberatory
refining furnaces and was second in production only to Anaconda, which by 1915 would
purchase the Boston and Montana Company and the Great Falls refinery. 326
According to Jonathan Leitner, the ability to home-refine Montana’s copper
matte, previously sent primarily to United Kingdom, proved the decisive blow to the
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already declining British copper industry. 327 Sharp declines in British production
occurred in the 1890s as both Great Falls and Anaconda smelters added electrolysis, and
again in the 1910s when Anaconda’s capacity was greatly increased. 328 (See Figure 4.1)

Technological Advances in Montana
At the Parrot smelter, in 1884, Andrew Davis built the first Bessemer converter
plant for copper in the United States. It included three “egg-shaped” upright converters
and a small cupola for remelting intermediate mattes. Despite two very different general
arrangements, upright and horizontal, all converters operated essentially the same, and,
according to Laist, outside of modest improvements in charging and capacity, few
significant technological changes occurred with them through the 1950s, with the
exception of improved lining materials that decreased the frequency of lining changes
from every 6 or 7 charges to once every few years. 329 (See Figure 4.15 below)
Following system improvements in refining, Montana smelters turned to
improving roasting. Like pyritic smelting, roasting improvements were executed largely
to improve production flow and eliminate labor rather than to curb or control smoke
emissions. The first attempts at roasting mechanization were largely efforts to rabble ore
in modified reverberatory furnaces. The first radical design change came with the
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Pearce-Turret, whose 36’-diameter circular hearth had mechanical rabbles that rotated
around a central shaft. The device had up to six circular stacked shelves to increase
production, but its poor operating performance limited its wide-spread use. 330 The much
simpler Bruckner Cylinder, a large, horizontal cylindrical tub that rotated on rollers and
tumbled ores over each other like a household dryer, saw much greater use, but its
separate firebox used considerable amounts of fuel.
The most successful of the new roasters, however, adopted the rotating circular
shelf concept of the Pearce-Turret. The new devices were first developed by McDougall
in Liverpool, England, in 1870, and featured several stacked, cylindrical, shelves, most
not larger than 10-15 feet in diameter. In the U.S. successful adaptations included the
Wedge, Herreshoff, and the Evans-Klepetko developed at Great Falls. The McDougallEvans-Klepetko married multiple-shelf circular hearths with a pyritic process in an
enclosed and insulated circular tower. It used the heat of sulfur and iron oxidation to
roast the ores on separate, non-rotating, enclosed shelves, with each shelf essentially
becoming a separate hearth. Mechanical rabbles rotated by a central shaft directed ores
to chutes that dropped them onto the next lower shelf. Without a separate fire box, the
roasters took up considerably less floor space, required fewer workers to tend, and
consumed virtually no fuel. 331 (See Figure 4.15)
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Figure 4.15 Upright 12’-wide Bessemer Converters of the Washoe Smelter for
refining smelted copper matte from the reverberatory furnace (left) and a typical
McDougall-style Wedge Roaster 33’ high used to burn sulfur out of sulfide copper
ores using the heat of sulfur oxidation to propel the process (right).
(Adapted from Shovers 39 and Hofman 95)

Montana smelters also made advances in roasting in the late 19th century. Not
only were the hand-rabbled, hand-charged long-hearth reverberatory roasters labor
intensive, but the smoke from so many smelting sites, some of whom still heap-roasted
large pieces or even stall-roasted ore-concentrates, taxed the residents of the growing
town of Butte. As early as 1885 citizens complained about the smoke destroying wild
flowers and strawberries, but to no avail. Attempts to control the smoke or dissipate it
with tall stacks largely failed, especially as output and heap roasting continued to increase
through the 1880s as Montana surpassed Michigan’s copper production. In 1891, the
city passed an anti-smoke ordinance that ended all heap roasting and required all smelters
to erect a minimum 75’-tall stack. 332
332
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The Dominance of Anaconda
By 1899, Marcus Daly’s acquisition of other high-output Butte mines and the
limitations of the existing Upper and Lower smelting works in Anaconda, drove the need
for smelter expansion. 333 Daly authorized $20 million and hired Frank Klepetko from
Great Falls to design and build the new facility that would become the Washoe
smelter. 334 Daly, who directed Klepetko to design a single new complex using the latest
equipment to maximize efficiencies and provide for future expansion in each department,
died before construction began in 1900. Klepetko selected a 230-acre site on an
Anaconda hillside from 200 to 700 feet above the valley floor to take advantage of
gravity, similar to what he would do at the Michigan Smelter a couple of years later. The
new, complete plant had concentrating, roasting, blast furnace and reverberatory
smelting, converting, and electrolytic refining departments all linked by internal
transportation with an original throughput of 5000 tons of ore daily. It was the largest
smelting plant ever built and in 1902, consumed 750 tons of coal, 2500 tons of lime flux,
778,000 kw of electricity, and 60 million gallons of water each day. By 1908, the smelter
processed 12,000 tons of ore and produced 600,000 pounds of copper and 9000 tons of
slag and tailings per day, doing so at 39% less cost than the older works. 335 With the
completion of the Washoe smelter, the Upper and Lower works became known simply as
the Old Works and were torn down.
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According to Laist, few 19th century technological changes in smelting rivaled
Anaconda’s effort to radically increase the size of its furnaces. In 1904, Anaconda
Copper Mining Company (ACM) took two of its 1901, 50’-long reverberatory furnaces
and joined them back to back with a single fire-box at one end and single flue at the other
creating in effect the largest reverberatory furnace ever built. With such a large size, the
Washoe smelters discovered they could continuously charge the furnace at the fire-box
end and that the latent heat of the furnace “greatly accelerated fusion” and effected a 50%
reduction in fuel needs per ton of copper smelted, all with little increase in personnel
needs. The new furnaces, now producing 250 tons of copper per day, became the
standard in the industry and were copied in Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Mexico. 336
Echoing the changes in reverberatory smelting at the turn of the century, blast
furnaces, which did not undergo radical operational changes, simply got bigger as well.
While the distance between blast furnace tuyeres never got much wider than 57” to
ensure adequate air pressure, the average furnace length grew to 8’ from a 36” cylinder.
The biggest blast furnace at Anaconda appeared in 1906, was 87’ long, and smelted 2500
tons per day. 337

Montana Smelting
By 1910, Anaconda’s gigantic smelter operated sixty-four Evans-Klepetko
roasters, eight reverberatory furnaces over 100’ long, three Mathewson 87’ blast
furnaces, one briquetting plant, and eight 12’ horizontal converters. Its concentrated ores
336
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were smelted in the large reverberatory furnaces for 45% copper matte. The matte was
sent to the converter department and refined to 99% pure blister copper, remelted in a
smaller reverberatory and cast into anodes that were taken to the electrolysis department
and purified to 99.97%. The blast furnaces were charged with coarse ores, concentrate,
reverberatory and converter slag, and 10-lb briquettes. 338 The entire smelter process
generated between 3000-4500 tons of slag daily that was blasted with water to granulate
it, then sluiced to dewatering ponds, and transported to a single colossal waste pile the
company used from 1902-1976. 339 (See Figure 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18)

Environmental Problems and Responses
In addition to concentrator slag and tailings, the site generated considerable
smoke. From nearly the start of smelting at the Washoe, regional farmers complained
about the smoke problem and damage to crops and livestock. In response to by local
agriculturists, the works replaced four small(er) stacks with a single 300’ stack on a
plateau 700 feet above the valley floor in 1903. The stack connected to the rest of the site
by a 2300’ flue system designed to cool the smoke, catch dust, and recover arsenics
before they exhausted the top. The stack complex included a roasting furnace and small
reverberatory furnace to process arsenical dust and a series of long-narrow rooms, called
kitchens, to encourage further arsenic condensation and recovery. 340
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Figure 4.16 Anaconda Washoe Smelter ca. 1950s with separate concentrating,
roasting, reverberatory furnace, zinc, leaching, and blast furnace buildings on the
hill side and arsenic recovery, dust collection, and smoke stack on the hill top
linked by a flue. (With permission of Marcus Daly Historical Society)

183

Figure 4.17 Diagram of Washoe Smelter, ca. 1950. (After, Shovers et al. 1991, 36)
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Figure 4.18 Montana Smelting Practices, ca. 1905 (Source: Author)
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Undaunted, in 1905 farmers brought a second suit against the Washoe and
Anaconda claiming damage to crops and livestock. Despite admitting to “some
damages” and agreeing to pay, Anaconda claimed the farmers grossly over-estimated
financial losses. In his ruling, Federal District Judge Oliver T. Crane agreed with the
Tennessee state judge in the Madison case, maintaining that the benefits from smelting
outweighed the damages to farmers, who relied on mining and smelter workers to
purchase their goods. He awarded the farmers a meager $350 in damages. 341 In 1909,
however, at the behest of Teddy Roosevelt, the United States attorney general sued
Anaconda for damages to Federal lands modeled after the successful Georgia v.
Ducktown case, and proposed a similar acid plant solution. 342 Unfortunately, an
economic demand for sulfuric acid and fertilizer did not exist at the time in the West, and
Anaconda agreed to independent monitoring and equipment upgrades such as new
Cottrell precipitators. 343 Despite poor potential for fertilizer sales, the company added a
100-ton chamber sulfuric acid plant in 1914 to recover sulfur from the smoke, expanding
it to 98,000 square feet in 1919 producing 215 tons per day. 344
In 1914, Anaconda bought the International Smelting and Refining Company,
expanding its operations into Arizona, Utah, Indiana, New Jersey, and Mexico. In 1915,
Anaconda, which had been keeping its many separate mines and holdings under the
341

Katherine Aiken, "Western Smelters and the Problem of Smelter Smoke," in Northwest Lands,
Northwest Peoples : Readings in Environmental History, ed. Dale Goble and Paul W. Hirt (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1999), 505-506.
342
Fred Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in
Montana 1880-1930" (PhD, University of Pennsylvania, History and Sociology of Science, 1998), 399.
343
Ibid., 350.
344
Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited., 41.

186

Amalgamated Copper Company, reorganized as a single company, the Anaconda Mining
Company (ACM), in an effort to economize management and better fight lawsuits. In
1917, the smelting works expanded to process all the copper produced from new mines
and included one-hundred roasters, eleven blast furnaces, eight reverberatory furnaces,
and seven converters. The increased capacity, however, overwhelmed the existing dust
collection system by an estimated 50%. Responding to new lawsuit threats and the need
for increased handling capacity, ACM constructed, not just the largest smoke stack ever,
but the tallest masonry structure ever built. The new stack measured 585’ tall, sixty feet
across the top and 75 feet across the bottom. (See Figure 4.14) It featured a new Cottrell
electrostatic plant that used high voltage electricity to more effectively precipitate and
capture 90% of the arsenic from the flue gases. 345

20th Century Evolution of Anaconda
Other improvements and processes at the Washoe works included a plant that
manufactured zinc from Butte ores from 1915 to 1972. ACM also operated a brick plant
from 1922 to 1980, a fertilizer plant that used acid from the chamber plant to create
fertilizer with phosphate rock from 1923 to 1961, and a ferro-manganese plant from 1941
until the 1950s. In 1923, it built a flotation plant to concentrate the poorer ores and, like
smelters in Tennessee and Michigan, started phasing out its blast furnaces. In 1933 it
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installed waste-heat boilers on its reverberatory furnaces and converted the steam to
electricity, producing up to 30% of the site’s mechanical power. 346
Also in 1923, in a move to expand operations, diversify, and more fully vertically
integrate as its Butte mine values and ore reserves start to decline, Anaconda purchased
the Chuquicamata mine in Chile, one of the richest porphyry deposits on earth, and soon
after bought the El Teniente and Potrerillos mines too. 347 Anaconda would ultimately
purchase brass rolling mills, copper foundries, uranium mines, aluminum, lead, and zinc
works, and a host of other end-product manufactories in an attempt to be completely
integrated and the largest non-ferrous company on the planet. 348
Following a failed attempt at underground block caving in the early 1950s,
Anaconda turned to open-pit mining in Butte and opened the Berkeley Pit in 1950. This
was a deep new surface mine created to excavate the large low-grade copper deposit that
sat below portions of the city of Butte and other district cities. The pit not only forced the
relocation of several neighborhoods and the destruction of popular parks, entertainment
venues, and more than a dozen underground mines, but it also destroyed the late 19thcentury smelting district that once housed the Butte and Boston smelter, Montana Ore
Purchasing Company smelter, and Boston and Montana upper and lower works. 349
Although the public outcry about the loss of town sites in the 1950s was muted by the
promise of jobs and extending the life of the declining district, by the 1970s, talk of pit
expansion and the removal of Butte’s central business district prompted the first elements
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of an organized protest movement, one that would play a major role in redefining the city
over the next thirty years, especially as the pit became the national archetype of miningrelated environmental disasters. In 1976, the Atlantic Richfield Oil Company (ARCO)
bought Anaconda after losses stemming from the 1973 expropriation of ACM’s Chilean
operations devalued the mining company. Anaconda had replaced its reverberatory with
electric furnaces to cut emissions in the 1970s, but in 1980 closed its smelter for good. 350
Important advances made in mining and milling techniques in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, including open pit excavation and the extensive use of flotation,
opened significant porphyry deposits in Utah and Arizona and new smelters were built at
or near the mines. New copper lodes were also opened in Alaska, Nevada, and New
Mexico and stand stand-alone smelters operated in Tacoma, Washington, and El Paso,
Texas, to process much of the new ores. Despite accelerated production and
consumption, few major technological changes occurred in copper smelting following the
general demise of the blast furnace in the 1920s, until the wider use of electric furnaces in
the 1970s and flash smelting in the 1980s. 351
American copper smelting evolved from relatively small-scale European
technologies into some of the largest metallurgical applications on the planet. Although
European smelters developed technologies to smelt and refine copper over many
centuries, their greatest technological advances came late, at a time of declining European
350
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mine production. The United States, however, with rapidly expanding electrical
applications that ushered in the modern world, created a demand for copper never before
seen. To meet the demand, miners and smelters adapted old and new European
technologies to produce copper faster and cheaper, and make available the extensive
deposits of very low-grade ore that, prior to the end of the 19th century, the world had had
little use for. While none of the three sites discussed in this work mined very low grade
ores, they each adopted, and in some cases advanced or even perfected, technologies that
allowed them to reap first the richest ore deposits, then, with ever advancing
technologies, some of the leanest deposits in their regions.
While many histories of the copper companies and copper producing regions
explore the technological and economic developments of their productive years, few,
until the 1990s, fully considered the after effects of this production and the waste streams
generated from ores with 2% or less copper. Part II of this dissertation will examine what
happens in copper-producing regions after copper companies ceased, or very
substantially reduced, mining and smelting operations. One of the legacies was typically
a degraded environment, the product of a century or more of producing mine tailings,
slag, acid rain, and deforestation. In some copper mining and smelting districts, the
degradation was severe enough to get portions listed as “Superfund” sites and involved in
federal environmental remediation efforts. Another legacy was, ironically, a growing
interest in preserving elements of the same industrial heritage that had caused the
environmental degradation and using it to promote heritage tourism as a replacement for
the now-lost industrial payrolls.
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PART II

An examination of the historic and contaminated copper mining and smelting
districts in Montana, Tennessee, and Michigan, and the efforts to both clean and
preserve the significant heritage landscape.

191

192

CHAPTER 5. DUCKTOWN
Observations were made on the condition of the vegetation in the region
surrounding Ducktown and Copperhill, Tennessee in the neighborhood of the
copper smelters during the month of September, 1913…The area affected by the
acute form of injury is probably larger than it was in 1905 and 1906… In the
worst affected area little herbage is found, and the hills look like a desert with a
greatly eroded appearance…Repeated acute injury of this sort kills the twigs of
trees and finally brings about the death of whole trees.
-George Grant Hedgcock, 1914 (“Injury by Smelter Smoke,” 70-71)
…the landscape opens up, and suddenly there is a vast, raw plain, cooking in the
summer sun. No trees, no plants, no signs of life, just a great expanse of dry redclay hills cut deep with massive gullies…so strange, so sudden, so out of place.
-Wilton Barnhardt 1987 (“The Death of Ducktown,” 36)
“It’s sort of sad. I’ve grown up with the painted cliffs and red hills and, in a
curious way, they’re quite lovely and unique….It’s our history and we’re proud of
it…They ought to leave it to show what man can do to nature [and] what man can
undo.”
-Loraine Lee, 1987 (Quoted in “The Death of Ducktown,” 41)
April 11, 2008
The final drive into Ducktown, Tennessee, from Chattanooga is rather
unremarkable especially given the striking, thirty-mile climb that follows the Ocoee river
gorge up from Cleveland (Tenn.). One would hardly know that this stretch of river was
once classified as ecologically dead and not expected to fully recover for decades. Dead,
however, is a relative term. The fall of the river over 30 miles powers three Tennessee
Valley Authority hydro-electric plants, offers recreational kayakers and rafters occasional
white water, and hosted the 1996 Olympic paddling course. Fish and aquatic plants and
insects, however, are sparse here. Heavy metals, arsenic, and acids washed into this
watershed from over a century of copper mining and smelting operations in the
Ducktown district. Some contamination resulted from the direct effluent of processing
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operations, but the majority came from serious and significant erosion caused by several
decades of open sulfide ore roasting that, combined with mining-driven lumbering
operations, left a completely denuded landscape of dirt hills and sediment-filled valleys.
Today the Ducktown area is a bucolic, forested hill top looking like any other
small town in eastern Tennessee accessible by a four-lane highway exit ramp. Unlike
Copperhill, its sister-city at the southern edge of the Copper Basin five miles south,
Ducktown has a small commercial strip, a fast-food restaurant, and a hotel but no railroad
station for excursion train stops. Driving east on U.S. 64, the only hint of any sort of
past industrial activity are the signs bolted to chained gates that read “McPherson Mine”
or “London Mill” or, one half-mile off the highway in downtown Ducktown, “Burra
Burra Mine” and “Ducktown Basin Museum,” the latter with its collection of historic
buildings and equipment largely invisible from the road.
The imagery changes along state highway 68 south to Copperhill. The large flagtopped head frame of the Central Shaft towers above the trees shortly before the
“Smelters” gristmill store and fireworks stand. Continuing south along the highway into
Copperhill, however, the extensive, chaotic, partial remains of the Tennessee Copper
Company smelter and acid plant loudly announce recent and not-so-recent industrial
activity, while a quarter-mile beyond the plant, quaint downtown Copperhill’s copperaccented street lights, heritage signs, and mineral gift-shops quietly suggest a past worth
remembering.
A mere thirty-five years ago, however, the landscape of the Tennessee copper
basin looked entirely different. Despite the cessation of all open-air ore roasting by 1905,
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the area remained sharply denuded and moon-like, with very little vegetation as late
1973. Locals claimed that the 50 square mile basin was the only man-made landscape
visible from space and among the myriad national articles and photographs about the
district is a now-famous two-page National Geographic aerial image showing the
sparsely populated built environment completely engulfed by totally barren red-sand
hills. 352 While an abomination to some, many locals, but not all, who grew up with this
landscape mourned its passing. Like the belching smoke of Pittsburgh’s blast furnaces,
the denuded landscape was a symbol of the region’s prosperity and a significant
component of its identity. Although attempts to preserve a small 30-acre portion of
barren hillside have succumbed to successful revegetation (See Figure 5.1) and
remediation efforts, preserving and celebrating the basin’s remaining mining heritage
remains a key development strategy for Ducktown and Copperhill. (See Figure 5.2)

Shutdown
Through mid-century, the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) added additional
plants in Copperhill to produce a variety of chemicals. In fact, its byproduct operations
were so successful that by 1950 copper was relegated to the third leading product
manufactured after sulfuric acid and iron sinter. 353 In the 1950s TCC’s chemical line
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Figure 5.1 Effects of remediation. Aerial photo of Ducktown on the left was taken
in 1944; the photo on the right was taken in 2008 from the point marked on the
photo on the left. (Aerial photo with permission of Ducktown Basin Museum, photo on the right
taken by author.)

Figure 5.2 Map of Tennessee Copper Basin showing selected heritage and
remediation sites. (Source: Author)
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grew even further after it added an organic sulfonating plant in 1952 and a sodium
hydrosulfite plant in 1956. In 1964, the company closed its last chamber acid plant and
constructed its fifth contact acid facility at Copperhill to compliment existing contact
plants built in Isabella and Copperhill between 1929 and 1954. 354 The former Ducktown
Sulfur Copper and & Iron (DSC&I) dismantled and either scrapped or moved its Isabella
chamber plants before being purchased by TCC in the 1930s, and TCC ultimately
removed the remaining chamber and defunct contact plants in the 1970s. 355
In 1963, in a move that foreshadowed later oil company takeovers of copper
companies, Cities Service Corporation, the Oklahoma-based predecessor of CITGO
Petroleum, bought the Tennessee Copper Company, continued underground mining and
chemical production, and in 1976 began open-pit mining northwest of Copperhill. 356 In
1982, the recently organized Tennessee Chemical Corporation (TChC) 357 acquired the
Copperhill and Isabella processing plants and remaining active mine assets from Cities
Service, while Occidental Petroleum purchased the rest of Cities Services including its
substantial oil refining and distribution network. In 1987 Tennessee Chemical ended
copper mining in the state and in 1989 declared bankruptcy. 358 In 1990, Boliden
Intertrade, a Swiss corporation, purchased the Copperhill plants from bankruptcy and
354

Stuart W. Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee," ed. Division of Geology The State
of Tennessee Department of Conservation, Information Circular (Nashville, Tennessee: State of Tennessee,
1966), 6-7, 18-19.
355
"Report for the Extent of Lead Contamination at the Former Isabella Lead Chamber Acid Plant,
Ducktown, Tennessee," Waggoner Barge, Sumner, & Cannon, Inc. (Nashville, Tennessee: Glenn Springs
Holdings, Inc., 2003), 2.
356
Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee," 6.
357
Tennessee Chemical Corporation will be referenced in the text by TChC so as not to confuse it with the
Tennessee Copper Company referred to as TCC.
358
Milton H. Hamilton, "North Potato Creek VOAP Order," in Site ID 70-508, Case No. 99-0480, ed.
Division of Superfund (Nashville, Tennessee: State of Tennessee, Department of Environment and
Conservation, 2001), 5.

197

entered into an agreement with the U.S. EPA not to sue (or be sued for environmental
damages of TCC or TChC) and continued operating the acid plant through 2000 and the
organic chemical facilities through 2008. 359 Properties not associated with Copperhill
remained in the bankruptcy estate of the Tennessee Chemical Corporation. 360
When Boliden Intertrade stopped producing acid and significantly reduced its
workforce, it eliminated all but 300 of what had once been as many as 2000 jobs in the
1970s, resulting in a considerable drop in the local economic benefits from mining and
chemical production. Where the 1906 Madison vs. DSCI lawsuit cited 12,000 jobs
associated directly or indirectly with mining and half the county’s taxes paid by DSCI
and TCC, by 2001 the U.S. Government was the largest single employer in the county
and controlled almost one-third of all land through the U.S. Forest Service. With
inexpensive housing and open forest lands and the Ocoee River offering hiking, biking,
rafting, and kayaking, tourism became the primary income-generator for the county, a
fact not lost on community leaders looking to create opportunities and accessible
landscapes for short-term visitors. 361 Mining and agriculture, the two largest economic
sectors in the county historically, had significantly lost influence by 2003 as locals
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focused efforts on developing a second home/retirement market to capitalize on the
“environmental resources of the area.” 362
Although Occidental Petroleum sold Cities Service in 1983 to the Southland
Company, which by 1990 had sold it to the national oil company of Venezuela,
Occidental remained the last viable district stakeholder with historic liability. 363
According to the 2009 website of Glenn Springs Holdings, an Occidental Petroleum
environmental subsidiary company:
In 1987 the EPA began investigating the site [the Copper Basin] and documented
its negative environmental impact. Since the only remaining stakeholder was
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental agreed to remediate the site in
good faith in keeping with the company’s commitment to environmental
stewardship. 364
Despite the seemingly effortless transition into remediation suggested by the above
statement, fourteen years passed before Occidental Petroleum, EPA, and the State of
Tennessee executed a formal consent agreement to clean up the basin. In fact, according
to relevant authorities close to the negotiations, the EPA pushed hard to have the region
placed on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL), but Occidental fought the listing,
fearing extensive litigation and attorney fees. The two reached agreement only after
Glenn Springs, which had been working in the basin since 1997, finally “voluntarily”
agreed to fund the clean-up, abide by EPA rules and guidelines, and reimburse EPA and
the State of Tennessee for costs incurred. The EPA, in turn, agreed to let Occidental
362
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manage the clean up and keep the operation from being federalized in an historic
memorandum of understanding signed in 2001, and the State’s Voluntary Cleanup,
Oversight and Assistance Program (VOAP) kept Glenn Springs from potential long-term
state-liability. 365

Early Reaction to Environmental Degradation and Response
It is true that citizens of Lower Wales and Southwest Montana complained about
and sued copper smelters over lost vegetation and sick animals, and that smelter smoke
court cases, newspaper accounts, and mining textbooks often cited barren landscapes
surrounding smelters. Few regions, however, experienced the debilitating effects of
landscape
change as great as the Ducktown district. As noted in Chapter 4, the loss of woodlands
surrounding Tennessee copper mining and smelting locations completely shut down the
industry in 1878, and, following a resumption of mining and smelting in the 1890s and
legal and technical efforts to reduce sulfur emissions, district companies and Federal
agencies began coordinating efforts to solve the landscape problem in the 1920s. While
Michigan copper regions harvested significant amounts of timber for mining operations
and Montana smelter smoke led to considerable vegetation loss, efforts to combat these
problems usually resulted in court orders or municipal actions ending the injurious
practice or damage awards to affected parties, not complete shutdowns. Tennessee
365
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observers chronicled the problem more completely, and companies took actions to
actually remediate the problems well before any other district.
This is not to argue that Tennessee corporations were more environmentally
conscious than other mining companies. Rather the Tennessee copper district operations
caused significant problems outside the region, especially noticeable after Franklin
Roosevelt created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933. TVA’s jurisdiction
extended over the entire Tennessee River drainage, including Davis Mill Creek and North
Potato Creek, both of which ran through the Copper District, fed Ocoee River hydroelectric plants, and ultimately emptied into the Tennessee River. While the extra-regional
awareness created by TVA resulted in funding for studies and remediation efforts, the
conservation movement actually began in the region in the late1920s, and it is difficult to
define what early drivers were present in Tennessee that didn’t exist in other regions.
Karen Daniels argues that the 1907 Georgia Supreme Court case created regional
awareness and ignited the conservation movement, 366 but court cases occurred in other
areas, including Montana, Utah, and California that did not coalesce into a sense of
community responsibility and a need to remediate the after-effects of smelting. 367
Tennessee’s landscape itself may have contributed to a stronger sense or
perception of loss. The barren, red-soil lunar landscape of the Ducktown district sat in
stark contrast to the thickly wooded green Appalachian forests that visitors traversed to
366
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reach the district, strongly emphasizing the devastation. Similarly, Southern residents in
general found greater identity with their Southern Culture and its agricultural roots than
with industrialization often associated with Northern culture, and for a short time in the
1930s, a group of Tennessee scholars and writers called the “Fugitives” promoted an end
to creeping industrial materialism and a return to traditional Southern agrarian values.
While this particular group did not foster much change and was largely washed out by the
depression, it did contribute to a controversial agrarian manifesto, I’ll Take My Stand: the
South and the Agrarian Tradition, and reflected some deeply seated beliefs. 368
Thus landscape devastation would have caused greater concern. Further,
Michigan mines and smelters followed by Montana mines and smelters each led global
copper production, creating a stronger regional/state-wide industrial identity and pride for
the productive output of their districts. Big mines led to big production and greater
population densities and diversities including the establishment of mining colleges that
continued as technological universities after the end of most mining. Tennessee mines
and smelters never produced at the rate of either Michigan or Montana, had more visible
environmental problems and landscape degradation, and with strong regional agricultural
identities, state and regional residents were more likely to react to landscape change than
industrial production. In any case, writers, mostly non-locals, described the landscapechanges earlier than in other copper smelting districts, and companies tried to remediate
the environmental effects earlier than other districts. Later local residents would try to
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preserve the desolate landscape as an element of their historic identity, earlier than their
counterparts in other copper regions.
A short review of popular imagery from the 20th century of the three districts also
demonstrates key identity issues for the areas. Where regional Montana photographs and
postcards show mining activities, smelting equipment, downtown buildings, and people,
and regional Michigan photographs show miners, industrial structures, and shipping,
popular Tennessee imagery is dominated by the denuded landscape. Both Montana and
Michigan regions are depicted by the built environment. Tennessee is depicted mostly by
environmental destruction. 369 Not until the Superfund era and greater environmental
consciousness did popular views begin to focus on environmental decline in Montana,
mostly at the Berkeley Pit, while in Michigan this still has not occurred despite the
Superfund cleanup.
The denuded Ducktown landscape was a direct result of mining and smelting
operations, but M. –L. Quinn added twelve reasons why the landscape itself was partly to
blame for the devastation. From isolated mountains with poor transportation routes, to
high sulfide and pyrite concentrations, and high rainfall, humidity, and temperature
inversions, the environment itself was not a passive victim, according to Quinn, but rather
contributed to it own desecration. 370
Environmental susceptibility is an identified condition whereby the environment
of a particular location, because of the location’s natural features, is especially
369
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vulnerable (is predisposed) to injury from specific human activity. Susceptibility,
therefore, is a function of a site’s natural features, but the basis for its
determination is the manner in which those features interact, or could interact,
with a particular human activity. 371
In any case, the estimated loss of 50 square miles of forest and vegetation was formally
recorded in 1929, and in 1944 the TVA estimated that Basin lands eroded at a rate of 39
ac-ft/mi2/year

while the rest of the Ocoee River drainage averaged only 0.44 ac-ft/mi2/year.

Further, by 1951, TVA had documented that in two separate 5 and 15 acre parcels,
erosion had consumed a total of 1.8 and 1.9 feet of topsoil and subsoil over 17 years. All
of that sediment, much of it contaminated with acids and heavy metals, found its way into
the Ocoee River. 372
Despite an early and clear understanding of vegetation loss and the effects of soil
erosion especially during heavy rains, efforts to re-forest the basin and control sediment
loss did not begin until 1929, when the Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron Company
(DSCI) sought advice from the U.S. Forest Service. With the Department of Agriculture
it planted and/or distributed 3000 trees in 1930 with the assistance of the University of
Tennessee extension service, and continued this practice in subsequent years. Although
no clear reason for the company-sponsored revegetation emerges from the literature,
Edward Johnson cited a 1929 Forest Service report that included a discussion of financial
returns from timber production based on market demands and wood quality. While
Johnson does not state whether this was the prime reason for tree-planting or a secondary
benefit, the late 1920s economic decline in copper and acid production that ultimately led
371
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to the 1936acquisition of DSCI by TCC, may have forced the company to look for
alternate means of income as its economic position declined. In 1973, a Cities Service
report stated:
The land reclamation program carried out over more than 35 years by TCC and
subsequently Cities Service has been carried out in the interest of better utilization
of our natural resources (land) by putting it into productive forest land use as well
as reducing possible siltation of surface waters in the Basin. This program has
been carried out as a Company Policy and has been in no way connected with
legal or administratively imposed requirements from any governmental body or
Agency. 373
Despite limited culpability or admission of responsibility, the company may also have
been succumbing to political pressure or reacting to negative accounts of the landscape,
problems with the TVA, or the potential threat of lawsuits.
Through the 1930s and 1940s, several groups including the Tennessee Extension
Service, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Plant Industry, Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC), Federal Soil Conservation Service, TVA, and universities in Tennessee, Georgia,
and North Carolina studied and worked to continue reforesting efforts the area but with
only partial success because many early plants did not survive long enough to reproduce
and establish new ground cover and forests. 374 Between 1939 and 1950, the TVA, which
had done little direct work on the Copper Basin erosion problem in the 1930s despite
direct siltation effects on its two (at the time) downstream hydro-electric plants, took the
lead in research, and with an established CCC camp in 1941 planted trees on the
perimeter of the worst affected areas and experimented to determine which tree and shrub
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species grew best in the basin’s acidic soils. 375 In 1943, TVA built a third hydro-electric
plant on the Ocoee. This one, just a few miles downstream from the basin, included a
large reservoir to stem the flow of sediments and heavy metals to its further down-stream
plants. 376 According to Muncy, however, by 1973, sediment completely filled the
Number Three hydro-plant reservoir, requiring occasional sluicing of sediments
contaminated with heavy metals and acids downstream. 377
TCC largely took control of the revegetation efforts from TVA in the 1950s and
hired a professional agriculturalist to continue its tree planting program. 378 Through the
1970s a variety of programs continued, each with some degree of success as acre by acre,
the 32,000 acres of denuded landscape slowly shrank to 20,000 in 1943 to 12,000 in 1986
to close to 1,500 in 2000. 379 While successful experiments with the “miracle legume”
kudzu in 1956380 proved the plant to be a “competitive threat” to other flora, 381 most new
plantings included some combination of loblolly pine, Japanese fleece flower, or weeping
lovegrass. Each of these demonstrated resistance to district toxins especially when
augmented with new fertilizers, planting techniques, and, in the 1970s, rapid aerial
seeding and feeding. Between 1950 and 1969, 4.5 million trees were planted, and
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between 1970 and 1986, 6.85 million.382 By 1999 over 17 million trees had been planted
since TVA-funded reforestation efforts had begun in 1941. 383 By 2008, most sources
cited only one unvegetated 30 acre parcel, intentionally left denuded behind the museum
that, because of dangerous subsidence from a mine collapse, could not be entered to
remove the volunteer trees successfully reseeding. 384 Although nearly 75 years of
plantings have significantly reduced the desert appearance, a 2008 drive through the
basin reveals a few remaining bare spots. 385
About the same time as heavy revegetation efforts began, community awareness
and activism crystallized at a rally of the Tennessee Conservation League held in the
Copper Basin on May 27, 1950, organized for the kickoff of a state-wide “Keep
Tennessee Green” campaign and to recognize the successful contributions of local
industry. The speakers included Tennessee’s Governor, TCC’s General Manager, and
regional historian R.E. Barclay among others. Several focused on the success of early
reforestation efforts in the district, then about 50% recovered. 386 Governor Browning
remarked that as a nation “conservation of our natural resources must be our aim if we
are to survive” and “that the human race is just 8 inches from starvation and one-half of
this has gotten away from us,” referring to lost topsoil in the Basin and reflecting the dust
bowl just fifteen years earlier. TCC’s general manager proclaimed that the copper
company had only just begun remediating and pledged to “Keep Tennessee Green,”
382
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while R.E. Barclay asserted, after describing the contributions of the copper company to
community employment and taxes, that communities could rebuild lost houses and cars,
but that without plants, it would surely perish. Probably the most telling observation and
an early indication of changing directions in economic thought, however, came from C.
P. Swan, State Commissioner of Conservation, who described how state-wide tourism
had become a $225 million dollar industry by 1949, third only to manufacturing and
agriculture, and with better managed green spaces, Swan saw no reason why that that
amount could not be doubled. 387 (See Figure 5.3)
Efforts to further sway negative, outside public opinion and convince observers
and potential tourists that remediation was successful included a 1000-acre bluegrass and
clover-covered demonstration farm that supported a 100-head herd of “purebred
Aberdeen-angus” cattle, and a nine-hole golf course right in the heart of the district.
These 1950s projects were designed mainly to serve as “proof that the soil [wasn’t] as
dead as some of it looks” despite the fact that TCC lost money on their operations. 388

Origins of Ducktown Heritage
In popular articles titled “Ducktown-A Post War Challenge” (1943), “Healing the
Scars” (1956), “Tennessee Valley Today,” (1973), “Copper Basin Cover-up” (1983),
“Death of Ducktown” (1987), “Industrial Destruction Reversed at Copper Basin” (2002)
and “Up from the Mines in Tennessee,” (2007), journalists made a point of describing

387

""Must Conserve Resources If We Survive," - Browning," Copper City Advance, June 1, 1950, first and
last pages of section 1.
388
Peters, "Healing the Scars in the Copper Basin," 1.

208

Figure 5.3 Conservation Rally in Copperhill, Tennessee, 1950 to kick off
“Keep Tennessee Green” campaign. (Source Tennessee State Library and Archives

website http://tnsos.org/tsla/imagesearch/index.php, accessed March 31, 2009.)

Ducktown as a landscape mired in environmental conflict and asserting that only near
super-human effort had ultimately resulted in a resounding remediation victory. 389
While these authors represented mostly an outsider perspective about the remarkable turn
around in just 50 years, others questioned whether such a full restoration was of any
value to district resident insiders.
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M. –L. Quinn, probably the most prolific writer on Ducktown since R. E. Barclay,
wrote a 1992 article titled, “Should all Degraded Landscapes be Restored?” in Land
Degradation and Rehabilitation Journal, complimenting four additional articles she
wrote on the historical and environmental forces that shaped the Tennessee copper
mining district’s landscape. In her Land Degradation article, she reflected on the desires
of some locals who felt a sense of loss because the heritage landscape they grew up with
changed so dramatically as the restoration process neared completion. Quinn argued that
all reforestation efforts should stop (as of 1992) until the extant mining/smelting
landscape could be surveyed and documented for its unique and historically important
characteristics and to determine if remediation efforts conflicted with or diminished the
cultural and historical value of the Basin—similar to processes required by Federal
projects under Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA. Quinn further called for independent
historical assessments because TVA and the U.S. Forest Service had been too zealous in
their reforestation efforts and the EPA’s mission of protection and remediation rendered
it incapable of objective evaluation. 390
Similar themes surfaced in Barnhart’s and Dixon’s Ducktown articles, although
these authors quoted residents mostly for literary contrast. Quinn’s notions, however,
reflected a growing body of literature questioning the extent and value of some
remediation efforts. Archeologist Don Hardesty wrote “Issues in Preserving Toxic
Wastes” (2001) in the Public Historian, specifically questioning the value of remediating
all toxic sites, especially those that have recoverable archeological data or heritage value
390
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and are not, of course, posing immediate threats to human life. 391 Similarly David
Robertson wrote in “Heaps of History” (2000) in the Journal of Illinois History, that
despite their negative association to outsiders, there may be greater community value
than harm in not fully remediating waste streams. In the case of Toluca, Illinois, he
described how residents unanimously approved historic landmark status for “Jumbo,” a
massive coal mine waste pile. 392 Even more critically, Fred Quivik questioned the very
authority of the EPA to decide remediation treatment options in sensitive cultural areas in
“Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous
Materials: An Assessment of Superfunds’ Record” (2001) in the Public Historian. 393
The issue of preserving a portion of denuded basin and counter efforts to fix the
erosion problem drew considerable outside attention. Many district residents wanted to
keep at least a part of their “beloved scar” 394and a community survey conducted in 2001
quoted residents who wished to preserve the “moon-scape.” 395 Even as late as 2008,
when most of the open acreage behind the museum was well on its way to volunteer
reforestation, Ducktown’s mayor still wanted, but didn’t know how, to keep part of the
small parcel free from trees to commemorate the region’s history. 396 (See Figure 5.4)
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Figure 5.4 The 30 acre parcel behind the Ducktown Basin Museum in 2008
intentionally not revegetated to leave a reminder of the basin’s once denuded
landscape. However, because of the success of new species introduced, the
parcel, off limits because of the visible mine collapse, is reforesting itself
naturally. (Source: author)
But the quandary was to balance local heritage needs while overcoming the real
and perceived ill effects of the region’s mining and smelting past and somehow tap into
the “4.5 million stressed out Atlantans, just two hours south” as potential short-term
visitors. 397 Unfortunately for the city of Ducktown, the 2008 north-bound excursion train
from Blue Ridge, Georgia, and the south-bound train from Etowah, Tennessee, run on
existing tracks and stop in Copperhill completely by-passing Ducktown. So although
Ducktown has the commercial strip and museum, it doesn’t have the built-in tourism
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vehicle its sister city has. It thus struggles for regional identity and greater authenticity in
its heritage planning. 398
Like other rural mining districts, especially those that functioned for over a
century and were in some state of economic decline, third and forth generation Basin
residents sought to commemorate their heritage and celebrate the people and places that
gave their region distinction. In 1978, an impromptu mining exhibit began in a
Ducktown grocery store with some bartered artifacts. It ultimately grew into a more
formalized museum where former workers and local residents gathered personal
collections, stories, and photographs. Shortly after the museum opened, Cities Service
abandoned the Burra Burra Mine site in Ducktown that served as the TCC surface
headquarters from 1899-1976. In 1982, Cities Service donated the mine site to the
Ducktown Basin museum, incorporated in 1978, as a historical monument and museum
space. In 1988, the museum transferred ownership of the site and artifacts to the State of
Tennessee, but continued to manage and interpret the mine site, artifacts, and local
history. 399 The museum soon occupied ten buildings on seventeen acres, including the
office building, machine shop, and ore bin ruins and in 1983 the site was nominated to
the National Register of Historic Places. 400 Although the museum interprets
environmental conditions and copper milling and smelting, it is primarily a mining
museum and, with the exception of the attempt to preserve the small smelter-denuded lot
behind the museum, does not fully address the complex and significant (both positive and
398
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negative) smelting operations of the district. Very similar mining museums operate in
Butte, Montana, and Hancock, Michigan, but both of these districts have other, more
formalized efforts to include part of the built smelting landscape.
The only other significant heritage movement before the remediation efforts came
in the 1990s with multiple national register nominations for districts and sites in the
Basin. The Southeast Tennessee Development District nominated the Ducktown and
Copperhill downtown business districts and neighborhoods, the last-standing and
regionally-unique Central Shaft mine head frame, and two individual non-industrial
buildings to the National Register in 1992. 401 With the exception of the inaccessible but
highly-visible Central head frame, all nominated structures and districts, including the
1983-nominated Museum site, were publicly accessible. The more significant industrial
site, the Copperhill smelter and acid and organic plants, however, were left off
completely. Relevant Authorities suggest that planners discussed the potential of listing
the site, but that they were discouraged by the smelter’s Swiss operator, possibly because
of unfounded fears of federal restrictions on site use. Further, the large active site might
not have helped the kind of development regional authorities hoped for. From its
website, The Southeast Tennessee Development District:
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provides and shares a staff to cost effectively plan, promote and implement
programs that result in the development and improvement throughout the
southeast region of the Tennessee River Valley Basin. 402
While little evidence supports the assertion that the site may have been too ugly for
inclusion, from the 1950s to 2008, tourism had been a key, if not the key, development
issue for the Copper Basin, and the Copper Hill plant site with all of its disarray and
destructive appearance, never quite fit well with the clean, controlled, and “attractive”
appearance of its National Register-listed neighbors and shopping districts. In fact as
heritage planning and remediation efforts continued after the Memorandum of
Understanding was signed in 2001, the still-active Copperhill site continued to be largely
excluded from heritage planning. 403

Superfund
While the most visible effects of smelting operations in the Ducktown district
were remediated by extensive tree planting over a 75-year period, few contemporary
articles or studies mentioned the extent of “invisible” toxins remaining in the district until
the advent of the Clean Water Act (1970), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(1976), and Superfund (1980). From 1970 to 2001 several studies examined the remains
of mining and smelting works in the district and determined the extent of environmental
damage. At many locations heavy metals including copper, lead, iron, manganese,
aluminum, and zinc, as well as acids, PCBs, and other chemicals remained in the soils
402
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from a century of operations. For example, one report listed the following contaminants,
many carcinogenic, in one soil sample taken near the Isabella plant in 2004: 2Methylnaphthalene, Benzo(a)anthracene, Benzo(a)pyrene, Benzo(b)fluoranthene,
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene, Benzo(k)fluoranthene, Chrysene, Fluoranthene, Indeno(1,2,3cd)pyrene, Naphthalene, Phenanthrene, Pyrene, Cobalt, Copper, Iron, Lead, Manganese,
Selenium, and Zinc. 404
Under CERCLA, the EPA retains the authority “to pursue long-term remedial
response actions that permanently and significantly reduce the dangers associated with
releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances.” 405 However, before EPA can act
and spend federal money, it needs to first justify the extent of the damage, then initiate
response actions and pursue those ultimately responsible to pay for it. From the EPA’s
description of the Copper Basin on its website (accessed March 13, 2009):
Mining and related activities have resulted in the environmental degradation of
portions of the Copper Basin, including the North Potato Creek Watershed, the
Davis Mill Creek Watershed, and parts of the Ocoee River. Waste materials from
mining and processing activities remain as sources of contaminants in the form of
acidic drainage and high levels of metals in the soils, sediments and surface
waters of the watersheds that drain into and impact the Ocoee River. Acidic
conditions and leaching metals have impaired water quality and deforestation has
resulted in severe erosion. PCB containing oils have been released to the
environment from abandoned transformers. Abandoned and collapsing mine
works and other deteriorating facilities and waste piles also pose significant
physical hazards. In addition, the lack of a healthy soil structure and the poor
quality of riparian and upland ecosystems contribute to poor surface water quality.
This has caused the degradation of large portions of the 10,000 acre North Potato
Creek and the 3,000 acre Davis Mill Creek Watersheds and 26 miles of the Ocoee
River. The two creeks that drain the Copper Basin Mining District site, when left
404

"Report of Inventory and Characterization of Former Mining and Processing Areas and Materials
Located on Public and Private Lands," 4-13.
405
"Copper Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements toward a Common Goal,"
3.

216

untreated, were releasing over 8,600 pounds of metals and greater than 19,000
pounds of acid into the Ocoee River every day. 406
In most Superfund clean-ups, after determining a need for action, the EPA must
list the locations on the National Priorities List (NPL). Once listed the EPA can initiate
clean up actions with Federal funds based on a structured approach outlined in CERCLA
and pursue the potentially and principally responsible parties (PRP) to pay/reimburse the
government for the work, although it often attempts to identify a PRP before initiating
action. In most PRP-funded clean-ups, the project is federalized and managed by the
EPA, often with negotiated input from state and local officials and the PRP. Under such
conditions other applicable laws pertaining to federal agencies must be followed, such as
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act requiring mitigation of
damages to significant cultural resources.
In the Copper Basin, the EPA sought to list the district on the National Priority
List, but the issue was fought by Occidental Petroleum, the only remaining district
stakeholder with liability. Despite arguing that it was not directly involved in any
regional pollution, Occidental had purchased the company (Cities Services) that
purchased the company (TCC) that, along with a company it bought (DSCI), was
responsible for the majority of the pollution. 407 Since the only other surviving district
entities with any potential liability were either out of business (Tennessee Chemical
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Company), free from prosecution (Boliden Intertrade), or owned by a foreign nation
(CITGO), Occidental ultimately realized a prolonged fight would entail considerable
legal fees. Further, presuming even more legal fees associated with an EPA-managed
Superfund clean up along with the negative tourism and development impacts for a
district associated with Superfund, Occidental agreed to assume full financial and
managerial responsibility for the clean-up, accept federal monitoring, reimburse the
government for its cost, and abide by the general Superfund procedures and protocols
outlined in CERCLA in exchange for operational control and the agreement, that as long
as the clean-up followed Superfund guidelines and activities approved by EPA and/or
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) under a voluntary
cleanup and assistance program (VoAP), the operation would remain private. 408
Although the clean-up remained private, Occidental entered into a legally binding
Memorandum of Understanding with EPA and TDEC to enforce the clean-up order. 409
Similar to federalized Superfund clean-ups, potentially responsible party (PRP) funds
supported studies to determine the extent of damage, proposed and executed clean-up
actions, and promoted community involvement in the decision process. A certain portion
of the money expended was also contributed directly to community projects as reparation
for damages caused and loss of quality of life. Occidental, through its Glenn Springs
subsidiary, contributed significantly to district projects. It funded annual picnics and site
tours, funded museum projects, developed a Community Involvement Plan, provided
408
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funds for the community to hire technical experts to assist it in participation, and
provided scholarships to district students attending state universities. 410 However, unlike
federalized projects, Glenn Springs and the EPA argued when pressed, this clean-up was
not legally bound to follow laws that applied to government activities or government
property, such as Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA, and no federal agency or the State of
Tennessee pursued the issue further.
EPA divided the region largely into three main components in the memorandum
of understanding (MOU), each a separate watershed emptying into and including the
Ocoee River. (See Figure 5.5) The North Potato Creek watershed encompassed most of
the original mining lands, the open pits, and the towns of Ducktown and Isabella,
including the substantial smelter and acid complex that was largely abandoned by 1987.
The Davis Mill Creek watershed included some later mining activity but bisected the
Copperhill site that was active in some capacity through 2008. Although Glenn Springs,
as outlined in the MOU, removed a substantial slag deposit adjacent to the Ocoee River
in Copperhill and implemented water-treatment plans and water diversion controls to
contain metals and acid run off from Copperhill and significantly reduced contamination,
most of the clean-up activity focused on the North Potato Creek watershed because Davis
Mill Creek still contained operating industry governed by other laws. 411
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Figure 5.5 Copper Basin Mining District showing North Potato Creek and Davis
Mill Creek watersheds. (Source: "EPA Proposes Action on Davis Mill Creek," 2003, 3)
Ultimately, much of the remediated area in the North Potato Creek watershed will
be converted to public park land with hiking and biking trails, and some heritage
interpretation with the Ducktown Basin Museum serving as the park trustee much in the
same way it manages the state-owned Burra Burra mine site. 412 By 2008, Glenn Springs
had already capped the lead contaminated soils surrounding the Isabella acid plants, and
412
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capped and revegetated the former Isabella slag dump and tailings pond. It had fenced all
of the collapsed mines, removed PCB- contaminated soils, and deposited non-hazardous
acidic wastes into the flooded Isabella mine collapse for “sub-aqueous” disposal. Glenn
Springs had also built water treatment plants at the South mine pit to process North
Potato Creek waters, pumped and treated water from flooded mines, and built an
experimental wetland to explore natural water treatment alternatives. All told, according
to an EPA website, the water treatment plants in the Copper Basin have removed 16
million pounds of metals and neutralized 28 million pounds of acid. 413

Heritage
An important part of any Superfund clean-up, whether publically funded or
privately managed under consent decree, includes public participation. Glenn Springs in
the original MOU agreed to develop and execute plans for public involvement in
remediation, education, and future use decisions for the remediated lands. The first page
of the October 2001 Community Involvement Plan, created by the Community
Involvement Partnership that included TDEC, EPA, and Glenn Springs, stated the
partnership’s mission was to “provide consistent, accurate, and timely information, and to
listen and respond to concerns from citizens.” 414 In addition to explaining the process
and legal framework Glenn Springs would follow in remediation, it also included a
section outlining community concerns, ultimately resulting in a 2003 Future Use Plan.
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The Community Involvement Plan listed six areas of primary public concern: the
cleanup effects on current and future economic conditions, the need for preservation of
the unique and historic region, the availability of remediated lands for future use,
compromised aesthetic land values for future uses, potential site-related health and
environmental problems, and the cost and duration of clean-up activities. 415 In general,
most residents were happy with the remediation plan proposed and had only minor
questions about health and safety issues. Other public viewpoints included relief that the
region was kept off the National Priorities List (NPL) avoiding the potential negative
affects on the tourism-market, and a strong desire to preserve the unique character of the
region and create new recreational opportunities linked with historical and environmental
education programs. Still, long-time residents voiced wishful regret that “the unique
moonscape” and deforested red hills could not be preserved. However, “most residents
[accepted and many welcomed] the reforestation efforts that…restored the tree cover
over the last few decades.” 416
Two years after the Community Involvement Plan, Glenn Springs submitted a
Future Use Plan to “outline the decision-making process for restoring the Lower North
Potato Creek Watershed to a condition that is protective of human health, safety, and the
environment; and provides for re-development of the site so that it becomes an economic
as well as environmental asset to the surrounding communities.” 417 This plan only
applied to abandoned properties in the district and not to the then-active corridor through
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Copperhill. A significant portion of the report focused on economic development,
especially tourism, and broke down the demographics of regional visitors and the extent
of monetary expenditures in the area. Most of the plan’s new development ideas were
geared toward tourism and included new hotels, shopping, and restaurants. 418
According to the Future Use Plan, two primary factors shaped the “sense of
place” in the Copper Basin, Ocoee River, and Cherokee National Forest areas: nature and
outdoor activities, which the reforested lands complemented, and the mining heritage that
defined the region’s historic identity echoing the long-standing landscape conflict
between mining and nature in the district. While the recreational attributes of the region
were well established and growing, the plan admitted that, outside of the Museum, “very
few historic places remain and none currently provide interpretive opportunities.” 419 Of
the “few” historic places remaining, the plan cited the structures on the National Register
and the three Ocoee powerhouses and dams, but also called for additional heritage
preservation, specifically citing the Central Head Frame and Hoist House, Isabella
building and acid tank foundations, and parts of the original Old Copper Road. Noting
that restored sites fit into a general upswing in nostalgia-based tourism, the plan called
for additional thematic developments, such as the historic excursion railroad, addressed
specifically to visitors.
Summing up the importance of heritage to visitors, the Future Use Plan stated:
“preservation of cultural landscapes such as the barren areas near the Ducktown Basin
Museum and the mining structures are important, and displays of how the environment
418
419

Ibid., 10-12.
Ibid., 12.

223

and the people were shaped through the mining activities should be included in the site
design.” 420 The Future Use Plan recognized the community’s desire to include heritage
in any sort of redevelopment and its understanding that tourism was a key factor in future
economic growth. It also demonstrated the commitment of Glenn Springs Holdings to
the community and its desire to be a more positive corporate citizen, despite accepting
financial responsibility for pollution cleanup while declining any culpability.
Despite Glenn Springs’ significant financial contributions to community
programs, however, the Tennessee Copper district was beset by complications to heritage
planning. Heritage preservation in general is not a simple task, and the decisions about
what to remember/commemorate/preserve are contested based on relative perceptions of
value. A mill building may be seen by some as an important reminder of what made the
region they live in significant, while to others it may look like an old dilapidated structure
taking away from natural beauty.
Both Ducktown and Copperhill recognized the importance of retaining their
historic character if they were going to attract the kind of tourism and economic
development they saw as their only viable means of income after their industry departed.
While the Ducktown Basin Museum and the Copperhill excursion rail terminals both
contribute to that end, the district is missing a structured approach to broad heritagelandscape management. Tennessee had (and has) its heritage champions, but its
relatively small copper output ultimately did not generate the type of population density
that fosters the formation of large, well organized heritage groups. Polk County (TN)
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only had a 2007 estimated population of 15,000, no university or college to draw in new
community members, and largely had dedicated individuals, as opposed to organizations,
promoting heritage projects. 421 The Tennessee Copper Basin, unlike the Michigan and
Montana copper districts, had little means to bring in new people outside of tourists and
people seeking vacation homes.
Tennessee’s Copper Basin heritage champions, moreover, are beset with
additional complications. Because the cleanup is privately-funded on private land, there
is no legal requirement to consider cultural resources under Sections 106 and 110 of
NHPA, and therefore decisions about preservation are left to the groups managing the
clean up. This does not necessarily mean that the cleanup organization and its public
monitors do not want active preservation. Quite to the contrary, they do, but they do not
base decisions on National Park Service-defined levels of significance but rather on
practicality without a strong professional heritage group assisting.
Ducktown’s mayor, the museum director, and relevant authorities close to the
clean up have all expressed desires to keep part of the built mining landscape, interpret it,
and make it accessible to the public. However, without a legal structure and formal
procedure as outlined in NHPA, the greater expense of preservation over demolition, and
the fact that simple steel or concrete structures are easier to care for than more
complicated buildings, dominate decisions. Which things get saved largely boils down to
the cost of preservation and long-term maintenance rather than to issues of significance.
Under Sections 106 and 110, important structures too damaged to retain would at a
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minimum receive some sort of documentation prior to demolition. This is not to suggest
that Glenn Springs Holdings avoids the issue of preservation, but rather as the funder of
an expensive clean up whose mission is primarily to remediate the environment, its
decisions are based heavily on economic considerations.
The Ducktown Basin Museum director faces similar constraints. Ultimately, the
remediated land will be managed under a trusteeship by the Museum. As the only
heritage professional directly or indirectly involved in the project, the director can offer
opinions on a structure’s historical significance, but has little direct influence over the
process to select which structures get preserved. He is further constrained by the future
responsibility of caring for the old structures and the potential liability of dangerous
structures. While mill buildings and smelter foundations may be historically and
culturally significant, they ultimately will be very expensive to maintain, especially for a
small regional museum with a limited budget. 422
The selection process for preservation thus becomes very simple in this case.
Many decisions about heritage preservation are agreed to by handshake based on
windshield surveys and discussions about the demolition and clean-up costs, public
accessibility, structural stability, health and safety, and long-term needs. While these are
all appropriate considerations for preservation discussions, without significance being
considered first, the preserved structures are largely limited to concrete bins, masonry
retaining walls, some foundations, and simple steel structures such as the Central head
frame.
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Although few could argue against the heritage significance and value of the
Central head frame, other head frames, and museum buildings, some of the other
structures slated for saving have less significance in their existing context. For example,
the partial remains of the concrete fine ore bins at the London Mill site are being kept.
The site of the cleaned bins in their now-grassy field has stunning beauty similar to
Stonehenge in the United Kingdom (especially on a sunny summer day), but much of the
ore bins’ heritage value is lost because they will be the only historic structure left of a
once very large and important milling complex. Without a larger context of surrounding
buildings or at least foundations, the bins are isolated megaliths in a beautiful setting,
belying their own importance and incapable of relaying the historic processes that took
place there without extensive interpretation. (See Figure 5.6)

Figure 5.6 Fine Ore Bins at the London Mill site before restoration (ca. 2000) and after
in 2008. (Sources left: EPA “Copper Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements

toward a Common Goal,” (2005), 1 and right: Author)
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The decision to save only the fine ore bins reflects the nature of heritage
preservation in the Tennessee Copper Basin. The bin’s cleaning costs actually exceeded
demolition costs, reflecting some compromise with full remediation. But the desire to
economically neutralize contaminants associated with chemically hazardous processes at
other buildings in considerable disrepair at the site led to the demolition of the remainder
of the facility and thus the loss of the bin’s heritage context. 423 Given a more structured,
rather than narrow, short-term approach to heritage planning, decisions that included
greater considerations of cultural and historical significance might have resulted in a
more complete industrial landscape.
Further, there is no iconic symbol left in the district. No single entity in the
Copper Basin serves as a replicateable and brandable banner image. Although the
Central Mine head frame comes closest in terms of visibility and recognition by locals, it
is not used as consistently as landmarks in other districts. Unfortunately, the one iconic
feature commonly associated with the Basin, the denuded landscape that appeared in
myriad photographs and articles for a century, is all but gone.

Smelter Heritage
The comparative focus of this dissertation is three copper smelting sites in larger
mining heritage contexts. If by definition, smelting includes every process after milling,
then roasting, smelting, and refining and relevant by-products must also be included.
Therefore, the region affected by smelting in Tennessee includes the entire area denuded
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by open-heap roasting, and the effort to preserve the small patch behind the museum
should be similarly included as smelter heritage along with acid production and the
smelters themselves.
The Isabella smelter site, historic home to significant developments in pyritic
smelting technology and the construction of large acid production facilities, is among the
most contaminated in the Basin. Near Isabella are the historic roasting yards of the
Buena Vista mine and near Ducktown, the McPherson Roast yards, both of which are
also considerably contaminated with heavy metals and acids. All three locations were
significant to the smelting and mining heritage of the region: the two roast yards for the
smelter smoke they generated that led to the lunar landscape and the Isabella smelter
plant for its technology.
Much of the Isabella site, however, was dismantled during the 1970s when metal
and acid production was fully moved to Copperhill. It was further damaged by the
nearby mine collapse that is now serving as sub-aqueous storage for slag waste. The
acid plants resulted in considerable lead deposition in the soil, estimated at more than
1,400 tons. 424 Part of the approved remediation plan involves covering the contaminated
soil with an impermeable cap to eliminate potential human exposure. Other potential
contaminants at Isabella have either been removed, covered, or in the case of slag,
dumped in the pit, leaving little available for historic interpretation. The contamination
of the area is without doubt, but slag piles and debris that pose minimal human health
hazards and sound structures are being saved in other districts, even if in a ruined state.
424
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Other significant Tennessee structures and features might have been saved too if a more
structured approach had been attempted. (See Figure 5.7)
The other significant smelter location at Copperhill has more potential for
heritage preservation, but it too is in the process of being dismantled by the company
operating the site. Because the Copperhill location was active at the time of the
memorandum of understanding and not under the jurisdiction of CERCLA, the plant was
not included in the original clean-up plan and therefore not considered for heritage
planning. Because the State of Tennessee is not interested in pursuing heritage
considerations in the midst of a complicated non-federalized cleanup, little will likely be
done to preserve any of the significant foundations or remaining structures of what was
once the largest acid production plant in the world. (See Figure 5.8)

Figure 5.7 Isabella ca. 1945 and 2008. (Sources left: “Copper Basin Pictorial Calendar”

(2008) , right: author)
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Figure 5.8 Copperhill smelter and acid plant as it looked in April 2008 after
years of successive demolition and removal projects. (Source: author)
This is not to imply that Glenn Springs is not interested in contributing to the
heritage of the district. Its intentions, efforts, and contributions are well documented. It
is simply not bound to consider damages or impacts to properties eligible for the National
Register. In general, its decisions are made on the basis of practicality and not on
historical significance. Ultimately, nearly the entire remediation project area will be
converted to park with walking and biking trails augmented by some historic features.
But the features selected are being chosen for their durability based not on study or
systematic heritage planning, but on hand-shake agreements following windshield
surveys.
In the summary document of the Future-Use Plan submitted to foster public
discussion, the authors assert that the future-purpose of the remediation is to “develop
revenue generating” recreational assets to attract tourism to the Ducktown/Copperhill
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region and the State. “Improvements would encourage cultural, historic, and
environmental tourism through enhancement of historic mining features and would be
important to the region’s economy.” 425 Specific projects included constructing
walking/biking trails, developing interpretive trails and outdoor classrooms to educate the
visitor on mining operations, post-mining stewardship practices, and natural history,
improving educational facilities at the Ducktown Basin Museum, pursuing greater
national historic recognition, and establishing redevelopment/enterprise zones in
Ducktown and Copperhill to encourage mixed-use office and festive/thematic retail
development, and establishing excursion rail service from Blue Ridge, Georgia, and
Etowah, Tennessee. 426
Although a part of the North Potato Creek site will be converted to an industrial
park, the fortunes of the county are geared squarely on tourism development. 427 With a
substantial population in Atlanta just two hours away and sizeable populations in
Chattanooga just one hour away and Nashville only three hours away, and proximity to
the Appalachian Mountains and Great Smokey Mountains National Park, the Copper
Basin seems like an ideal location, and heritage is at the top of the list of attractions.
Although the smelter landscape is largely conglomerated into the broader mining
landscape, its historic effects will still be visible despite significant improvements in
ground cover. A few small plots of land that do not take to reforestation are exposing
stark red soil amid the green canopy, while the intentional plot of denuded land is self425
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foresting. Interpretive signs will increase the visitor’s understanding of the historical
processes that shaped the district.
The individuals working to save and interpret some of the historic structures of
the Basin should ultimately be commended for their efforts. Much preservation in this
country is geared toward tourism, and with luck the two will go hand-in-hand. Moreover,
it is hard to assess how the experiential sensation would be different had a more
structured approach to significance been applied to determining what parts of the
landscape were retained, or how more structured interpretation would combat the stark
realization of some inquisitive visitors who, after a period of time hiking and biking in
the Copper Basin woods, are suddenly struck by fact that all the trees are exactly the
same and all the grasses are exactly the same and all the bushes are exactly the same.

If a single underlying theme were identified to tie the history of the Ducktown
District together from the first mining, through the cleanup and heritage plans, it would
be the idea of the landscape and the land and the on-going conflict with mining or later,
mining heritage. From the beginning the landscape and its characteristics, what M. -L
Quinn called environmental susceptibility, defined and even drove human interaction
more than any other factor outside of economics. The region’s remoteness contributed to
the first two shutdowns. Further its geologic basin features tended toward temperature
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Figure 5.9 Central Shaft 2008 towering above State Highway 68 between
Ducktown and Copperhill, Tennessee. (Source: author)
inversions and limited wind, holding in smelter smoke and contributing to the substantial
denuded moonscape. The smoke from the land’s sulfur-rich ore killed vegetation and
elevated erosion, leading to significant toxin and sediment problems for the Ocoee River,
which, as part of the landscape, generated power for businesses and homes, and prior to
mining and smelting pollution, provided fish for food. The ore’s high sulfur enhanced
the development of pyritic smelting and created a need for sulfuric acid plants both to
protect the land and, through fertilizer production, enhance the growing capacity of the
land. The first remediation treatment, tree planting, was in direct response to the
landscape degradation, and later remediation efforts ultimately resulted in a substantial
wooded park, whose sheer size and long-term management challenges are affecting
heritage decisions.
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The other key issues affecting Ducktown District heritage are the privatization of
the cleanup effort and the relatively small and isolated community. The fact that the
cleanup is private makes many of the active stakeholders’ jobs relatively easier when it
comes to placing priority on remediation over preservation. The EPA can carry out its
mission to protect human health and the environment through MOUs and Consent
Decrees while not having to be formally distracted by legal considerations for heritage.
The cleanup company can largely focus directly on the clean up and choose how it wants
to engage the community. In terms of public relations, this allows it to respond directly
to specific needs of the broad community and not necessarily become embroiled in
controversial heritage decisions. The company is preserving some structures, as well as
contributing financially to many other community projects, and most people in the region
are quite happy with the company’s efforts.
It is difficult to argue that the State of Tennessee is not interested in historic
preservation, but with limited budgets and staffing, the State Historic Preservation Office
is likely a little relieved that it, too, is not embroiled in assessing significance and
enforcing Sections 106 and 110. Certainly the Ducktown Museum would like to retain a
greater portion of structures in the remediation area, but it suffers from limited budgets
and staff, and already has a fairly stable collection of mining structures, so the fewer new
buildings to take responsibility for, the easier it will be for the museum in the long-run.
Overall, it is difficult to determine how negotiations with the clean up company would
have evolved if the EPA had been forced to ensure much broader heritage planning and
enforce payment for greater historic stabilization projects and long-term care.
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Moreover, the small population of the Copper Basin means that organized
preservation groups are small. Had the mining district been more significant nationally in
terms of production, then the small preservationist contingent might have had a stronger
voice for greater preservation. Had more of the nationally significant smelting structures
like the Herrshoff pyritic furnaces or part of the world’s largest acid plant survived, then
preservationists might have had a stronger voice, even if the complexity of remediation
and preservation increased significantly. Had the region not been as polluted over 100
years by copper mining and processing, maybe more outsiders would have been
interested in visiting and more structures in the contaminated areas could have been
saved. But with only a handful of people driving heritage with tourism as their main
goal, and a general satisfaction with the clean up progress, the community is getting what
it ultimately argued for—despite largely top-down heritage decisions.
The approach to heritage in Tennessee is largely an a-historical and skewed, topdown process with EPA and Glenn Springs making the majority of the decisions as
opposed to heritage professionals. This, however, is not the only approach. Montana has
been largely a bottom up process with well organized local groups and members of the
community largely deciding what they want in terms of heritage, then negotiating with
the EPA and the PRP to get it.

236

CHAPTER 6. MONTANA
The city wasn’t pretty. Most of its builders had gone in for gaudiness. Maybe
they had been successful at first. Since then the smelters whose brick stacks stuck
up tall against a gloomy mountain to the south had yellow-smoked everything into
uniform dinginess. The result was an ugly town of forty thousand people, set in
an ugly notch between two ugly mountains that had been all dirtied up mining.
Spread over this was a grimy sky that looked as if it had come out of the smelters’
stack.
- Dashiell Hammett, 1929 (Red Harvest, 3-4)
ARCO save that stack, touch not a single brick
Signify the livelihood that made Anaconda tick.
Still let it stand there stark against the sky,
Like a somewhat obscene gesture catching every eye.
-Tom Dickson (quoted by Mercer 2001 Anaconda, 216)
November 9, 2008
Driving west on US 90 fifteen miles from Butte, Montana, travelers get their first
glimpse and it is dramatic and huge. It dominates the skyline, but not in the same way
the Empire State Building towers over New York or the Eiffel Tower stands above Paris.
The Washoe Smelter stack sits on a geologic shelf 700 feet above the valley housing the
city of Anaconda and Warm Springs Creek, and in front of a mountain as tall as it. This
entire landscape is rooted in the Montana Rocky Mountains, just 10 miles from the
Continental Divide. The stack, at 585 feet, is the largest free standing masonry structure
in the world, 30 feet taller than the Washington Monument, and sits in a view-shed of
equally tall and imposing geologic features.
You know it’s big because the Rocky Mountains are big. You know it’s big because
you can clearly see it from more than 10 miles away. Unfortunately you really can’t get a
sense of exactly how big it is. From even a half-mile away, the stack has still not come into
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its full height. The chief reason is that the stack is the only remaining part of what was once
the largest, most complex, and most advanced copper smelter in the world. There are no
other buildings or structures left to give it proper scale. In fact, you can’t get a real sense of
its immense size until you stand right up next to it and look up. (See Figure 6.1)

Figure 6.1 Anaconda Smelter Stack, from left to right, approximately six miles, one
mile, one-quarter mile, and fifty yards away, November 2008. (Source: Author)
It is remarkable that the stack was saved from demolition. Certainly one of the
most complex, heavily photographed, and arguably entertaining parts of many copper
smelter reclamation efforts is the demolition of the stack. These structures are often
among the tallest free standing structures in any given county and their demolition is a
very dramatic event that causes as dramatic a shift in the landscape as their erection. The
implosion of the Great Falls (MT) smelter stack, for example, was called slow and defiant
and touted as one of the city’s most heavily attended events. 428 Following the
announcement of plans to demolish the Washoe stack just a few months after the Great
Falls stack came down, a group of dedicated residents formed a committee to save the
Anaconda stack, initially as a memorial to the remarkable efforts of the masons who built
it, but as the movement gained popular support, the soon-to-be-preserved stack came to
428
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commemorate the town and smelter workers as well, both still reeling from the shock of
the smelter’s closure and the pending disappearance of the other landmarks of their
history threatened by a Superfund mandated clean-up.
Equally peculiar, but for very different reasons, are the remaining slag-wall
settling ponds in Butte at the former site of the Butte Reduction Works. This long-lived
and innovative early 20th century smelter had immense ponds near its site to store copperrich tailings. Instead of erecting masonry walls or earth dikes, the company used a waste
resource it had on hand: slag. To create the walls, smelter workers erected temporary
forms for retaining walls, probably of sheet steel, to create boxes roughly 10’ (l) x 8’ (w)
x 4’ (h), and poured molten slag into the forms, let the slag set, then moved the walls to
the next section and poured again eventually building up a substantial series of structures,
some over 15’ high that impounded an area of approximately 100 acres. Even more
interesting, two of the formed walls created a slag-canyon that Silver-Bow creek still
flows through. Like the Washoe Smelter, the Butte Reduction Works and all its physical
plant have long since been demolished, except for these slag walls. But unlike the smoke
stack, whose function is rather intuitive even if its size is not, the slag walls evoke an
unknown or little understood historical process until one stumbles upon the interpretative
sign one quarter mile off the main street.
Despite the sometimes confusing nature of seemingly random historic features,
heritage pervades the Butte-Anaconda region. A fellow researcher in the Butte-Silver
Bow archives liked to say that “history is to Butte, what food is to the French.” 429 The
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ubiquitous symbols of the region’s mining history, the gallows frames, are everywhere. 430
The 13 remaining black steel frames dominate the built environment, and are further
emphasized by red cord-lights that outline and illuminate the gallows frames at night.
The frames are on license plates, street lights, newspaper banners, phone books,
brochures, and countless local advertisements. They decorate city hall. They are
modeled in the county courthouse. They are on business cards and in the City-County
Seal. They hold up signs, and are stylized in the logo of the Convention and Visitor’s
Bureau and Mainstreet-Uptown Butte. 431 Several six-foot (appx.) tall gallows frame
models show up on restaurant lawns, abandoned lots, apartment balconies, and even as a
mailbox post in one neighborhood. (See Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2 Gallows Frames of the Original Mine in Butte (left) and model frame
used as a mailbox stand in the Flats (right). (Source: Author)
430
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Heritage symbols fill Anaconda too, but to a lesser degree. The smaller of the
sister-towns, it seems to have had less development and pro-active preservation since the
smelter closed and, except for the stack, was demolished. In addition to being visible
from ten miles away and in nearly every part of town except the historic cemetery above
the county courthouse, reproductions of what locals boast is the tallest freestanding
masonry structure in the world show up on car dealers’ signs, city web-sites, and
advertisements. 432 “Anaconda Stack” is also the name of the smallest State Park in
Montana, founded to take ownership of just the stack site and a small viewing area about
a mile away. The name of the City of Anaconda’s founder, Marcus Daly, not as
maligned as in Butte where references to him only shows up in the name of the Montana
Tech coffee/lunch shop as a pun on “daily,” turns up in Anaconda motel names, coinlaundry names, and in the name of the local historical society that has had at least four
different names since its incorporation several decades ago. 433
The other and probably second most recognized smelter heritage site in Anaconda
is the Jack Nicklaus designed “Old Works Golf Course” built on the location of
Anaconda’s pre-Washoe smelter site. Although most of the old works structures were
removed shortly after the start of the 20th century, Nicklaus incorporated existing
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foundations and waste piles into the course design, and even filled the sand traps with
Washoe smelter slag, now called “sland” by locals. 434
However, there are not many other popular references to or celebrations of waste
or toxicity in the region and only one current visible commercial/iconic reference to the
wastewater-filled, former open-pit mine, the Berkeley Pit. The Pit Printers sits on Front
Street in Butte, and at some point in the 1990s the “Bookley Pit” bookstore operated. 435
But, like Ducktown, interpretive signs extol the virtues of cleaning up man-made
environmental disasters. The Washoe Smelter site, Old Works Golf Course, Butte’s
gallows frames, and the Reduction Works slag walls are all part of the largest Superfund
cleanup in the United States and, at the same time, are part of one of the largest National
Historic Landmark Districts in the country. These two competing poles create a rich
environment for preservation of what was once the greatest copper mining district among
whose notable achievements included significant landscape degradation. (See Figure 6.3)

Shutdown
The decline of the great Butte-Anaconda district was not linear. The Anaconda
Copper Mining Company’s (ACM) Montana mines and smelters experienced their
highest production in 1917, but also saw significant peaks in 1929, 1935, and 1943, each
within 82-85 percent of 1917. 436 Anaconda’s rapid buildup in the early 20th century
included the 1914
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Figure 6.3 Map of Butte-Anaconda showing selected heritage and remediation sites.
(Source: Author)

acquisition of International Smelting and Refining and its New Jersey, Utah, Arizona,
and Indiana smelters. 437 In 1915, it became the sole corporate entity of Amalgamated
Copper holding company and in 1916, built a zinc plant at Great Falls that by 1920 was
the largest in the world, producing over half of the global supply438 In 1917 Anaconda
built a copper wire and rod mill in Great Falls as it began to vertically integrate more
fully. 439 By 1919 it owned all but two daily newspapers in the state and successfully
fought off or favorably negotiated very visible pollution-litigation lawsuits from local
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farmers and the United States Government. 440 Further, suspicious union-hall bombings
and at least one union organizer murder went unprosecuted. In 1922 Anaconda bought
American Brass and in 1929 created the Anaconda Wire and Cable Company. 441 By
1930, the Anaconda owned nearly 90% of the copper mining capacity and 100% of the
smelting capacity in Montana, held considerable local and state political power and
influence, and had expanded operations into Chile and Mexico.
Despite the growth and expansion of the 1920s and new mining techniques
implemented in the 1950s, several historians argue that Montana copper production and
the Anaconda Copper Mining Company declined after World War I and never fully
recovered. 442 Although the decline was gradual for several decades, it often appeared
worse when compared to the rapidly expanding output of Utah and Arizona. Following
earlier copper mining investments in Mexico (1906) and Chile (1917), ACM bought a
substantial portion of the Guggenheim’s Chile holdings in 1923, including the largest
single copper reserve in the world at Chuquicamata. As Chile’s mines increasingly
buoyed profits, ultimately supplying two-thirds of Anaconda’s copper and three-quarters
of its income by the 1950s, the once-singularly dominant Butte-Anaconda copper
producing region became just a division of a much larger multi-national corporation. In
the late 1920s, Kennecott’s Bingham, Utah, mine began out-producing Butte, and
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Arizona became the single largest copper producing state in the country. 443 All this
happened just 40 years after Montana wrestled the designation of largest copper district
in the world from Calumet and Hecla and the rest of the Michigan copper mines.
Despite local fears of a corporate pull out, the Anaconda Company continued to
invest, mine, and produce copper in Montana leading to significant World War II output.
David Emmons cites combined American and Chilean ACM production figures for 1946,
by no means a record year, that included 3.7 million ounces of silver, 30 thousand ounces
of gold, 1.47 million pounds molybdenum, 1.55 million pounds of cadmium, 4,883 tons
of arsenic, 15.6 million pounds of lead, 1.5 million pounds of zinc, 111,397 tons of
manganese, and 742 million pounds of copper, all in the midst of a post-war recession.
The Montana component of this production contributed to a 1948 state-wide per capita
income sixteen-percent higher than the national average, and likely the second or third
highest in the nation. Emmons considers the late 1940s to be Anaconda’s and Montana’s
“last hurrah.” 444
On paper, however, Butte-Anaconda produced at a fairly steady pace from the
late- 1940s through the mid-1970s with peaks and valleys averaging out to a slight
increase over the period. 445 This trend, however, does not reflect significant changes in
the mining landscape. In 1947 ACM began the “Greater Butte Project” to recover lowergrade ores from deposits under the city because most of the deep veins were so low in
copper content that they could no longer be profitably mined. Up until this time
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Anaconda recovered all its copper ore by traditional hard rock stope mining where miners
tunneled into ore veins, blasted out most of the copper-bearing rock, then proceeded to
next level of the mine and repeated the process sending ore to the concentrators, smelters,
then refineries to produce pure copper. The “Greater Butte Project” initially used blockcave mining methods that essentially under-cut ore bodies allowing ores and ceilings to
collapse from gravity and then drawing off ores and considerable amounts of other
materials from below, substantially reducing labor and mining costs, although entailing a
substantial increase in rock and ore haulage before concentration.
Despite claims of 3.5 billion pounds of recoverable copper, plans for a completely
interconnected underground system to allow surface-recovery of ores from multiple
mines at a single head frame, and a nearly 20-year extension of underground working,
most historians consider the “Greater Butte Project” a bust because it was abandoned
after only nine years and never produced at the level expected. 446 However the success
of the block caving plan was measured, the new underground works were quickly
overshadowed by an open-pit mining project that recovered even lower-grade ores by
means large excavators, dump trucks, and far fewer workers.
The Berkeley Pit began just northeast of uptown Butte in 1955 and quickly ate
away at sections of town. Not only did the new mine absorb several historic underground
mine sites and above ground smelter locations on Butte hill, but eminent domain or the
446
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threat of eminent domain enabled it to consume the neighborhoods of East Butte, Dublin
Gulch, Finn Town, Meaderville, and McQueen. 447 Many of the displaced families and
businesses resettled in an area called the Flats, the valley floor south of Butte Hill that
had previously housed smelters, ancillary industries, streetcar suburbs, and cemeteries.
The Berkeley Pit owed its success largely to the significant quantities of low grade ores
that could be mined with relatively few workers, making the poor ore economically
profitable. If the late 1940s were the last hurrah for Butte, the opening of the pit and loss
of neighborhoods and mining jobs heralded the end of the district and the beginning of
even greater changes to the landscape and identity of the region. 448
As with all other mining districts, as the copper content of the ore diminished,
considerably more ore was mined to meet production demands. In addition to greater
gangue mined per ton of copper produced, the “Greater Butte Project’s” more
indiscriminant block-caving methods significantly increased the amount of waste tailings
generated by Anaconda, forcing the company to build extensive new settling ponds to
keep tailings and dissolved metals from washing into Clark Fork. Operationally, the lowgrade copper ore became too expensive to transport from Butte to the Anaconda
concentrating plant, forcing ACM to build a new concentrator in 1964 near the edge of
the Berkeley Pit. The erection of this facility effectively closed the concentration
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department and tailings ponds in the town of Anaconda as ACM opened new ponds and
disposed of waste tailings closer to Butte mining operations. 449
The population of Silver Bow County (including Butte) peaked in 1920 at 60,000,
but dropped by nearly 19,000, or about one third, by 1970. In 1990 the population would
drop to half of its 1920 high. Anaconda’s Deer Lodge County, whose population peaked
in 1960, would not experience significant declines until 1980, but it too would lose nearly
half its population by 1990. 450 Amid declining mineral output and population loss, the
company divested itself of its newspapers in 1959 and broke its ties with Montana Power
in the 1960s, an organization it had once controlled through common board members.
In 1971, a leftist coup forced out the pro-American, pro-Anaconda government of
Chile, and new president Salvador Allende nationalized most foreign-owned mines and
smelters in the country. This action spelled the beginning of the end for the Anaconda
Copper Mining Company. That same year, ACM declared a net loss of $357.3 million
and went into receivership. 451 In an effort to trim costs and overhead, the company sold
its lumber operations and closed its Anaconda and Great Falls zinc plants. In 1974 it
announced it would reduce its workforce by 700-1000 jobs and the next year laid off
1,500 more workers. In a further effort to remain viable, the company began plans to
expand the Berkeley Pit into the uptown area of Butte amid a growing public outcry.
Despite a rash of unexplained and unprosecuted fires to both uptown buildings and
popular parks, and an effort by Butte’s mayor to use the progressive Federal “Model
449
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Cities” program to fund the relocation of uptown to the Flats (discussed more fully
below), the pit only got deeper over the next few years, not wider. By 1977, ACM had
eliminated a full one-third of its Montana workforce, closed its last underground mines,
ended operations at its Anaconda foundry, and, in a last attempt to continue Butte
operations, began mining the East Berkeley Pit, later renamed the Continental Pit to
avoid association with the pollution-filled Berkeley Pit just to the west. 452
These efforts, however, did not save the Anaconda Copper Mining Company.
Like Cities Service in the Ducktown district a decade earlier, the Atlantic Richfield Oil
Company (ARCO), looking for ways to spend-down some of the considerable cash it
earned during the oil crises of the early 1970s, purchased the substantially de-valued
holdings and facilities of Anaconda Copper with a promise to invest millions in the state
and modernize its mines and smelters. 453 ARCO’s commitments however, were shortlived. In 1980 to the shock and disbelief of Anaconda and Great Falls residents, it closed
the company’s smelter and refinery operations, citing increased pollution abatement
costs, and in 1982 it ended operations at the Berkeley Pit and shut off the pumps,
allowing the pit to fill with toxic water.

Epilogue to Butte Mining:
In 1986, the (Dennis) Washington Construction Company of Missoula, Montana,
purchased the mine properties of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company from ARCO,
forming Montana Resources, Inc. (MRI) and began mining the Continental Pit for
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copper and molybdenum on a significantly reduced scale with non-union workers, an
unusual arrangement for pro-union Butte, for the first time since 1934. 454 It also
reopened the 1964 concentrator ACM had built at the Berkeley Pit rim and continued
production through at least 2009. More significantly for this dissertation, MRI sold
several historic mine sites to a new venture called the Montana Mining Properties, which
said it intended to restart underground mining in several of the historic shafts. 455 In the
process of raising additional capital for its operations, however, Montana Mining put
several of the historic gallows head frames up for sale for their scrap value. The thought
of losing the last few remaining frames may have been the final event that galvanized
the community toward preservation. Ultimately none of the head frames offered for sale
were purchased for scrap, and all now make up one of the most unique mining heritage
landscapes in the country.

Washoe Smelter Closure
Unlike the gradual end of ACM and later ARCO mining in Butte, the end of
copper smelting came very abruptly to the City of Anaconda and its workers on
September 29, 1980. At the time, labor and local management were in the midst of strike
negotiations, but both groups shared the expectation of a settlement and a quick return to
work. Just thee months earlier, the Anaconda Minerals Company (AMC), the name
ARCO gave its Montana copper mining division, dedicated a new “state of the art”
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visitors center at the smelter’s main gate, and the company was in the process of
upgrading air pollution controls. Further, just three weeks prior to the closure, AMC was
publically considering switching back to coal to fire its Anaconda smelters. 456 In fact, the
upper management of the smelter and company-owned railroad were fully expecting to
resume operations following the strike and until the morning of September 29th did not
know the smelter would close.
Twenty-five years later Mel Stokke, the last general manager of the site, said “the
closure was a complete shock, I never thought it would come to pass. Up until the day
they told us we were shutting down, I never had a clue.” John Greene, general manager
of the company-owned Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific Railway, echoed the same
sentiment: “We were all pretty damn shocked. It just didn’t make any sense to us.” 457
Even Roger Williams, regional EPA administrator, expressed surprise and deep concern
at the time, that the company proceeded with the closure especially after having had
recent discussions with ARCO about alternative solutions to abate sulfur emissions. 458
Despite a mid-1970s effort to bring the Washoe into compliance with state and
federal environmental air pollution laws that included the installation of electric furnaces
to melt ores, bag houses to collect dust, and a new acid plant to capture sulfur, the site
still fell far short of other regional smelters in terms of emissions control. By the late
1970s, it was the third largest of fourteen western smelters in terms of output, but
eleventh in terms of sulfur recovery efficiency, and was cited by the EPA as one of the
456
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largest single sources of sulfur dioxide emissions in the country. 459 Attempts to fix the
problem aside, the company claimed increasing difficulty hitting what it considered a
“moving target” of federal and state air pollution regulations. 460 By the late 1970s,
ARCO estimated that it needed $300-400 million in upgrades to bring the smelter into
full and permanent compliance. 461 James Marvin, ARCO’s AMC-division president, said,
announcing the 1980 closure, “the smelter just can’t be retrofitted on any reasonable basis
and become cost-competitive with modern smelting operations elsewhere in the world.”
“Since 1972,” reporter Shari Meets paraphrased Marvin’s statements made the day after
the closure announcement, “the smelter operated on a series of variances granted by the
state environmental agencies and, as a responsible company, we do not want to, nor do
we intend to, continue making applications for variances from the environmental
regulations of this state or union.” 462 Citing excess smelting capacity in the world in
1980, most notably in Japan, and the high costs of upgrading, ARCO announced the
permanent closure of the strike-idled smelter on September 29, 1980. To lessen the blow,
ARCO claimed to be considering the construction of a new, state-of-the-art smelter in
Montana or maybe an American port city, but neither came to be as just two years later, it
ended all mining in the state.
Skeptics, recounting conflicting factors in the months leading up to the closure,
argued ARCO was simply interested in minimizing losses and not protecting its workers
or caring about their communities. An EPA study requested by displaced workers under
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the Clean Air Act showed that the smelter could continue operating under current
conditions without any equipment upgrades for eight more years before having to meet
new federal air pollution rules and that specific waivers existed for non-ferrous smelters
under 1977 revisions to the act. 463 Further, the EPA concluded that the cost of permanent
pollution controls was grossly overestimated and instead of $300-400 million dollars,
should cost ACM between $120-160 million. 464
More damning claims came from the Montana Eagle, a major independent
newspaper, in early December 1981. Journalist Bob McCarthy reported that the closure
and layoff of 1500 Anaconda and Great Falls employees came just months before the
effective start date of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which
governed the transportation and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes. The act, however,
contained an exemption for companies that ceased operations before November 19, 1980,
prompting the former Anaconda City Commissioner and several state Health Department
officials to claim that this date played a significant role in the order to shut down. The
acting plant manager, however, denied this claim despite the fact that he too had not been
informed of the decision to close until the day of the formal announcement. 465 Whatever
factors led to the decision, the McCarthy article demonstrated that the shock of closure
was still festering in late 1981, nearly fifteen months later.
To assuage concerns as much as it could, ARCO pledged support to ease the
transition and soften the economic blow. Local officials claimed that the closure would
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result in $24 million annual loss to the Anaconda community in wages and an indirect
loss of 1.5 non-AMC jobs for every one AMC job lost. Although another $16 million
would be lost each year in Great Falls, the city’s greater population and more diverse
economy somewhat cushioned its difficult transition away from smelting. 466 ARCO
claimed that it would help place workers in new jobs, pay benefits and severance, and
pledged $5 million to the city to attract new development. Hopes were pinned in 1981 on
a new plastics firm lured with development incentives, but by 1982 the firm had declared
bankruptcy and defaulted on the $900,000 development loan. Overall, ARCO
development funds created only 30 new jobs, while 14 local businesses failed in the two
years following the closure. 467
Ultimately little could be done to soften the blow of closure. In the first few years
following the closure people left the region looking for work. The state government
promised task forces and attempted to lure new industry, but most efforts did little to
stem the rising unemployment and growing economic crisis in the town. Worse for the
once proud town, however, was the growing concern for the toxic residue left behind by
the smelter and the growing interest by the U.S. EPA in exploring the site under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
or Superfund, the new federal legislation to remediate abandoned hazardous waste sites.
Although ARCO pledged to keep cleaning up problems as they arose, in general, the
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company felt it was getting close to the end of its responsibility despite the looming
Superfund concerns.

Value Transitions
Montana’s U.S. Senators had better luck combating the declining economy in the
Butte-Anaconda region. As early as 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield’s support for
magnetohydrodynamics (MHD), a high-tech coal conversion technology, brought a
development facility to Butte amid significant copper production declines. Mansfield
followed this up by sponsoring a bill for the creation of the National Center for
Appropriate Technology (NCAT) also to be located in Butte. Signed by President Carter
in 1976, NCAT was to apply small-scale and renewable technologies to develop new
means to solve the problems common to low income communities. Appropriate
technology ideation, Carrol Pursell wrote, came out of a “broad counterculture
movement, a reassertion of doubts about the role of technology in American life, and the
burgeoning environmental movement.” 468 NCAT, in many ways, stood at the polar
extreme ideologically from the Anaconda Copper Mining Company.
Not that a financially declining ACM, or a financially stable ACM for that matter,
would be concerned that a few hundred left-leaning professionals moved into the region,
but Senator Mansfield nonetheless successfully headquartered the NCAT in Butte. While
neither it nor the MHD project was intended as an economic replacement for mining, it
was an attempt to change the culture and perception of the region to reflect a more high468
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tech and diversified future. Both projects contributed hundreds of new high-tech
engineering, science, and social-science jobs, but because the region could not fill them
locally, they led to the first significant influx of outsiders to Butte since the 1950s. These
new residents, discussed below, would play an important role in defining the future
identity of the region.
With the end of operations, the district’s identity changed as well, emphasizing
the finality at the end of its mining era. Like Ducktown, several writers and lawyers now
made a point of emphasizing the environmental destruction in Montana caused by ACM
mining and smelting operations since the 19th century. Unlike Ducktown, however, it
wasn’t until copper production ended in the district and the EPA began exploring the area
under Federal Clean Air statutes and CERCLA, discussed in the next section, that the
negative impact of industrial development, beyond smoke-related problems, became
apparent to the public. The significant waste piles surrounding mining and smelting sites,
growing scholarly concern about environmental issues, the dramatic loss of Mill Creek
housing to contamination in 1987, 469 and, more significantly, the feeling that Montana
residents had been left with a huge toxic liability now visible to the entire nation
combined to elevate public awareness of the region’s environmental dilemma. Montana
historian Michael Malone writing in 1985, summed up the growing ethos in the state:
The antique Anaconda Smelter shut down in 1980; the landmark Great Falls
smokestack was demolished; and the yawning Berkeley Pit now fills slowly with
469
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toxic water, perhaps a fitting symbol of the wrenching death of what has
historically been Montana’s greatest industry. 470
David Emmons, writing in 1994, added:
The discovery that the world no longer needed what generations of Montanans
had made had a far more chilling effect on the states’ collective psyche than any
alleged subservience to ACM. 471
Punctuating the evolving local and national perception of regional defeat and
contamination, a large flock of migrating white snow-geese landed in the filling Berkeley
Pit in 1995 resulting in 342 deaths. Some of the birds died that same day from pit-acids
and arsenic poisoning, leaving hundreds of highly visible white carcasses floating on the
pit’s surface. Others died within a few days as they tried to leave the area. 472 Although
ARCO and the State of Montana hotly debated the reasons behind the snow-geese deaths,
it nonetheless contributed to the declining general perception of the area. In 1993, two
years before the snow-geese incident, Travel and Leisure Magazine called Butte, “the
ugliest spot in Montana…despite a spirited historic district,” and Anaconda, “a sad-sack
mining town dominated by a smelter smokestack.” 473 By 2009, the region’s reputation
had hit a new bottom culminating in a travel designation as one of the world’s “mustmiss” vacation places. 474
The designation of “must-miss,” however, is far from fair. From the mid-1980s
through 2008 a well organized and dedicated group of Butte and later Anaconda
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professionals and volunteers have been carefully watching the Superfund mandated
cleanup. They have skillfully managed the legal framework under CERCLA and NHPA
to create not only a safe environment for new economic development, but also a well
managed approach to heritage resulting in significant structural preservation and regional
industrial/environmental interpretation projects, all funded through the Superfund project.

Early Reaction to Environmental Degradation
The mining and processing of gold, silver, zinc, and copper ores generated
enormous quantities of solid wastes: those wastes were an inherent and
unavoidable part of the enterprise. Clogged streams, mounds of overburden, mine
dumps, slag heaps, tailings and slime fields and ponds cluttered the landscape of
historic Western mining camps and smelting towns. There were occasions when
the miners dumped their wastes directly into adjacent streams and rivers; at other
times they stored them, often for decades, behind berms and levee walls. Some of
this stored waste became trapped in low-lying marshy areas and some if moved
through the swamps and was washed into and down streams and rivers.
Occasionally spreading out for hundreds of yards on either side of the waterway;
some made its way even further downstream. Because they signaled robust and
economically healthy mines, these wastes were not initially seen as problematical.
While few had anything to say about mining and mineral processing wastes—
whether in place or carried by waters—fewer still had any idea of what to do with
them. 475
Much of the early history of land degradation in the Butte-Anaconda district
centers around important wastes: smelter smoke, concentrator tailings, and, to a lesser
degree, slag. Although tailings are not directly part of the smelting process, they figured
significantly in Superfund decisions in both Montana and Michigan copper districts and
had clean-up implications at smelter sites in both areas.
475
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As discussed in chapter 4, Anaconda’s 19th-century sulfur dioxide and arsenicrich smelter smoke killed vegetation and sickened livestock, and the problems only
increased as the region’s smelters increased capacity in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. The primary recourse for affected parties, however, was through the legal
system, suing for property damages or injunctive relief. One of the earliest municipal
actions in the country against smelter smoke was the 1890 Butte Smoke Ordinance, which
mandated an end to in-town open heap roasting and tall smelter stacks. 476 The Deer
Lodge farmers’ and United States Government’s lawsuits against Anaconda’s Washoe
works in the first decade of the 19th century were early significant attempts to formally
combat the smoke itself through the court system. None of these efforts, however,
ultimately reduced pollution, especially with increasing output leaving ACM free to
continue operating nearly unabated for the time.
Early, the company largely settled lawsuits through court actions or monetary
payments, or sought a means to minimize damages and potential lawsuits through
property purchases, while searching for technical solutions to the smoke problem to abate
future legal action. In 1902 ACM paid $340,000 to settle claims by farmers and ranchers
but, in 1903, built the first large stack and flue system at the Washoe for reducing some
smoke emissions. During this period it also conducted its own experiments to determine
the affect of smelter smoke, operated ranches and farms under the smoke plume largely
to challenge would-be litigants, and acquired smoke (and tailings) easements from some
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property owners. 477 It also purchased some affected farm land outright to avoid civil
penalties and also began purchasing land for tailings storage. The tailings held
considerable amounts of copper to be recovered when later technology permitted. Early
20th-century land purchases increased Anaconda Smelter holdings in Deer Lodge County
from 5,945 acres in 1906 to 7,014 in 1917, and Anaconda’s other county land holdings
from 3,000 acres in 1906 to 19,139 in 1917. 478
Following the Department of Justice’s 1910 lawsuit against Anaconda, DOJ and
ACM established the Smoke Commission in 1911 to monitor pollution and recommend
alternative practices to abate future problems. As long as Anaconda consented to the
commission’s recommendations in good faith, then the Justice Department would not
pursue the lawsuit in court. The commission ultimately had a hand in the decision to
build the 585’ Anaconda Stack, install Cottrell arsenic precipitators. 479
By 1920, historian Fred Quivik surmises, the Justice Department may have been
satisfied that the Cottrell precipitators recovered 80% of the arsenic, that the new stack
sufficiently disbursed smoke, and that no profitable means for sulfur removal was
available in Montana. Further, Anaconda was satisfied that the processes and equipment
recommended by the commission ultimately increased profits by recovering saleable by-
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products without disrupting smelting operations and, since the Government lawsuit was
not formally prosecuted in court, ACM did not have to pay damages. 480
Although the Justice Department was satisfied with the efforts of Anaconda, the
United States Forest Service (USFS) was not. In 1922, it identified 150,000 acres of
forest, worth $1.3 million in lumber-, land-, and grazing-potential, damaged by smelter
smoke. Instead of taking the corporation to court, the USFS proposed a land swap of
equal value properties, and Anaconda consented. By 1932, in several separate
agreements, the United States and Anaconda exchanged 84,000 damaged acres for 95,000
valuable acres in southwest Montana. Although additional land swaps were negotiated
and some later executed with the Forest Service, the Justice Department, feeling there
was nothing left for it to do regarding the 1910 lawsuit, ultimately abandoned it in
1933. 481
The acquisition of Deer Lodge and Silver Bow county lands had one major
culminating effect. By 1933, when the Justice Department dropped its lawsuit, ACM had
largely settled all of its early pollution issues by buying or trading the agriculture, ranch,
and forest lands its smelting operations affected, and, either buying land or purchasing
easements on all the other lands it needed to dump its waste. By the 1930s Anaconda
operated with a pollution-buffer surrounding its operations that would enable it to operate
without interference until the passage of federal regulations to control the transportation
and disposal of hazardous wastes starting in the 1970s. (See Figure 6.4)
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Figure 6.4 “’E’ Smoke gets in their eyes.” An
end to pollution litigation did not mean an end to
smoke problems or even a denial of its existence.
This cartoon appeared in The Mining Journal in
1943 reflecting age-old ideas that smoke was a
sign of a healthy, robust, and, in this case, patriotic
industry. (The Mining Journal, Feb. 15, 1943, 11)
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Origins of the Butte-Anaconda Heritage Movement
She’s battered, and she’s beaten,
She’s ugly and she’s torn,
She’s battle-scarred and gutted,
From the Copper she has borne.
Still she is majestic,
As she sits upon her throne
A mile high and beautiful,
To those who call her home.
-George T. Grosse (1957, Quoted in Chavez, 1982)
Reading through the secondary literature on the Butte-Anaconda district, one
comes across many poems and short comments reflecting the view that, although their
region is regarded as dirty and unkempt, and ACM corrupt, local residents are still proud
of their communities and their work. Baum and Knox quoted a retired miner who said,
“Them times was tough, but we had no worries about that. Anaconda owned this town,
and Anaconda put food on the table.” 482 However, as underground mining slowed
considerably in the 1950s and the Berkeley Pit began consuming neighborhoods, the
community members remaining after redundant parts of the population left to find work
elsewhere, began to think about the glory days when its mines and smelters were some of
the largest producers on earth. While the decline of mining in Butte-Anaconda may have
initiated heritage directly, the drive to keep mining and expand the Berkeley Pit had a
much more powerful influence on the first attempts to document and preserve the region.
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In the same manner as the Michigan District in the 1950s and the Ducktown
district in the 1970s, Butte-Anaconda opened a museum at an abandoned mine site and
strove to get its significant structures listed in the National Register of Historic Places in
the 1960s. The Butte Exchange Club started the museum in 1963, and by 1964 had found
a permanent home at the Orphan Girl Mine, donated by Anaconda Copper Mining
Company. Between its official opening in 1965 and its 1,000,000th visitor in the 1980s,
the World Mining Museum amassed an eclectic assembly of mining artifacts, many
donated by workers or ACM itself, and added a mining hall of fame, a recreated 19thcentury wild-West mining town, and above ground, open-air exhibits on mining. By
2008, it had added an underground tour, a memorial garden to fallen mine, smelter, and
railroad workers, and a significant photo archive. 483
While the decline of mining in 1950s and 1960s caused locals to reflect on their
past and open a museum, the Berkeley Pit and later the threats of pit expansion caused a
much more dire threat to the district than the decline of mining. Where the Michigan and
Tennessee districts built museums and lost structures slowly to neglect during the decline
and abandonment phases, neither district faced the large-scale destruction of cultural
resources until the Superfund period. Butte encountered this earlier. The expansion of
the Berkeley Pit destroyed neighborhoods, industrial areas, recreation areas, and
churches, and caused citizens to react to start preserving their heritage.
The initial construction of the Pit in the early 1950s and its growth in the ensuing
years had clear ramifications on the identity of the district. According to one Relevant
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Authority, the growth of the pit in its early years caused local Butte residents to feel
trepidation about its expansion, and one local resident, the owner of one of the original
“Copper King” mansions, initiated contact with the National Park Service to get portions
of Butte listed on National Register. 484 This effort, although affording little actual
protection against pit expansion under eminent domain, resulted in a 1958 survey leading
to a National Historic Landmark (NHL) designation for Butte in 1961, 485 covering
several uptown blocks and listing at least 31 contributing structures. 486 The 1961
designation would only be the first step. The original effort would be expanded in 1985
to include a new section formally documenting buildings and mining sites, and the NHL
nomination would be significantly enhanced in 2005 to include Anaconda. 487
Two additional series of events struck at the heart of an economically depressed
Butte in the 1970s. First were a series of fires, some resulting from faulty wiring in old
buildings, but more troubling were the scores of arsons and fires of unknown origin.
Between 1972 and 1975 more than 20 major buildings in the uptown historic district
burned. 488 While several of the arsons went unprosecuted, many locals suspected that at
least some of the fires were authorized by ACM preceding the planned Berkeley Pit
expansion. Locals recounted stories about friends of friends who earned $500 for
burning buildings in the 1970s, and others suggested the company used minors as their
484
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primary arsonists to allow them to avoid “adult” jail if caught. 489 At the same time as
fires were burning uptown, new commercial developments were being constructed on the
Flats including a new shopping mall, airport terminal, restaurants, and housing
developments. By 1975 more than 30 businesses had fled the central business district
(CBD) for new retail developments in the Flats. 490 Further, the development of Interstate
90 significantly altered the traffic patterns of the city because it allowed drivers to bypass
the older Uptown stores and focus on Flats commercial district. 491
The city of Butte was shifting away from its historic business district uptown to
the sprawling flats south of the hill. While suburbanization was a common feature in
most extra-urban growth areas after WWII, Butte had an additional uncommon external
pressure on its older surviving neighborhoods: the Pit. By the 1970s, most community
leaders seemed resigned to the eventual loss of the uptown area. A map accompanying a
revision to the 1960s National Historic Landmark nomination form demonstrated the
extent of the expected pit expansion. (See Figure 6.5)
With the decline in mining, an operating museum, and a National Historic
Landmark district, the heritage movement had a fairly typical start, very similar to the
Ducktown district and many other historic industrial districts in the country. However,
the heritage movement in Butte would grow significantly as a result of three more events:
the “Butte Forward” plan to relocate the CBD, a significant reduction in funding for the
NCAT, and, like the other districts, the advent of Superfund.
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Prompted by the December 1975 letter everyone in town had been expecting for
years from ACM detailing the need to expand the Pit, Butte’s mayor proposed the “Butte
Forward” plan initiated by the Federal Model Cities program. This program granted
funds for infrastructure repairs, administrative training, and reorganizational studies
under the broad rubric of “urban renewal.” Under the 1976 plan, city officials created a
public-private development group called Butte Forward, Inc., to plan for and execute

Figure 6.5 Extent of the expected Berkeley Pit expansion from 1970s to 2000
included the primary central business district, courthouse, and several churches,
restaurants, bars, and schools. This particular map was used to argue for the creation
of the National Historic Landmark district. Ultimately, however, the pit did not
expand into the central business district and remained at the size indicated by the
“present extent of the Berkeley Pit.” (After Dosch (1972). Author shaded area on map to
highlight anticipated expansion of the pit through 2000)
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the relocation of the central business district. Later in 1976, the group submitted a $50
million dollar proposal to the city with expected contributions of $11 million from ACM
and $39 million from the U.S. Government. Despite a petition effort by uptown
merchants calling for a public vote on the matter, and some debate on the actual location
of the new business district, the city council voted 8-5 to move ahead as planned, but,
because of a procedural matter, tabled the issue and planned to officially reconsider the
measure two weeks later. 492
To the consternation of the Mayor and ACM, the council rejected the plan on the
second vote in a move that historian Brian Shovers suggested was possibly the most
important decision in the City of Butte’s one-hundred year history. Shovers wrote, “In
defying relocation [and rejecting the century-long dominance of ACM] Butte not only
reaffirmed its historic identity, a persona forged by the rigors and spawned by the culture
of underground mining,…but had drawn the line on how much it might sacrifice in the
name of a paycheck.” Almost immediately Montana Power, which held several seats on
the Butte Forward, Inc, board, began purchasing historic buildings and refurbishing them
for tax credits while other organizations realized that the city made a significant decision
to embrace its historic identity began shifting priorities. 493
Although many still did not fully embrace heritage as an economic model, several
efforts began to funnel money into restoration projects. In 1979 and 1980, the Historic
American Engineering Record (HAER), a department of the National Park Service, was
invited to Butte under sponsorship of the local government to formally document inactive
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industrial features of the landscape. 494 At the time, HAER was a part of the Heritage
Conservation and Recreation Service of the NPS. While the documentation of historic
industrial sites was a paramount component of its mission, the HAER team was also
charged with assisting in the redevelopment of blighted areas and in this instance,
“analyzing and developing a revitalization strategy for Butte’s uptown historic
district.” 495 In addition to photographs, drawings, and a written history, the project also
proposed the creation of a revitalization agency to manage redevelopment in Butte’s
historic district. Although parts of Anaconda would be documented during the 1980s, the
initial project missed the Washoe Smelter largely because it was a still-active site when
the initial documentation began, then demolished before the later documentation efforts
began.
Around the same time as the HAER project began, a local resident noticed large
dump trucks pulling up to the former ACM office in Butte to dispose of company
records. After stopping the destruction of records, he ultimately formed a group that
worked with the county executive to establish the Butte-Silver Bow Public Archives in
1981 with $7.5 million of public-approved funding. 496 The archives grew to encompass
considerable regional corporate and labor records.
In 1980, Butte consolidated with Silver-Bow County into a single governmental
entity and followed the HAER recommendations and created an Urban Revitalization
Agency (URA). URAs are basically planning and development organizations designed to
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use tax increment financing to promote infrastructure and restoration improvement
projects, in this case within a specified uptown historic district. 497 The additional tax
collected on the increased value of restored building was then pooled in a fund managed
by the URA and reallocated for new restoration and development projects in the historic
district. 498
The growth of heritage interests in the region were further enhanced by setbacks
to programs which residents had hoped would offset the loss of mining jobs. In 1980,
Ronald Reagan was elected president and set out to reduce the size of the American
government. 499 Reagan slashed budgets and social programs without a strong economic
impact and attacked those who, according to Pursell, refused “to embrace technological
vanguardism as the finest expression of national virility.” 500 Two affected programs were
the NCAT office and MHD labs in Butte. Both organizations had brought highly
educated and, arguably, activist people to the tough, but fading blue-collar mining town
of Butte to work on high tech and politically-progressive programs. When budget cuts
hit, the MHD lost several hundred people and NCAT went from over one hundred and
twenty people to about ten in a very short time. 501 Many of those affected stayed in Butte
to continue their work and research and would become involved in heritage preservation.
Several, for example, formed a corporation reflecting the NCAT mission, Renewable
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Technologies, Inc (RTI), a mixed-mission organization that allowed individuals to pursue
personal projects, including supporting preservation agendas within the larger superfund
project.
Between the 1960s and 1980s, heritage professionals later reflected, Butte and
Anaconda’s long-term mining residents still hadn’t fully embraced heritage as either an
expression of identity or potential market for tourists. The long-term residents were often
still numb from the closure of the mines and smelters and psychologically shaken by the
spate of fires and uncertainty of their town’s physical presence. 502 They felt the heritage
movement was driven in many ways by outsiders who, like ARCO, valued the built and
cultural landscape differently because it didn’t hold the same meanings for them.
Further, many of the outsiders came after the demise of the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company, the loss of neighborhoods with the construction of the pit, the rash of
unexplained fires, and the “Butte Forward” plan.
City of Anaconda residents lagged even further behind those of Butte in heritage
concerns despite a significant effort to preserve the Washoe stack and the creation of a
local historical society. Whether it was Anaconda’s smaller population, the “stillfestering” shock of the smelter closure, or the lack of any new economic development,
Anacondans in general seemed to give heritage a lower priority until the Butte movement
started thinking of and planning for a larger historic copper production district and
included Anaconda smelter, foundry, and transportation sites in the late 1990s and early
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2000s. 503 In fact, it seems that much of the preservation of foundations and waste piles at
the old-works golf course came at the insistence of Jack Nicklaus rather than local
development officials. 504
It was ultimately not until the work of the new outsiders began to reshape the
district and significant infusions of Superfund-generated money became available for
remediation projects that the perception of the “ugly town, set in an ugly notch between
two ugly mountains” began to change.

Superfund
A century of mining and smelting in the Butte-Anaconda district resulted in
several significant modifications to the landscape. Not only did it create nearly 3000
miles of underground mine shafts, adits, and tramways, but it dug one of the deepest open
pits, built the largest smelter complex in the world in the 1890s and then again in the
1900s, erected the tallest masonry structure in the world, and produced over 30 billion
pounds of metals worth over $22 billion. 505 However, in mining and processing the Butte
copper lode and extracting significant profits from its sale, industry was ultimately
responsible for the landscape changes that resulted from dumping and discharging its
wastes, most of it legally, into the local environment. The significant problems
associated with the scale of arsenic and sulfur laden smelter smoke and dusts, acidic and
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metal-rich waters emanating from tailings deposits and mine drainage, the Berkeley Pit,
and significant tailings and slag dumps led, not surprisingly, to serious and extensive
problems. From the EPA websites for Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area Superfund Site:
More that 100 years of mining have resulted in the development of over 500
underground mines (with roughly 3,000 miles of underground workings) and 4
open pit mines including the Berkeley Pit with its ancillary tailings ponds, waste
dumps, and acid leach pads. Operation of silver mills and copper and zinc
concentrators/ smelters in Butte resulted in the production of a variety of mill and
smelter wastes including particulates (aerial emissions) and tailings. The long
period of mining in Butte left the landscape littered with un-vegetated or sparsely
vegetated mine wastes, often containing hazardous concentrations of metals and
arsenic. These wastes represent significant sources of environmental
contamination to Silver Bow Creek and posed human health and risks to the
environment.
Ground water, surface water and soils are contaminated with arsenic and other
heavy metals, including copper, zinc, cadmium and lead. Silver Bow Creek and
the Clark Fork River contain metals from the cities of Butte to Milltown. The
tailings, dispersed along the creek and river, severely limit aquatic life forms and
have caused fish kills in the river. Potential health threats include direct contact
with and ingestion of contaminated soil, surface water, ground water or inhaling
contaminated air. 506
Similarly for the Anaconda Smelter Superfund site:
The processing facilities at the site were developed to remove copper from ore
mined in Butte from about 1884 through 1980. Milling and smelting produced
wastes with high concentrations of arsenic, as well as copper, cadmium, lead and
zinc. These contaminants pose potential risks to human health, to life in nearby
streams, and to plants and animals in adjacent lands over some 300 square miles.
In addition to the millions of cubic yards of tailings, furnace slag, flue dust, and
square miles of soil contaminated by airborne wastes, millions of gallons of
ground water have been polluted from wastes and soils. Arsenic is the primary
COC and drives the remediation. 507
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The scale of mining waste emanating from the Butte-Anaconda region ultimately
led to three separate Superfund listings on the National Priorities List, each with multiple
individual operable units to coordinate the massive scale of the clean up. 508 (See Table
6.1) The Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area, officially listed on September 30, 1983, then
expanded on July 22, 1987, had 13 individual operable units encompassing Butte mine
and smelting sites in the Silver Bow Creek watershed, metals-contaminated residential
soils, contaminated mine, pit, and ground water, and the extensive tailings strewn along
the length of Silver Bow Creek from Butte down to and including the Warm Springs
settling ponds outside of Anaconda. The Anaconda Company Smelter Site, listed on
September 30, 1983, included 10 operable units in the Warm Springs Creek watershed
relating to three smelting locations and ancillary industries, contaminated soils and
house-dusts, and the Opportunity ponds just outside Anaconda. In each of these regions,
the chief contaminants were heavy metals that existed in smelter flue dust including
significant amounts of arsenic and copper that settled on plants, soils, and inside people’s
houses, and water contamination with dissolved acids and metals including sulfuric acids,
arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc that flowed from groundwater into wells and
discharged into waterways.
The third Superfund site relating to mining and smelting was the Milltown
Reservoir/Clark Fork River area that included 120 miles of the Clark Fork River from
Anaconda down to and including the Milltown Reservoir outside Missoula, Montana.
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Remediation of a fourth regional Superfund site, the Montana Pole and Treating Plant Site was also
funded by ARCO although its contamination came primarily from the treatment of wood poles for bridge
and road construction, and utility needs from the 1940s-1980s not directly from mining activities.
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Table 6.1 List of Superfund Operable Units in Butte and Anaconda
Silver Bow Creek/Butte Operable
Units 509
1 Streamside
Remedial
Tailings
2 Area One

Anaconda Co. Smelter Site Operable
Units 510
1
Anaconda Smelter
Removal
2

Anaconda Yards

Removal

3

Remedial

3

Arbiter

Removal

Remedial

4

Beryllium

Removal

Removal

5

Old Works

Removal

6

Butte Mine
Flooding
Warm Springs
Pond
Reduction Works
Tailings
Travona Mine

Removal

6

Mill Creek

Removal

7

Rocker

Remedial

7

Flue Dust

Remedial

8

Butte Priority Soils

Remedial

8

Community Soils

Remedial

9

Active Mining and
Milling

Remedial

9

Remedial

1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3

Residential Soils

Removal

10

Lower Area One

Removal

Old Works/East
Anaconda
Development
Anaconda Regional
Water, Waste, Soil

Warm Spring
Ponds Inactive
West Side Soils

Remedial

4
5

Remedial

Remedial

Removal actions are intended for the immediate
removal of direct threats to human health and
the environment while remedial actions are
intended to be long-term, permanent solutions to
contamination.

This site was broken into just two operable units, the Milltown Reservoir, which entailed
2.2 million cubic yards of impounded contaminated tailings, and the Clark Fork River’s
entire length which was strewn with tailings that did not wash all the way down to
509

See: "Second Five-Year Review Report for Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area Superfund Site," ed. Region 8
U.S. EPA (Helena, Montana: CDM, 2005).
510
See: "Third Five-Year Review Report for Anaconda Company Smelter Site Anaconda, Deer Lodge
County, Montana," ed. Region 8 U.S. EPA (Helena, Montana: U.S. EPA, Region 8, 2005).
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Milltown. Here, too, the primary concern was heavy metals that precipitated out of water
and contaminated Clark Fork riparian and impounded Milltown soils. In both operable
units, the primary solution was the removal of contaminated soils and tailings and
depositing them in the still open Opportunity Ponds in Anaconda.
Unlike Occidental Petroleum in Ducktown, ARCO accepted the initial listing but
like Occidental resisted active participation for a decade claiming that the oil company
didn’t pollute the region directly. 511 Further, ARCO contended, as the State of Montana
and EPA sought additional penalties, that the state and federal governments were also
potentially responsible parties because they both encouraged mining for regional and
national gain and did not create or enforce stricter pollution legislation. ARCO
eventually hired its own historians to prove it in court. 512 That argument, however, was
largely lost as early as 1983, when ARCO consented to pay for initial remediation
projects.
Court challenges continued, nonetheless, through the 1990s and into the 2000s,
especially after both the state and federal governments sought to recover their costs and
impose civil penalties for reparations and community projects. ARCO responded to the
new charges and filed suits against both the U.S. Government and the State of Montana
to recover its response costs, contributions, and to receive “contractual indemnity,
equitable indemnification, and declaratory relief” citing the government’s conspiracy to
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develop and promote mining in the western United States. 513 Ultimately, however, with a
series of negotiated consent decrees from 1998 to 2008, ARCO agreed to pay additional
civil penalties, albeit less than originally sought by the lawsuits, and to cover
governmental cost and oversight expenses. 514
Needless to say, the entire remediation project emanating from mining and
smelting in the Butte-Anaconda region led to significant Superfund clean-up costs and, in
terms of geography, became the largest executed in the country. By 2008, ARCO had
agreed to pay the State of Montana $230 million for natural resource damages to Silver
Bow Creek, 515 $168 million for damages associated with the Clark Fork River and other
sites, and nearly $14 million to the U.S. Government for EPA costs and to settle damage
claims made by the National Park Service and Bureau of Land Management. 516
Additional costs included an estimated of $316 million to remove sediments from the
Milltown Reservoir and even more for other clean ups, community development projects,
EPA and state fees, and long-term waste monitoring and remediation projects for various
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Emmons, "United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division; United States of America
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al; Expert Report of David Emmons, Ph.D.,” 53.
514
United States District Court for Montana, “United States v. Atlantic Richfield Company, State of
Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Streamside Tailings Operable Unit and Federal and Tribal Natural
Resource Damages Consent Decree,” (Helena, Mont.: United States District Court for Montana, 1998) 2,
and "Summary of 2008 Settlement of Clark Fork River Remediation and Natural Resources Damages
Claims and Related Restoration Plans," ed. Montana Department of Justice (Helena, Montana: Natural
Resource Damage Program, 2008), 1-3.
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sites in the districts. 517 As early as 2002, ARCO expected its total bill for clean up in
Montana would exceed $1 billion dollars. 518
Although the Environmental Protection Agency vigorously pursued ARCO under
CERCLA in pursuit of its mission to protect human health and the environment, it was
less concerned with ancillary requirements of CERCLA, such as abiding by the
Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) as required under
section 121(d). Almost from the beginning, the EPA eschewed its responsibilities to
fully consider impacts to cultural resources eligible for inclusion on the National Register
as required under Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA. According to a Relevant
Authority directly affiliated with clean-up monitoring for the U.S. government, the EPA
met only the minimum necessary requirements of Sections 106 and 110 as it interpreted
them, and simply took photographs of buildings in 1987 it thought might be impacted. 519
Jerrold Marcus, writing in the Engineering and Mining Journal, stated the EPA only had
two strategic goals: remediate the site and allocate as much of the costs as possible to the
potentially responsible parties. Further, EPA officials understood that as a lead agency, it
would be “severely criticized” for its decisions by other stakeholders no matter what it
did. 520 Heritage professionals fell into this latter group.
Mark Reavis, former Butte-Silver Bow County preservation officer, recounted
that he had to fight the EPA and ARCO to get them to comply with NHPA and retain the
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Sherry Devlin, "Arco Recommends Leaving Milltown Sediment," Missoulian, November 6, 2001.
Karen Dorn Steele, "Superfund Revived Butte," Spokesman Review, July 28, 2002.
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region’s significant historic character. 521 He later argued that, “Odd as it sounds, those
dumps are historic resources. The preservation community here is worried that we’re
going to lose, bury, and cover-up all signs of mining. Butte should be a monument to a
social decision: the quest for minerals. I’m trying to preserve. They’re trying to clean
up.” 522 Fredric Quivik, who came to Butte to work for NCAT in 1977, wrote in 2001,
“the EPA…often pursued its mandate to remediate hazardous materials with a singlemindedness that has not recognized other national priorities, such as the preservation and
interpretation of important cultural resources.” 523 “Local [EPA] administrators seemed to
see the historic copper industry as the enemy, and they saw the only design alternative for
remediation to be the obliteration [of] any historic features that happened to be in the way
of the clean-up and to cover those areas with newly planted grass.” 524 A Relevant
Authority affiliated with preservation management in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County
acknowledged that Superfund benefited the health of the community but noted that it
could be detrimental to historic preservation. Further, this authority cited instances where
EPA manipulated Sections 106 and 110, claiming that sites it didn’t want to remediate
were historic while other sites it wanted to clean were not. 525
The Butte-Anaconda district, with the largest superfund sites and one of the
largest National Historic Landmarks, highlights the inherent conflict between remediation
and preservation. Unlike Ducktown, where the heritage decisions were largely left in the
521
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hands of the remediaters, the Butte-Anaconda district with combative new residents and a
strong Montana SHPO and heritage community, ultimately established procedures and
negotiated heritage preservation with both the key national heritage organizations and the
EPA and ARCO, although during the planning process many sites, like the Washoe
smelter, were lost.

Superfund-generated heritage
In Butte-Anaconda, the clout of heritage preservation advocates grew slowly
between the mid-1980s and 2005, and included the creation of county-level preservation
officers to oversee heritage management plans. (See Table 6.2 for a summary of dates.)
While Superfund/ARCO funded or contributed to many of these plans, the genesis of
these efforts were often local reactions to the potential loss of cultural fabric from
cleanup activity that had mostly been driven by the new, proactive outsiders captivated
by the region’s rich heritage, but not “affected” as much by its decline.
According to a Relevant Authority, the URA gave birth to the first comprehensive
preservation ordinance in the region. 526 Although the National Historic Landmarks
(NHL) office established an architectural district in 1961 and Butte established physical
boundaries for tax increment funded redevelopment in 1980, the URA created a new
historic overlay zoning district in 1985, twice the size of the earlier urban revitalization
area to promote the preservation of historic sites, structures, and buildings by “addressing
preservation issues at the local level and integrating them into the planning and decision

526

Conversation with a Relevant Authority (7).
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Table 6.2 Timeline of Preservation and Remediation Events in Montana
Dates

Event

Location

1961

First Butte district NHL listing

Butte

1965

Mining Museum Opens

Butte

1967

Underground mining ends

Butte

1971

Chile nationalizes mines

Butte

1975

MHD lab opens in Butte

Butte

1976

NCAT office opens in Butte

Butte

1976

Threat of Butte CBD relocation

Butte

1977

ARCO buys ACM

Butte

1979

HAER documentation

Butte

1980

URA begins

Butte

1980

Washoe Smelter closes

Anaconda

1981

Butte Silver Bow Archives begins

Butte

1981

MHD and NCAT budgets slashed

Butte

1982-1986

Washoe Smelter Demolition

Anaconda

1983

Superfund National Priorities List

Butte-Anaconda

1985

First Butte NHL expansion

Butte

1985

Washoe Smelter Stack saved

Anaconda

1985

Butte-Anac. Historic Park Master Plan

Butte-Anaconda

1988

General Work Plan for Anaconda cleanup

Anaconda

1990

RI/FS for Anaconda

Anaconda

1993

Regional Historic Park Plan

Butte-Anaconda

1997

Old Works Golf Course opens

Anaconda

2005

Second NHL expansion, includes Anac.

Butte-Anaconda

2008

Butte Reduction Works slag walls saved

Butte
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making process.” The ordinances’ specific goals were to “enhance the visual character…
encourage maintenance of the present housing stock…promote [cultural] tourism…
enhance property values…foster public appreciation of and civic pride in the beauty of
the community and accomplishments of the past…and to safeguard the heritage of the
community.” 527
More significantly, the new ordinance specifically included the existing thirteen
head frames and defined historic buildings to include “appurtenant mining structures.” 528
It also created a historic preservation commission to administer the preservation
ordinance and a historic preservation officer to enforce codes that required a review and
permit process to move, remove, or demolish historic structures, and created appeals,
enforcement, and penalty policies for violations. Before defining the boundaries of the
new district, however, the new ordinance required a new survey to identify structures.
The years from 1981 to 1986 witnessed several surveys, documentation efforts,
and planning processes to catalog historically significant structures in Butte, expand the
original National Historic Landmark district to include industrial sites, consider sites in
Anaconda, and begin planning for an eventual National Historical Park dedicated to
American copper. Following the Historic American Engineering Record documentation
project in 1979, the Butte Historical Society began a five-year project to survey all
historic resources in the historic district. 529 By 1985 the Butte Historical Society, with
additional financial support from ARCO, the State of Montana, community development
527

"Council Bill No. 238 ("1985 Preservation Ordinance")," in Ordinance 238, ed. Butte-Silver Bow
Montana (Butte, Montana: 1985), 8.
528
Ibid., 7.
529
Martin and Shovers, "Butte, Montana: An Architectural and Historical Inventory of the National
Landmark District,” 1.
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grants, and a host of additional sources, funded an RTI planning study of the architectural
and industrial heritage of the Butte-Anaconda corridor that ultimately created a context
for preservation. Not only did these studies put the entire mining/smelting district into a
single historic context for the first time, but ultimately served to provide reference points
for restoration projects and long-term planning efforts. 530
Two significant planning documents came from this effort. First, with the
realization that so much industrial heritage still existed, the original 1961 National
Historic Landmark District was expanded to include mining sites on Butte hill. More
importantly, the study generated the first comprehensive heritage planning document for
the combined mining and smelting districts. The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System
Master Plan was written by RTI in 1985 and published by the Butte Historical Society
with funds from Anaconda Minerals Company, the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, Tri-County Historical
Society (Anaconda), Anacondans to Preserve the Stack, and Butte the Uptown
Association. The plan:
grew out of the perceived need to develop a comprehensive and coordinated plan
of action to protect and interpret the historic features of Butte and Anaconda.
Many of these nationally significant mining and smelting sites are threatened by
demolition, vandalism, natural deterioration, and proposed reclamation…This
study [is] a first step in combating these problems while integrating historic
preservation and environmental reclamation. 531
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See: Ibid. and Mark Fiege, Fredric L. Quivik, and Brian Shovers, "Industrial Heritage of Butte and
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The plan stemmed partially from the many requests for support of preservation and
community projects received by the Anaconda Mineral Company and its desire for a
coordinated approach to site management. The master plan provided historic background
to the region, several interpretive themes for future heritage exhibits, expected
community contributions and tourism benefits, and a phased approach to implementation.
While the National Park Service ultimately rejected the idea of a National Historical Park
in Butte-Anaconda, citing a new copper-industry themed national park in Michigan’s
mining district, regional planners in Montana hoped to create at a minimum a
partnership-based National Heritage Area. 532
While the regional park plan was being worked on, the EPA was in the midst of
evaluating the region under CERCLA and determining the best course of action for
remediation. The park plan recognized the significant potential impact to historic
resources from remediation and that planning would require “creative thinking and
innovative reclamation” to successfully meet both goals of historic preservation and
cleanup activities. 533 At the same time as significant planning was being undertaken, the
Butte Historical Society began a short-lived journal named the Speculator after one of the
local mines. Although it didn’t survive beyond three volumes, in its short life the
Speculator collected a wealth of research on the history and heritage of the mines, people,
and region.
CERCLA-mandated remediation projects were well under way by the early
1990s, when the heritage community and the state began raising serious issues based on
532
533
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Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act. In most Section 106 or
110 proceedings, the State Historic Preservation Officer monitors and rules on issues of
National Register eligibility and required mitigation of impacts, often on a case by case
basis. However, the extent of this particular Superfund project and the extensive
potential for impacts required a more formally planned approach. In 1992 and again in
1994, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, the Montana Department of
Health and Environment, the counties of Butte/Silver Bow and Anaconda/Deer Lodge,
Walkerville, and ARCO entered into a programmatic agreement regarding the creation of
a regional historic preservation plan (1992) and an implementation strategy for the
completed plan (1994). Recognizing the “substantial potential for the loss of historic
resources…under CERCLA” and the importance of compliance with NHPA, the parties
agreed to create a comprehensive preservation plan to consider potential impacts before
they occurred and decide which significant structures would require what type of
mitigation before impact occurred while recognizing the potential for “undiscovered’
resources and mitigation procedures. 534
The Regional Historic Preservation Plan (RHPP), developed by the 27-member
RHPP Joint Committee and completed in 1993, was the culmination of ten years of
heritage planning in the district. It brought together the work of all the previous surveys
534

"Programmatic Agreement among the Environmental Protection Agency Region VIII Montana Office,
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and plans and included sections on preservation and remediation issues, interpretive
themes and related sites, revitalization, management, and planning. It also outlined the
goals of preservation articulated by CERCLA and included relevant legal documents
describing Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA, earlier programmatic agreements, and
studies. 535
Lastly, in 2005, the Secretary of the Interior substantially expanded the National
Historic Landmark district beyond its 1961 focus on Butte. The district grew from the
original 31 individual contributing structures listed in the 1972 inventory to over 5000. 536
After successive expansions in Butte, the new NHL district designation, organized under
considerations expressed in the National Park Service labor theme study, included
substantial new commercial, residential, and, industrial sites in Butte and Anaconda, and
the railroad corridor between the two. This document, with the studies and plans
executed in the 1990s, completed the transformation of two distinct cities into one single,
large heritage planning district. While no single national or state historic park was
established to interpret the region as a whole, both the RHPP and NHL district
designation provided a broad coordinated understanding and approach to heritage
management in the region.
As the planning process progressed, the communities of Butte and Anaconda both
began backing heritage projects more enthusiastically. New organizations such as Butte
535
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Citizens for Preservation and Restoration (CPR) and the Restoration Alliance worked to
support the efforts of the existing Certified Local Government and Main Street
preservation and development programs. 537
Despite the growing strength of the local heritage movement, the national
perception of Butte-Anaconda did not evolve equally. Becoming the second largest
National Historic Landmark district in the United States was no match for the stigma of
being the largest superfund site in the nation. From the 1990s to 2009, the national media
focused on the environmental devastation. Articles on Butte-Anaconda appeared with
titles like, “We Want People who have a problem with Mine Wastes, to think of Butte”
(1992), “Pennies from Hell” (1996), “Butte America: Poisoned, Ruined, and SelfCannibalized” (1997), “Butte Breaks Ground to Mop up a World-Class Mess” (1998),
“Richest Hill on Earth and Costliest Mine Superfund Site” (2000), “Montanans Weigh
Options on a Toxic Legacy” (2001), and “In a Town Called Opportunity, Distress over a
Dump.” These contributed to existing, and previously cited, designations of ugliest spot
in Montana (1993) and one of the world’s must-miss vacation spots (2009). Occasionally
some glimmer of hope that all had not been destroyed by pollution appeared in articles
like “In its own decay, Butte Sees a National Treasure (1997) and “Town Pins Hopes on
Superfund Site” (1997). 538
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Smelter heritage
Despite the drive of the Superfund clean up, three significant elements of the
region’s smelting landscape remained in 2009: the Butte Reduction Works slag walls,
the Washoe Stack, and foundations and waste piles of the Anaconda Old Works. All
three of these sites were slated for demolition at some point in the Superfund planning
process, but regional heritage advocates organized to save them. The rest of the Washoe
smelter site, however, was not so lucky and was demolished just as the Superfund process
and more organized heritage planning began in Montana.
The Butte Reduction works operated from 1885-1910 at the base of Butte Hill
along Silver Bow Creek south of town. Early in its operations, like other smelters in the
district, it realized existing concentrating technology left considerable copper in the
tailings and was concerned about potential lawsuits from downstream land owners so it
stockpiled its tailings. Unlike the earthen berms of the Anaconda Company, the Butte
Reduction Works built waste-slag retaining walls to impound its tailings and keep them
from washing down Silver Bow Creek during spring floods. Although the smelter itself
was largely dismantled by WWII, much of the tailings and slag retaining walls remained
at the start of the Superfund cleanup. (See Figure 6.6)
EPA assigned the two parts of the site to Operable Unit Lower Area One and
Operable Unit Reduction Works Tailings, and in 1993 began removing 1.2 million cubic
yards of metals- and arsenic-contaminated tailings and other hazardous wastes. The
materials were disposed of in a nearby storage area where they were capped with clean
soils and covered with an impermeable membrane to prevent water from leaching acids
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Figure 6.6 Slag walls of the Butte Reduction Works, 2008, showing former
enclosed tailings ponds and close up of unique slag wall construction technique.
(Source: Author)

and heavy metals. The second phase of remediation involved restoring of the natural
flow of Silver Bow Creek, creating a buffer wetlands area, installing a groundwater
treatment facility, and constructing an interpretive trail through the site. 539 According to
a Relevant Authority, however, the initial plan also called for the removal of the slag
walls that ran throughout the site. This would have lowered the cost and complexity of
the remediation project and contributed to a more “natural” looking area, both high
priorities for the EPA. 540
However, the 1985 park plan called the slag walls at the site “the best preserved
remnant of [the Butte smelting] component of the local mining history,” 541 and cited its
very high integrity and interpretive potential with minimal safety concerns. It also called
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for an interpreted, self-guided tour through the site. 542 The 1993 Regional Historic
Preservation Master Plan called the slag walls the primary historic feature of the site and
asserted that remediation efforts should avoid damaging or removing them as the cleanup progressed, suggesting that this site be used to interpret the early technology of
smelting in Butte. 543 In an article from 2000, Fred Quivik, who was also a primary
author of the 1985 Park Plan, referred to the Butte Reduction Works slag canyon as an
often ignored industrial feature that was not simply worthless waste product, but rather an
ingenious way to conserve its other wastes (tailings) and prevent property damage and
potential litigation. 544
In 2009, the Lower Area One and Reduction Works Tailings project was more
than half-way complete, and the slag walls had been saved as an important cultural
landscape feature. An interpretative sign stood near one of the slag walls describing the
historic use of the site, the clean-up, and the future public-use planned for the site. 545 The
slag walls in Butte were preserved because of the heritage planning efforts of the county,
an early recognition and declaration of significance, and a well thought out approach to
managing heritage amid clean-up activities. The two Anaconda smelter sites, however,
were saved largely by creative thinking in the wake of significant clean-up momentum.
Anaconda Copper had largely demolished and removed the structures of the 19thcentury upper and lower smelter sites by the early 20th century. Although some historic
building foundations and toppled smoke stacks existed on the site in the early 1990s,
542
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large extant waste slag and sinter piles from its smelting period generally had long
encouraged the residents of Anaconda to use the site as a dump. The EPA estimated the
volume of the historic waste piles at over 1.5 million cubic yards of flue dusts, slag, and
soils contaminated with arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc. 546 Although the
Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis work plan outlined four pages of actions required
to satisfy the NHPA, 547 the general work plan called for the stabilization of debris piles to
prevent further contamination of Warm Springs Creek during high water events which
included consolidating the various piles into a single waste repository then capping and
covering to prevent water leaching.
The 1985 park plan described both the Upper and Lower Works sites as largely
foundations strewn with brick, stone, and abandoned waste. Although of high historical
importance, the plan noted the multiple locations’ low structural integrity and moderate
accessibility but still called for a relatively large interpretive center and an interpreted
trail along the abandoned rail bed.

548

Although the interpretive center was not built, by

2009 a paved trail wound through the Upper Works site along a former rail bed with
signage identifying significant features of the site and others describing the processes and
people formerly tied to the site. The rest of the site with its intertwining ruins and slag
and sinter piles, was capped with 18-20 inches of new soil, revegetated, and protected
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with a new drainage system to prevent leaching into the creek and provide a stable cover
over a waste deposit, and then converted into a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf course.
During the planning and design phases, Nicklaus held steadfast to some heritage
ideals, keeping many aspects of the site’s ruins as part of the course. The foundations of
the Upper Work’s smelter building entice golfers along the #3 and #4 fairways, while
golfers on the #7 tee hit off of the top of a slag mound. There are no white sand traps on
the course. Nicklaus filled all the traps with granulated slag, now called “sland,” from
the Washoe Smelter waste dump, claiming it was superior in many ways to traditional
trap sand and less expensive to obtain—it was free and virtually inexhaustible given the
size of the deposit. 549
Who to credit for the idea of building a golf course among smelter ruins as a boost
to the local economy and a first step toward rebranding Anaconda an “outdoors”
destination is unclear. Several different golf course origination stories circulate, ranging
from a retired smelter foreman’s joke to a regional developer’s “eureka” moment while
playing golf in Idaho. However it started, many claimed that the course was an important
defining moment for the community. Just a few years earlier, the EPA had permanently
relocated the residents of the smelter town of Mill Creek because of significant arsenic
contamination in homes and local soils, an event that was likely the low point in locals
perception of their landscape. The golf course was designed to not only serve as a
control barrier between the public and the hazardous materials underneath, but to bring in
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120 full-time jobs and almost $900,000 in income and spending to the community, not
counting money spent by golfers. 550 (See Figure 6.7)

Figure 6.7 Oldworks Golf Course showing Washoe Smelter stack in the
background and “sland” traps in the foreground. The entire ARCO-funded course
was designed to provide long-term cover for the hazardous wastes stored
underneath, inject some income into the local economy, and retain some heritage
features such as building foundations and slag piles. (Source: Author)
While some in the preservation community bemoaned the loss of the historic
character of the old works and others still await the economic rewards from the course,
the EPA and ARCO believe it has been a large success and that the site is ready to be
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removed from the National Priorities List (NPL)….All this while in sight of the
Anaconda stack.
Within a year of the 1980 shutdown of the Washoe smelter in Anaconda, the
ARCO subsidiary, Anaconda Minerals Company, began plans for its demolition and in
1982 hired Cleveland Wrecking and began removing parts of the site. Because of the
extensive contamination of much of the debris and waste piles--estimated at 185 million
cubic yards of tailings, 27 million cubic yards of slag, and 250,000 cubic yards of flue
dust 551--both Cleveland Wrecking and AMC became subject to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations governing the handling and
transportation of hazardous wastes. In 1982 EPA also began superfund procedures and
listed the site on the NPL in September 1983. 552 The EPA-approved demolition plan for
the Washoe Smelter was rather extensive and called for removing all structures leaving
only “massive concrete foundations and bulkheads…weathered bedrock, contaminated
soil, pulverized brick, and some construction debris.” 553 Sanctioned demolition work
began in 1983 and finished in 1986. 554
Despite ongoing demolition and plans for the complete removal of structures, the
General Work Plan (GWP) written for the smelter site five years after its NPL listing,
included a five page description addressing the need for a cultural resource assessment. 555
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The GWP noted the need for a survey to identify sites eligible for the National Register
prior to demolition work, recognized that the smelter stack was already so listed, and
specifically stated that the survey to address historical, archeological, and prehistoric
resources be completed within 180 days of the order to proceed. Further, it called for
consideration of identified and eligible resources during the remedial investigation and
feasibility study (RI/FS) and in designing remediation alternatives for the site.
Unfortunately for the smelter’s heritage, the GWP was finished in 1988, six years after
demolition began and simply assumed that the appropriate Section 106 and 110 actions it
outlined had taken place. 556 The RI/FS was finished in 1991 and largely did not address
heritage because most of the site was already gone.
There is no evidence that ARCO and the EPA followed through with the
historical survey. In any case, little was ultimately left at the smelter site by 1988 when
the General Work Plan identified the need for cultural resource assessments. Despite the
fact that at a minimum some sort of documentation should have occurred, no record of
this survey existed in the Superfund repositories in Anaconda, Butte, Helena, or the EPA
regional office in Denver. By 1988 what was once the largest and most advanced copper
smelter in the world had been completely demolished with the exception of the tallest
free standing structure large stack in the world which would became the smallest state
park in Montana.
Following the demolition of Great Falls stack in 1982 and the announcement of
plans to demolish the Washoe smelter, several community members formed the
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“Anacondans to Preserve the Stack” committee (to distinguish itself from the Great Falls
“Save the Stack” group) to pressure ARCO and state officials to leave the Washoe stack
in place. According to a Relevant Authority close to the preservation movement, the
group recognized it needed both local and state government support before approaching
ARCO. Fortunately, committee members were only about an hour’s drive from the state
capital and could lobby and make meetings on very short notice. While the group’s
founders were related to the masons who constructed the stack in a mere three months,
many in the community and the local press enthusiastically backed the plan as a
monument to all smelter workers. According to another Relevant Authority, the
organizers met with little resistance in Helena, and the state ultimately agreed to create a
state park. ARCO for its part was also enthusiastic about stack preservation, largely
because they expected much greater resistance to the smelter demolition and, the
community, maybe a little short-sighted, had only asked to save one structure which
would have also been very expensive for ARCO to remove. 557
The 14-acre Anaconda Stack State Park sits in two parcels. One is simply the in
situ stack and a small area around it on smelter hill. While at some future point, there
may be limited public access or guided tours to the stack itself, in 2008 the hill parcel had
restricted access because of existing soil contamination and the potential for falling
bricks. The second parcel is approximately two miles away and is called the “viewing
area.” It includes interpretive signs describing the operations of the stack and smelter,
data comparing the stack’s size to other similarly tall structures like the Washington
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monument and Eiffel Tower, and a full-diameter, three dimensional brick model of the
stack base that exactly replicates the stack’s 75’ external and 60’ internal diameter, while
only rising four feet from the ground. 558 (See Figure 6.8)

Figure 6.8 Interpretive panels at the Anaconda Stack State Park. This is a very
small park in plain sight of the stack, and the interpretive displays focus on smelter
operations in general and the stack specifically. (Source: Author)
The 1985 Park Plan discussed the initial public outcry over the planned stack
demolition, noted that it had been converted into a state park, and largely assumed that
any hope of saving any other smelter structures had been already lost. 559 The plan,
however, recognized the significant interpretive potential of the stack and state park
viewing area and called for an expanded visitor center and outdoors museum that would
include salvaged equipment from the site. Although the state installed interpretive panels
describing smelter operations, replicated the stack’s cross-section, and placed some
equipment and ladles around the park, the formal museum and visitor’s center was never
constructed.
558
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The Anaconda stack and the Butte gallows frames provide single, simple
representational brands for the heritage of the region. Although a few people opposed
saving the stack, most locals embraced its preservation. Some historians might claim that
the stack, when operating, was a means of non-verbal symbolic hegemony over the
workforce, constantly reminding them who controlled their lives. Some economists
might claim the preservation of the stack was holding the city back by preventing it from
looking to the future. 560 In many ways, however, the stack now stands as a reminder of
what once gave the place meaning and what the region pins its hopes on for the future.
Unlike the Berkeley Pit which serves more as a monument to pollution and the negative
aspects of mining on the environment, the stack, although also responsible for the
distribution of significant pollutants for more than a century, has become more of an icon
for positive revitalization.
Almost every person I talked to in Anaconda knows the stack’s height, the fact
that it is still the tallest masonry structure in the world, and its association with, at one
time, the greatest copper district in the world. The same goes for the Butte gallows
frames. Although they were responsible for bringing toxic materials to the surface and
creating acid runoff and mine drainage, their preservation is regarded by locals as a
monument to the people who worked there. The other sites in the Butte-Anaconda
corridor try to balance their story between the toxic and heroic, trying to turn the story of
human contamination into human triumph both over the land itself and the mess made by
the copper industry. Like Ducktown, Michigan, and Butte-Anaconda hopes to use
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historic industrial sites to revitalize its economy and draw as many tourists to the region
as possible.

If a single word emerges to describe the environmental and heritage development
of the Butte-Anaconda area it is the word large. Historians and locals declare that Butte
had the “richest” hill, the most production, and the biggest non-ferrous minerals company
in the world (for a time). Anaconda, both the town and the company, had the largest
copper smelter in the world that housed the largest reverberatory and largest copper blast
furnaces, and the tallest masonry structure. The district also has the largest Superfund
site in terms of physical size and the largest National Historic Landmark district. It has
the largest grass-roots heritage movement and the one of the largest heritage planning
efforts for a superfund site.
While many of these efforts were large in size, the key feature of the heritage
process in Montana was the organization of a strong bottom-up planning effort. Many of
the planners were not locals at first but identified with the landscape and organized and
planned for the eventual Sections 106 and 110 conflicts with EPA and ARCO with little
national-level support except for expanding NHL district boundaries.
Butte also demonstrates the value of place to locals and the complimentary
perceptions of new-locals who value the landscape as they first see it. The miners and
laborers of the region during the 1950s-1980s witnessed the decline of their district, the
loss of neighborhoods, and considerable demoralizing change. New people who moved
into the region in the late 1970s and 1980s, outsiders at first, saw not necessarily the loss
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of the previous decades, but the considerable wealth of cultural resources remaining and
organized, along with some long-time locals, to protect those remaining resources. While
the efforts produced planning documents and led to important preservation successes, not
all could be saved. Then the new comers experienced a sense of defeat over the cultural
losses, especially as the cleanup gained momentum and made major changes to the
landscape. Yet, people new to region in the 2000s, aware of, but not witness to, the
losses of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, but interested in heritage, are able to
enjoy the results of planning efforts, preservation projects, and heritage integration into
the city landscape carried out by local preservationists in the 1980s and 1990s. It is easy
to be significantly impressed with the level of what was saved, not with what was lost,
which is exactly the sentiment civic leaders want visitors to have.
Similar to the Butte District, the Keweenaw Peninsula saw considerable declines
in its mining, leading to efforts to commemorate the past. Unlike Montana however,
where heritage planning was largely organized solely from the grass roots and dominated
by local planning efforts, Michigan heritage planning was driven by a combination of
National Park Service, top-down planning, and the efforts of long-standing tourism and
heritage groups that melded into a quasi-structured historical park.
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CHAPTER 7. QUINCY SMELTER
WHEREAS, THE Quincy Smelting works is the last remaining historic smelter left
anywhere in the world and reflects smelting technologies of the late 19th Century…
WHEREAS, the smelter site continues to severely deteriorate with open windows, roofs,
and walls…
WHEREAS, the [Keweenaw National Historical Park] has not been successful in
securing funds to stabilize buildings nor to restore any of the Smelter buildings for
historic interpretive purposes;
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Cities of Houghton and Hancock
City Councils…do hereby support the restoration of the Quincy Smelting Works and
request the Keweenaw National Historic Park make the restoration of the Quincy
Smelting Works its highest priority, funded by the Federal FY 2010 budget and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that if this effort to restore the Quincy Smelting Works
is not funded by the Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Budget, the facility be recommended for
demolition in the interest of public safety and blight removal, and allow redevelopment
opportunities to be undertaken by Franklin Township.

-Houghton Hancock, Joint City Councils Resolution (2007)

The first historic mining-related landscape feature a visitor to the Michigan
Copper Country sees and recognizes is likely a head frame. Most visitors pass dark sand
beaches unaware they’re looking at stamp sands and drive through Michigan
Technological University, not knowing that this is the 21st-century incarnation of the
Michigan School of Mines founded in 1885. No, the first physical element that most
visitors likely notice is the Quincy shaft-rock-house that is part head frame, part sorting
building. It sits on the apex of Quincy Hill just up from the Portage Lake waterfront.
Like the Butte gallows frames, the clean, reclad shaft rock house is a ubiquitous postmining symbol appearing in many images and forms throughout the region.
But much more like the trip from Ducktown to Copperhill than the trip from Butte
to Anaconda, as visitors proceed north along US Highway 41 and approach downtown
Houghton, they may notice a largely disheveled conglomeration of historic buildings in
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various states of disrepair on the waterfront across the narrow lake. While not as large or
imposing as the Copperhill site, this collection of structures, belonging to the smallest of
the big-three 20th-century smelters on the Keweenaw Peninsula, is almost as intact as it
was when it closed in 1971 after 73 years of service. Most people in the region desire
some sort of positive development of such a visible and valuable piece of waterfront
property. While some would like to see the buildings preserved and interpreted as an
important historic site with mixed-use public function space, others, citing blight and
decay, call for their complete removal to allow for new residential or commercial
opportunities. This dichotomous sentiment is echoed in the Joint City Council resolution
quoted above.
Copper smelters and smelting landscapes in general receive only modest heritage
attention often because smelters create some of the largest environmental problems.
They tend to get demolished and remediated quickly after their functional use is gone.
While many mining museums talk about smelting, there are virtually no copper smelting
museums and, compared to mining heritage sites, almost no preserved and interpreted
American copper smelter sites or partial sites exist outside of the fading 30-acre parcel
behind the Ducktown Museum, the Anaconda Stack, and, to a lesser degree, the Old
Works Golf Course. Even in Swansea, Wales, home to the single greatest concentration
of copper smelters ever, there is little homage to and virtually no remains left of the
historic industry of the town.
The Michigan copper district, however, has an opportunity to change the
perception of smelting and its technological, social, and ecological effects on the
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metallurgical production system. The Quincy is the only near-complete historic copper
smelter site in the world with in situ reverberatory furnaces and related equipment,
offices, support buildings, and still-occupied homes of smelter workers. (See Figure 7.1)
The site sits within the Quincy Mine National Historic Landmark district, is a former
Historic American Engineering Record documentation project, and is a significant
contributing site to the Keweenaw National Historical Park (KNHP). (See Figure 7.2)
Unfortunately, the site is also part of the Torch Lake Superfund project and at various
times has been considered for both full preservation and full demolition. The smelter’s
current owner, Franklin Township, does not have the resources to invest in the
preservation of the site, which has largely sat unattended and unmaintained since its last
heat in 1971, slowly succumbing to the ravages of harsh winters and vandals.
Although the site is a contributing location to the KNHP, the National Park
Service Washington Headquarters requires careful analysis and consideration before
allowing its individual parks to own or get too involved with sites saddled with
contamination or liability issues. Further, Congress, in the 1992 enabling legislation that
created KNHP, specifically excluded NPS from acquiring properties that have significant
Superfund contaminants. Complicating the preservation of the smelter site, EPA, in its
zeal to identify at least one potentially responsible party (PRP) to pay for part of its
Superfund cleanup in the area, named the NPS a PRP because the Park had assisted the
township with preservation and use planning. This ultimately forced KHNP to step back
from assisting the township until the Superfund liabilities were removed.
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Figure 7.1 Quincy Smelter Site 2008. (Source: Author)

Figure 7.2 Map of the Keweenaw showing selected heritage and remediation sites.
(Source: Author)
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Shutdown
During the 1930s both the Tennessee Copper Company and Anaconda Copper
Mining Company came to completely dominate production in their respective districts,
controlling almost all mining, milling, and smelting operations. Both companies
continued their singular hold over their regions until large, multi-national petroleum
companies bought them in the 1960s and 70s, but continued to produce copper or related
chemicals into the 1980s. Unlike both Ducktown and Butte, Michigan copper mining did
not coalesce into a single corporate entity. Instead, three companies of the 300 or so
native copper mining companies chartered in Michigan survived until the district ceased
operations, with one of the three, the Calumet and Hecla, outliving and out-producing the
Copper Range Company and Quincy Mining Company. 561 Also, while Tennessee and
Montana copper mines both worked the same veins for a century, Michigan’s copper
mines worked multiple ore types stretched over 100 miles in three different Keweenaw
Peninsula counties, leading to multiple starts, shutdowns, and abandonment of various
regional mining districts, often leaving ghost towns scattered throughout a still-active
mining region.
Although Michigan copper mining production peaked in the late 1910s, its
prominence on the world stage began declining in the 1880s as Butte copper production
matched then surpassed Keweenaw output. From 1847-1880, Michigan copper mines
produced nearly 75% of US domestic copper, reaching a high of 82% in 1880, just as
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C&H ended mining in 1969 and although Quincy ended native copper mining in 1945, its mills
continued through 1967 and its smelter until 1971. Copper Range ended native copper mining in 1967, but
its copper sulfide operation continued in Ontonagon County until 1997.
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Montana silver mines reached the rich Butte copper lodes. 562 Between 1880 and 1884,
annual copper production outside of Michigan rose from 10 million pounds to 76 million
pounds, causing a price drop from $0.20 per pound to $0.14 over the same period, and a
further drop to $0.11 per pound in 1885. In an attempt to arrest the growth of Montana
mines and stabilize the market, Calumet and Hecla dumped excessive amounts of cheap
copper on the market between 1886 and 1887 and forced the price down to $0.10 per
pound— lower, it hoped, than the production costs of many newer western mines.
Despite underground fires at C&H mines in 1887 that reduced its production and forced
the company to halt its plan to control the market, several small and marginal Montana
copper producers went out of business. The plan, however, ultimately failed to affect the
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, whose 1887 output dominated Butte copper
production and led Montana past Michigan to become the dominant copper district in the
world. By 1890, Michigan mines were producing 39% of the US total and by 1900 only
24%.
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Keweenaw copper production, however, continued to grow despite mounting
complications. As with all mining districts, the remaining Michigan ores got leaner as
the richer veins were mined out. Further, Michigan copper mines became some of the
deepest mines in the world following copper veins to distances of over 9,000 feet from
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the surface by 1920, while the deepest Butte mines were operating at 3,800 feet, and
Arizona mines, largely open pits, did not have to venture further than 2,915 feet down. 564
Despite the increased costs associated with deeper mining of leaner ores, Michigan
companies were able to take advantage of technologies such as compressed air,
electricity, and the one-man rock drill to remain cost competitive, produce copper
cheaper than their Western competitors through the 1910s, and continue to pay dividends
through WWI. During the war and after mandated price controls ended, however, the
production-cost advantage of Michigan mines changed to a 10% cost disadvantage in
1916, increasing to 30% by 1920. 565
Despite the persistence of profits, adoption of new technologies, and increasing
production through 1916, the overall productivity of Michigan mines began declining
before the war. The largest and costliest strike in the district began in 1913 partly over
cost-cutting measures such as the one-man rock drill and workers’ wages and hours.
Although the mining companies prevailed, workforce problems persisted and even worsened
as miners left the area to find better jobs out West, new immigrants avoided the region
because of limited work during the strike, and new, well-paid manufacturing jobs
especially in Detroit, led to a general exodus of workers. Compounding these problems,
WWI drew young men into the armed forces, contributing to a cumulative labor-force
drop from 15,000 mining workers in 1915 to 8,000 in 1920. 566
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Although the post-war economic recession affected the copper industry nationwide, the pre-war conditions that began affecting Michigan production worsened in the
1920s. In 1921, many Michigan copper mines temporarily shut down to allow stock piles
to be sold off and, in the process, posted their lowest production levels since 1889 and,
for the first time since 1847, did not pay a single dividend. 567 Despite declines and
difficult economic conditions, mining continued on the Keweenaw, and would continue
in some instances for almost fifty more years, but the dominance of the region had clearly
faded as the remaining mines introduced new practices and diversified while they
struggled to extract the last bits of profit from the local rock.
Discussed in Chapter 4, C&H looked toward alternative sources of income and
savings and began “mining” its waste tailings in 1915, recovering copper through
leaching and flotation processes at half the cost of underground work. 568 In 1919, Quincy
began installing the largest steam hoist ever constructed, capable of winding 12,000 feet
of cable and quickly moving men, rock, and materials to and from the deepest parts of its
9,000-plus-foot-deep mine. Following depression era mine closures and WWII-era
production, it too began recovering lost copper from its tailings and operated its
reclamation mill through 1967 and its smelter through 1971.
Although Quincy ended underground mining the day its last government contract
expired in 1945, Copper Range and C&H further consolidated existing mines and
diversified their corporate holdings to remain in metals production. 569 Copper Range
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closed its mills and smelters shortly after WWII, but opened the copper sulfide-bearing
White Pine Mine in Ontonagon County after the United States entered the Korean War.
Although the company maintained a native copper mine on the Keweenaw through 1967
to supply copper to its subsidiary companies and transitioned through several owners, it
mined, milled, and smelted White Pine sulfide ores until 1997. C&H, which had
purchased and developed a number of profitable subsidiary companies by the mid 1960s,
became attractive to corporate takeover. In 1967, Universal Oil Products (UOP)
absorbed C&H and, in 1969, in the midst of significantly declining mining returns and a
growing labor dispute, closed the last C&H mine, ending the era of native copper
production in Michigan. 570

Note on Smelting Sites
Shortly after Copper Range closed its Michigan Smelter in 1950, the company
demolished the site and recovered any saleable materials. It then contracted its remaining
Keweenaw smelting needs to Quincy, leaving behind only the foundations and abutments
of its once important smelting works. 571 Quincy continued to operate its smelter through
the end of its tailings reclamation and the closure of Copper Range’s last native copper
mine (the Champion in Painesdale), both in 1967, and processed scrap copper at the site
until 1971. (See Figure 7.3) When pollution concerns mounted with the State of
Michigan who began insisting on the installation of pollution control equipment, Quincy
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Figure 7.3 Quincy
Smelter ca. 1920.
(With permission of
Michigan Tech
Archives and Copper
Country Historical
Collections.)

simply abandoned the site without scheduling any demolition or environmental
reclamation, and transferred ownership to the Quincy Development Corporation, an
entity formed to manage or sell the mining company’s lands. The smelter site, one of the
most complete of any in the world in a heritage context, was ultimately donated to
Franklin Township in 1999 in lieu of back taxes for development into a museum in
partnership with the National Park Service.
The C&H smelter closed in 1969 along with the cessation of mining and sat
vacant until 1982, when Michigan Tech Ventures, a private corporation created by
Michigan Technological University (MTU) to generate local business opportunities using
and promoting MTU-developed technologies, formed Peninsula Copper Industries (PCI).
PCI, with technological support from MTU, adapted a C&H process to recover copper
from scrap materials such as circuit boards and electrical wires, to create copper-oxide
chemicals for commercial purposes. PCI moved its operations into the 1912 C&H
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electrolytic plant at the smelter and used the blacksmith shop and former cupola buildings
for storage. Most other buildings on site had been or were ultimately demolished, leaving
a patchwork of foundations and disused transportation corridors in 2009. 572
Of the other smelter sites that once processed Michigan native copper in the
Keweenaw, several sat partially developed or as undeveloped ruins in 2009. The Dollar
Bay works site still retained foundations, and a few of the Lake Superior Smelter
buildings still stood intact, reused by the Houghton County Road Commission in
Hancock. The short-lived 1847 Isle Royale and Ohio smelter site on Isle Royale still had
foundations of demolished structures and some abandoned equipment, while the Lake
Superior Native Smelter Works site, which was converted to a foundry in the early 20th
century, had no visible features left except an altered shoreline. None of the other
Michigan smelter sites listed in Table 4.2 retain any physical features. 573

Early Environmental Concerns
Unlike the noxious gases produced from sulfide smelting in Montana and
Tennessee that caused visible and severe damages to the environment and personal
property, Michigan smelting was relatively benign, and as such, did not substantially
injure non-mining property or generate significant early concerns among residents and
governments about landscape degradation. In fact, forest vegetation and insect
populations were at times so thick because of long summer growing days, that residents
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in some respects looked forward to the winter fallow season and the availability of ice
roads on frozen lakes and rivers to ease overland transportation difficulties. 574
Michigan’s copper mining operations, like similar operations in other districts, used
significant amounts of lumber to shore up mines and heat residences and dumped its
stamp sands in local waterways. Although its coal-fired boilers and smelters produced
smoke, none of the ultimate effects were greater than any other industrial district and
were largely accepted as the price of mining from the 1840s until the 1960s when
pollution became an important issue across the country and the EPA began examining
levels of more invisible toxins associated with mining wastes. 575

Origins of the Heritage Movement
All three of the broader regions studied in this work became tourist destinations
because of their rugged mountainous landscapes, perceptions of purity and pristine
wildernesses, and rich histories. Butte and Ducktown, however, as specific locations
within a larger destination region, were largely shunned by early tourists because their
industrial and urban natures belied the expected pristine wilderness of their surroundings.
Historical environmental problems only exacerbated this perception. Smoke-generated
moonscapes, enormous settling ponds, dirty streets, and the persistent hum of industrial
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activity well in to the 1980s acted to repel most nature-seeking visitors. While the
Tennessee Copper Basin was largely remediated by the 1990s, and Butte-Anaconda was
investing in historic preservation and heritage interpretation in the 2000s, they were both
far behind the Keweenaw Peninsula in attracting recreational visitors. While Ducktown
had an environmental stigma since the 1920s and Butte had a significant stigma since the
1970s, the Michigan district was never really affected by degradation issues that
impacted tourists.
Michigan copper production began its final decline after WWII. But unlike
Montana and Tennessee, its copper industry did not take on new, more destructive forms
to stay alive, like the open pits of Butte and the continued production of copper-based
organic chemicals and acids on a very large scale like Ducktown. Further, because of its
pure copper deposits, its smelting industry never contaminated the local environment to
the degree as the other locations. So, just as the mining industry started seeing significant
declines in the 20th century and negative associations of environmental degradation were
nonexistent, the automobile and growing middle class incomes afforded a means for
people to escape crowded urban areas, and the Copper Country provided a perfect natural
attraction.
Geographically, the Michigan copper district was different too. Both Tennessee
and Butte copper districts were located close to scenic destinations and national parks,
and in the case of Butte, on a major interstate thoroughfare. These enabled automobile
travelers to avoid industrial areas despite the drive for tourism dollars in economically
declining regions. Michigan's copper district happened to be at the end of the road, and
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its mines were shutting down at a time of increased wealth and a bit of post-war
wanderlust brought on by returning GIs in the 1920s and 1950s. Michigan's copper
district was located in an area of reputed scenic beauty and because it was the destination,
as opposed to near the scenic destination, it drew more people directly in the 1920s-1960s
than the much more industrially active Montana and Tennessee copper districts. Further
the Keweenaw Peninsula was reachable in a day's drive by millions of people from
Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and lower Michigan.
By the late 1930s, tourism was Michigan’s second leading industry after
automobile manufacturing, and with increased personal incomes, the Upper Peninsula
became an important draw for its natural beauty and low population density. Natural
beauty alone, however, was not necessarily a powerful enough draw to create a tourism
market in the Upper Peninsula. According to Aaron Shapiro, tourism required careful
planning, development, management, and packaging by a variety of people and
organizations. 576 Early in the century, several Michigan development and tourism boards
created programs specifically to lure Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and
even Cleveland residents. They included the Upper Peninsula Development Bureau
founded in 1911, whose Cloverland publications touted the virtues of northern Michigan
vacations and whose support of the Hartman-Rushton Act (MI) helped pass the 1929 law
creating a funded and coordinated tourism-development organization that in 1937 became
the Michigan Tourist Council. 577 A second, more local organization, the Copper Country
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Vacation League, made up of local merchants, resort owners, and mining company
representatives formed in the 1920s to promote the Keweenaw Peninsula specifically.
While the Keweenaw held some of the same toutable vacation advantages as other
parts of the Upper Peninsula and Northern Wisconsin, it remained cooler in the summer
with Lake Superior cross winds blowing across the narrow land mass. Further, the
Keweenaw offered much greater access to the Great Lake with over 100 miles of
shoreline, and the opportunity to drive “to the end of highway US 41,” whose southern
terminus reached the ocean in Miami, Florida. Enhancing the scenic draw, a fair number
of early heritage tours sprang up utilizing the area’s abandoned mine sites, ghost towns,
and historic forts. To get to Keweenaw County, where many of these were located,
however, drivers had to pass directly through what was left of the declining Michigan
copper district centered in Houghton County, and, during the inter- and post-war periods,
several local entrepreneurs created mining-related attractions to lure tourists. 578 Where
Montana and Tennessee copper districts used heritage to create a tourism market,
Michigan’s early tourism market created the first heritage sites in its mining region. (See
Figure 7.4)
The 1926 Cloverland Tourist Guide advertised Houghton, Michigan, as “the most
cosmopolitan community in the Copper Country….and the gateway and very heart of
copperdom.” For tourists, the city offered good boating, bathing, and fishing, no hay
fever, and interesting historic sites nearby including “Fort Wilkins, the Douglas
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Figure 7.4 Tourism on Keweenaw Peninsula. The person on the left worked at
both the Arcadia Tourist Mine and Copperama before coming to the Quincy Mine
Hoist. The sign on the right, touted the salubrious nature of the region from the
1950s. (Both images with permission of Michigan Tech Archives and Copper Country Historical

Collections.)

Houghton Memorial, and famous copper mines, mills, and smelters.” 579 Nineteen-thirties
Works Progress Administration projects supported tourism infrastructure including the
construction of lodges, golf courses, and scenic drives. While these were the early
beginnings of heritage tourism, it was the post-WWII period that saw the creation of
specific mining-related and heritage attractions on the landscape.
One of the first post-war tourism destinations came out of a failed attempt to
restart mining in the abandoned Arcadian mine across the lake from Houghton during
WWII. While this venture ended with the death of its founder in 1943, it left behind an
unusual horizontal mine shaft one mile off the main highway to Keweenaw County. In
1951, the Arcadian’s new owners developed it into the first underground “tourist mine”
in Michigan and likely the nation. For over 34 years, the mine guided visitors 1500 feet
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into the rock face and even garnered recognition from Life Magazine in 1962. 580
Copperama, another site that opened some time in the 1950s or 1960s, sat right on the
main highway one mile south of Houghton. While documentation is sparse on this shortlived attraction, an undated, existing flyer claimed a “fascinating, highly educational
underground tour at one of Michigan’s oldest copper processing sites” located at the Isle
Royale stamp mill that closed in 1948.581
One of the longest lived of the mining heritage sites and museums began in 1958
following a tour of the 1920 Quincy Mine Hoist by the American Institute of Mining
Engineers (AIME). The members of the group, captivated by the size of the machine
and recognizing its significance to mining engineering, formed the Quincy Mine Hoist
Association with a governing board that included representatives of the local AIME
chapter, the Nordberg Manufacturing Company (original makers of the hoist), Michigan
Technological University, the Quincy Development Corporation, and the public. The
new organization petitioned the Quincy Mining Company for a 99-year lease on the
abandoned structure, intent on preserving the hoist and associated buildings as an
engineering landmark. The Quincy Mining Company provided initial funding through a
$50,000 no-interest loan (whose repayment was ultimately forgiven) and a significant
eight-to-one matching grant fund. 582
In 1968 the Quincy Mine Hoist Association opened for its first tours. In 1970, the
site was listed on the National Register of Historic Places and in 1978became the center
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of a Historic American Engineering Record documentation project that included the
mining company’s smelter, shaft rock house, mills, and other support buildings. 583 The
preserved buildings ultimately led to a National Historic Landmark designation in 1989
and became one of the key factors in the formation of the Keweenaw National Historical
Park in 1992.
Although many tourist attractions focused on the region’s history, no site had
been as historically significant as the Quincy Mine Hoist and none had really had as long
an impact on the region’s heritage. While the recognition that the site could become a
tourist stop did not escape the governing board’s founders, they understood that the site
had greater value than just an income generator. The preservation of such a significant
site contributed to a HAER documentation project and National Historic Landmark
designation, and, in many ways, sparked regional heritage curiosity.
The area’s untouched historic and archeological sites ultimately lured industrial
historians and archeologists, several previously involved in HAER work and state
industrial projects, to Michigan Technological University. This grouping coalesced into
a graduate program in industrial archeology. Further, the growing interest in industrial
history, the importance of Michigan’s copper mining to United States history, and the
level of preservation in the region led to the formation of the Keweenaw National
Historical Park in 1992 amid mounting concern about the lasting environmental effects of
the district’s mines, mills, and smelters.
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Later Heritage – Keweenaw National Historical Park
Although the Keweenaw National Historical Park falls into the temporal realm of
post-mining later-heritage and regional redevelopment, its creation was a direct result of
early and on-going heritage activities generated from the creation of regional tourism in
the 1920s and 30s and the preservation of the Quincy Mine Hoist. Congress created the
Keweenaw National Historical Park in October 1992, following nearly two decades of
studies and plans.
The first attempt at a regional historical park began in 1972 when Universal Oil
Products funded the design of “Coppertown, USA,” a large open-air museum intended to
rival Greenfield Village in Dearborn, Michigan. The attraction planned to feature mining
exhibits, copper products displays, ethnic and cultural centers, festival plazas, arts areas,
new hotels, and a 70’ tall miner statue. While the full concept proved a bit too ambitious
for the time and never was constructed, a much more modest indoor museum in the old
C&H pattern shop emerged with traditional interpretive displays on the region’s history
and a not-surprising emphasis on C&H. 584
In the mid 1970s, the Historic American Engineering Record conducted broad
surveys of American industrial areas to identify significant historic regions and cultural
resources in its realm of interest. In 1977, it followed up a survey of Michigan’s Lower
Peninsula with a survey of its Upper Peninsula. In addition to identifying iron mining,
timber, power, and transportation resources, the survey documented Michigan’s Copper
Country, identifying a significant number of intact mining resources, including the fairly
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complete system of worker housing, and the mine, mill, and smelter sites of the Quincy
Mining Company. Because of the high integrity of the Quincy sites, which included the
mine hoist, HAER scheduled a full site documentation of the Quincy for 1979. That
summer a large group of architects and photographers recorded the site’s physical
features, and a group of historians wrote its technological and social history, providing a
copious amount of formal historical research justifying the region’s significance. 585
Although the idea of a national historical park first surfaced in 1974, the
movement reemerged and gained true momentum following a Governor’s tourism
conference in 1986. Locals hit on the idea of a national park to stop the decay of
Calumet, once the center of the region’s copper mining industry, and began to pressure
Michigan’s influential congressmen. Ultimately responding to a congressional request,
the NPS researched and published Options for National Park Service Involvement in the
Management of Historic Copper Mining Resources on Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula
in 1988. Although this report neither recommend nor dissuaded a park, it demonstrated
the feasibility of a park and, if a park were to be established, proposed two units, one at
Quincy anchored by the existing mine hoist and one in Calumet centered on the
Coppertown Museum. 586 The report also articulated the need for National Historic
Landmark (NHL) district nominations for the two areas to demonstrate the high integrity
and national significance required for a national park. 587 The Options report and
subsequent NHL nominations led to a study of alternative designs that examined a variety
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of potential park arrangements and ultimately recommended a two-unit park managed
under cooperative agreements with the NPS. The new park would actually own just a
few key buildings and relatively little property, but would support affiliated sites both
within the park boundaries and related sites outside the boundaries that agreed to operate
and run programs to certain standards, and promote historic preservation and adaptive
reuse of buildings and landscapes. 588
Congress passed Public Law 102-543 creating the Keweenaw National Historical
Park (KNHP) in 1992 to: “tell the story of the role of copper in the development of an
American industrial society and the effects on the Keweenaw Peninsula of providing the
copper” and “identify, study, and preserve significant historical and cultural sites,
structures, districts and landscapes…for the education, benefit, and inspiration of present
and future generations...and develop and sustain into the 21st century the park and the
community through a blend of private, local, state, and federal management, investment,
and ownership.” 589 KNHP officially came into existence with the signature of the
President, and the NPS in Washington allowed the new unit to proceed with land
acquisitions, staff building, and limited financial assistance to partnership sites. Although
KNHP had a fair degree of autonomy in deciding how to proceed, one important clause in
the law, section 4 (b) restricted the park from acquiring lands that were contaminated
with hazardous substances. 590 This clause forced KNHP to explore only those parts of an
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industrial landscape that had not housed industrial activity that might have produced
hazardous wastes, such as mills and smelters.
Thus the Keweenaw National Historical Park owns only five buildings in the park
either a former administrative, warehouse, streetcar, or commercial facility but does not
own any site where industrial processes occurred. It originally partnered with 23
existing, privately-owned and operated historic sites, a reflection of the region’s early
involvement in heritage tourism, to interpret the region as a whole. Although several of
the sites have gone out of business over the years, by 2008 the list of heritage partner
sites in the region included the Adventure Mining Company, A.E. Seamen Mineral
Museum, Calumet Theatre, Chassell Heritage Center, Copper Range Historical Museum,
Coppertown Mining Museum, Delaware Copper Mine, Finnish American Heritage
Center at Finlandia University, Fort Wilkins State Park, Hanka Homstead, Houghton
County Historical Museum, Keweenaw County Historical Society, Keweenaw Heritage
Center at St. Anne’s, Laurium Manor Mansion Tours, Old Victoria, Ontonagon County
Historical Museum, Porcupine Mountains Wilderness State Park, Quincy Mine & Hoist,
and the U.P. Firefighters Memorial Museum. 591

Superfund
Concurrent with the formation of KNHP, the Environmental Protection Agency
was exploring the very same historic landscape for hazardous mining wastes from a
century of past activity. The local genesis of the Torch Lake Superfund site began with a
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Michigan environmental law designed to control pollution. Michigan’s revised
constitution of 1963, Article 4, stated that
…the conservation and development of the natural resources of the state hereby
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety,
and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection
of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment, and destruction. 592
Although this declaration mirrored developments nationally and seemed to suggest that
human welfare was of equal importance to the future exploitation of natural resources,
the first laws restricting pollution, implementing Article 4, did not surface until the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 and State’s clean air and clean water
acts in the 1970s.
Although Superfund would become the driving policy affecting clean up of
Michigan copper mining wastes, State of Michigan departments drove the initial
investigations into contamination in the area. In 1973, the Michigan Water Resources
Commission investigated a 27,000 gallon cupric ammonium carbonate discharge that
occurred in Lake Linden between 1971 and 1972. Although no “deleterious effects”
were reported because of the spill, it raised awareness of other potential mining
contamination and prompted state investigations into regional fish abnormalities called
locally the “Torch Lake Tumors,” and the long-term deposit of xanthates and creosotes
from milling operations. Further, in 1985 an International Joint Commission designated
the Torch Lake basin a “Great Lakes area of concern” because of potential
contamination. Although many of the fish tumors had disappeared by the early 1990s,
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high levels of mercury and PCBs were found, and fish consumption advisories remained
in effect in 2009. 593
Although the first formal implementation of mining-related pollution controls in
the Keweenaw came from the State of Michigan and affected the organization and
construction of the White Pine mine, mill, and smelter in the 1950s, and the final closure
of the Quincy Smelter in 1971, the state would ultimately cede control over the
abandoned wastes to the federal government. The state investigated or supported
investigations into copper tailings and slag wastes that ultimately contributed to the
official listing of Torch Lake on the Superfund National Priorities List in 1986. After
that EPA became the primary governmental entity to formally document past
environmental conditions, plan for remediation, and attempt to seek a responsible party to
pay for the cleanup under CERCLA. Although the EPA took charge, in most cases,
studies and remediation plans were developed with the consultation of the State of
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
Unlike the Butte and Ducktown districts, the pollution problems in the Keweenaw
from mining operations were relatively benign and not considered a high human health
risk. The EPA classified the region an environmental risk related mostly to the
deposition of tailings, slag, and airborne dusts, and ancillary industrial activity such as
chemical leaks and discarded storage drums. According to the Torch Lake Second Five
Year Report:
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Torch Lake was the site of copper milling and smelting facilities and operations
for over 100 years. The lake was a repository for all mining related
waste…Copper was extracted through a series of technologies…first by crushing
or “stamping” the rock…then by grinding… The copper and crushed rocks were
separated by gravimetric sorting in a liquid medium. The copper was then sent to
the smelter. The crushed rock particles called “tailings” or “stamp sands” were
discarded along with mill processing water, typically by pumping it into the lakes
and streams…Dredges were used [starting in 1916] to collect submerged tailings
which were screened, re-crushed, and gravity separated. An ammonia leaching
process involving cupric ammonium carbonate was used to recover copper…
During the 1920s chemical reagents were used to further increase the efficiency of
reclamation...[and] included lime, pyridine oil, coal tar creosotes, wood creosote,
pine oil, and xanthates. After reclamation…chemically treated tailings were
returned to the lakes. 594
Over the course of a century, more than 200 million tons of tailings and reclamation
wastes were dumped into Torch Lake filling approximately 20% of its volume. Despite
national prohibitions on creating obstructions to navigable waterways established by the
Rivers and Harbors act of 1890, Torch Lake was specifically exempted. The lake was
further exempted from dumping laws when mining increased during WWII.
During early site investigations conducted under CERCLA, EPA discovered
empty drums at mill and smelter sites along Torch Lake, and over 800 drums dumped on
the lake bottom. While those determined to have once contained hazardous substances
were removed and disposed of at a hazardous waste landfill, many of the empty drums on
the lake bottom were simply left in place. 595
Curiously, the EPA did not aggressively pursue Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRP) at this superfund site despite the fact that Universal Oil Products (UOP), Quincy
Development Corporation, and the Copper Range Company still existed at the time of the
594

Ibid., 17.
"First Five-Year Review Report for the Torch Lake Superfund Site," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago:
U.S. EPA, 2003), 13.
595

325

NPL listing. EPA began exploring cost recovery options in 1986, but, following
unsubstantiated claims from UOP that the EPA would make local private landowners
fund the clean up or that UOP would sue local land owners if it were required to pay,
EPA withdrew its pursuit in 1988, claiming it was doing so to assuage local fears about
protracted federal lawsuits. A more significant factor in deciding not to pursue PRPs
may have been that the total cost of the Torch Lake cleanup was estimated at a mere
$15.2 million as opposed to over $1 billion in Butte-Anaconda and likely several hundred
million dollars in Ducktown, and that the cost of pursuing UOP, Quincy Development,
and Copper Range would have incurred attorney fees and time costs much higher relative
to the cost of the cleanup. 596 Also, the contamination was not a significant human health
risk, but rather just an environmental risk and thereby a lower priority cleanup. In the
long-run, EPA may have simply found it less costly to pay for the work from the “superfund” generated from petroleum and chemical taxes.
While many of the documented incidents of hazardous substances in the
Keweenaw region were relatively minor, the primary concern and target for remediation
came from existing tailing and slag waste deposits. From the First EPA Five Year report
on Torch Lake:
The continuous release of tailing- and slag-borne contaminants via wind, surface
water runoff, and wave erosion are deemed to represent an unacceptable and
actionable source of ecological risk. The most severe ecological impact is the
degradation of benthic communities (bottom dwelling organisms) associated with
contaminated sediments in Torch Lake and other water bodies at the site. The
benthic community is an integral part of the base of a complex food web in lakes.
A severely impacted benthic community would impact the entire food web.
Toxic effects due to heavy metals (especially copper) appear to be related to
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sediment pore space dynamics and seem not to have significant water column
impacts. 597
The general plan for remediation thus became to arrest the flow of tailings- and slaggenerated toxins into the air and water, and the EPA identified Torch Lake itself and 13
specific sites on Torch Lake, Portage Lake, and Lake Superior that had large waste
deposits. EPA ultimately broke the sites into three operable units to manage. The plan,
according to 1992 record of decision (ROD) was to:
1. Reduce or minimize potential future risks to human health associated with the
inhalation of airborne contaminants from the tailings and/or slag located at the site;
2. Reduce or minimize potential future risks to human health associated with direct
contact with and/or the ingestion of the tailings and/or the slag located at the site;
3. Reduce or minimize the release of contaminants in tailings to the groundwater
through leaching; and 4. Reduce or minimize the release of contaminants in
tailings to the surface water and sediment by soil erosion and/or air deposition. 598
The thirteen specific locations were divided geographically into Operable Units 1 and 3,
while Torch Lake made up Operable Unit 2. 599
OPERABLE UNIT 1
10. Mason Sands
11. Hubbell/Tamarack City
12. Lake Linden Sands
OPERABLE UNIT 2
Torch Lake*

OPERABLE UNIT 3
1. Calumet Lake
2. Boston Pond
3. North Entry
4. Redridge*
5. Freda*

6. Michigan Smelter
7. Quincy Smelter
8. Isle Royale Sands
9. Dollar Bay
13. Point Mills
*No action taken

Although the record of decision called for no action regarding OU2 (Torch Lake)
because the lake was recovering on its own, the general plan of remediation for the
majority of other sites was a four part system of debris removal and grading of the
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tailings and slag deposits, followed by a 6 – 8 inch soil cap to arrest blowing and erosion,
topped by a vegetative layer to keep the cap intact and help shed water and prevent public
exposure, and finally deed restrictions to ensure the remedy remained intact. 600 There
were, however, a few exceptions to this treatment besides Torch Lake. Portions of the
Isle Royale Sands southeast of Houghton were being redeveloped for a sewage treatment
plant, and some of those stamp sands were used in concrete block manufacture. Part of
the Point Mills sands were being used for winter road traction, and sands at Freda and
Redridge were exposed to heavy Lake Superior wind and wave action and thus exempt.
Except for one location, none of these sites had significant standing historic
structures eligible for the National Register, and thus Sections 106 and 110 issues did not
apply to the EPA’s work despite arguments that the stamp sands themselves could be
considered a significant historic landscape feature representing major man-made changes
to shorelines. 601 The lone-exception was the National Historic Landmark-designated
Quincy Smelter site, built on stamp sands created by the earlier Pewabic and Franklin
mills. From the 2008 Proposed Plan for ROD amendments:
The Quincy Smelter…includes 25 buildings, which historically operated as a
copper smelting facility during the 19th and 20th centuries until 1969. The
Quincy Smelting Works is a significant component of the Quincy Mining
Company National Historic Landmark District established in 1989. This district is
also within the boundaries of the Quincy Unit of Keweenaw National Historic
Park. Franklin Township owns the Quincy Smelter complex and is interested in
developing and restoring the area as part of the national park. Activities
conducted under EPA’s 4 Superfund Redevelopment Initiative (SRI) have
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identified Quincy Smelter as having passive recreational use and historical
representation (historic site) use. 602
The smelter soon became a contentious issue for the region. The EPA and
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) claimed that the stamp sands
on which the smelter was built were prone to airborne disbursement and that its slag piles
contained high quantities of heavy metals and considered demolition as a potential early
remedy. 603 Local developers claimed the deteriorating buildings were an eyesore, that
prime waterfront real estate was being wasted, and argued that the buildings should,
therefore, be demolished. 604 The National Park Service argued that the smelter buildings
were not only part of a National Historic Landmark district, but they were affiliated with
the Keweenaw National Historical Park and part of the one of the last historic copper
smelter complexes in the world, and represented a significant component of the local
industry and should therefore be preserved. 605 The State Historic Preservation Office,
generally in charge of Sections 106 and 110 issues, largely deferred to the NPS. 606
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Meanwhile, locals split between preservation, commercial development, and complete
demolition.

Quincy Smelter
When selecting Keweenaw sites to be documented by HAER, choosing properties
to include in the National Historic Landmark district, and defining the boundaries of the
Keweenaw National Historical Park, heritage professionals in each case included the
Quincy Smelter site on Portage Lake for its integrity as a historic location and
significance to regional and ultimately national copper production. While other
significant contributing sites such as Coppertown Museum and the Quincy Mine Hoist
were under fairly stable ownership, the smelter had sat largely unused and abandoned
since its closing in 1971, suffering annually from the insalubrious affects of heavy
winters and chronic vandalism. Unfortunately for the site, the KNHP implementing
legislation forbade the new national park from acquiring the site because of potential
hazardous wastes and its listing on the NPL. The Quincy Smelter is the only Keweenaw
site listed specifically on both the National Historic Landmark District form and National
Priorities List.
The EPA and MDEQ evaluated Keweenaw stamp sand and slag deposits based on
the potential for redevelopment and potential exposure to hazardous substances, primarily
antimony, arsenic, copper, and vanadium. While many of the toxins had acceptable
thresholds for temporary exposure, such as at parks or recreation areas, the exposure
federally funded project with potential adverse affects on a national historic landmark,” (p. 6-7) These
responsibilities would be the same for the SHPO under those circumstances.
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threat became much more chronic if people were going to be spending considerable time
near the deposits, if the deposits were to be disturbed, or if children could be at risk of
ingestion, primarily the case if the areas were redeveloped into housing. Because of this
high risk, the EPA instigated the soil cap and vegetative cover remedy for sands that had
the potential for new housing. 607
The slag piles and stamp sands at the Quincy Smelter tested high for copper,
antimony, and chromium, which contributed to its rating of chronic hazard for prolonged
exposure. Copper was singled out as the “most pronounced contaminant” for potential
children residing at the smelter site, but antimony was also rated a high health risk. 608
Further, the slag piles also tested high for cadmium and chromium. 609 (See Figure 7.5)
However, unlike the Torch Lake stamp sands, the smelter site from the beginning of the
Superfund process had been considered for potential inclusion in the Keweenaw National
Historical Park with minimal exposure risks for visitors and staff. 610 In the 1992
Declaration for the Record of Decision, the EPA stated:
Assuming that the slag pile located in the Quincy Smelter Area (Appx. 25 acres)
will be developed as part of a National Park, no action will be taken. If the area is
not developed in the future, then deed restrictions will be sought to prevent the
development of residences in the slag pile area. 611
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b

b

Figure 7.5 Aerial
view of Quincy Site
1990. Showing
collections of historic
buildings (a) and slag
piles (b). (Source:

Michigan Tech Archives
and Copper Country
Historical Collections.)

a

In 1992, the same year the Keweenaw Park was formed, the EPA decided that no
action was required at the smelter site as long as it was developed as a historic attraction
without individual long-term exposure to hazardous wastes. Even if not developed, the
EPA decided it would only seek deed restrictions before considering taking the site off
the NPL. Unfortunately, the enabling legislation for the park prevented federal
ownership of the site, but not technical and financial assistance provided to the site
owner. In 1999 the KNHP worked with the site owner, Quincy Development, to transfer
the site to Franklin Township with the intention that the park would provide planning and
technical assistance and at some point in the future, lease, or otherwise develop the site if
legally permitted. In addition to funding smelter documentation and research projects,
and providing technical expertise, restoration cost estimates, and planning concepts to the
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township over the next five years, KNHP also provided guidance to EPA in the erection
of a security fence to protect trail users from friable and blowing asbestos. 612
Despite the EPA’s 1988 decision not to pursue potentially responsible parties and
its expectation, if not support, for the inclusion of the smelter site in the KNHP, EPA and
MDEQ interpreted the expenditure of NPS planning funds and its attempt “to impose
restrictions on the location of protective fences,” as signs of tacit ownership, and the
agency’s enforcement branch went after KNHP as a new PRP. 613 In a modified formletter received by the KNHP on June 28, 2004, the EPA’s Region 5 Emergency
Enforcement and Support Section claimed that it was planning to upgrade security,
prepare health and safety plans, perform comprehensive asbestos sampling, and remove
asbestos and any other hazardous substances it found at the Quincy Smelter site. Further,
the letter claimed to have received “information that [KNHP] owns or operates the
facility or generated or transported hazardous substances that were disposed of at the
facility,” and encouraged the park
as a potentially responsible party, to agree to reimburse the U.S. EPA for costs
incurred to date and to voluntarily perform or finance the response activities
which the U.S. EPA has determined or will determine are required at the
facility. 614
While this effort appeared to have little merit based on the intentions of the NPS, it
caused an immediate cessation of action by the local park staff and an order by the NPS
regional director to have no further direct involvement with the site beyond technical
612
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expertise, leaving the care and future of the site to Franklin Township, a governmental
unit with little excess revenue to fund the preservation and redevelopment of a 25structure National Historic Landmark site listed on the National Priorities List. 615
The site languished under a perplexing cloud with EPA both supporting and
subverting potential restoration and redevelopment. While the EPA was ready to take
“no action” and delist the site in the 1990s, the State of Michigan DEQ kept insisting that
the EPA work to remediate known toxins in the stamp sands and slag and remove
asbestos discovered in the early 2000s. The EPA did not initially pursue actions because
of the potential for a PRP, such as the NPS, to pay for the cleanup, but it did remove
hazardous materials stored in drums and ultimately abated asbestos at the site while
awaiting resolution of the National Park Service role. 616 The NPS, in the mean time,
could not contribute to restoration planning because of its potential responsibility and
liability. Franklin Township could not apply for Brownfield, coastal zone management,
or preservation grants because of the NPL designation. Meanwhile, the site continued to
disintegrate more with each passing winter, leading to further public controversies
reflected in the joint city councils resolution cited at the beginning of this chapter.
Public controversy, however, accompanied this superfund project from the
beginning. At early public meetings, residents commended the attempts to save the
smelter site and criticized the efforts to cover other stamp sands, recommending that
“EPA establish a defined protocol for the protection of these remarkable resources
615
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whenever they are encountered in any remediation activity.” 617 Others clearly
admonished the EPA for considering an option not to remediate the smelter site and some
stamp sands because the potential for any toxicity must be addressed. 618 The EPA
responded, that by law it was
required to consider all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements
(ARARs) in selecting and implementing the remedial action. National Historic
Preservation Act and Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act are some of
the ARARs to be considered… U.S. EPA will work with the MDNR (Michigan
Department of Natural Resources), local townships, and necessary agencies to
protect the historically valuable resources. In addition, based on the development
of certain areas as a historical park, the U.S. EPA has excluded those areas from
the selected remedy. 619
The lack of development or preservation activity with the smelter site after more
than a decade of discussion coalesced a group of local citizens to form a support group
initially called Save Quincy Smelter, but later formalized into the Quincy Smelter
Association. Conceived and formed by non-heritage professionals, the group initially
called for the development of a shopping area and crafts center in the restored buildings.
While this approach was not enthusiastically received by other stakeholders, especially
local city managers whose struggling downtown business districts could use less
competition, the controversy served to increase discussion about the site in the
community and force other stakeholders to find more reasonable solutions that could
satisfy the desires of the community and needs of historic preservation. While the
Quincy Smelter Association eventually backed away from the shopping development
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concept, it has held several fundraisers and supported small projects around the site and
been a public voice for the community. 620
In 2006, new inspections demonstrated that stamp sands at the smelter site
continued to erode into the lake. 621 Further, the majority of the 12 superfund sites
originally listed in the region had been officially remediated and, with deed restrictions in
place, effectively became eligible for delisting from the NPL and available for
appropriate redevelopment. 622 This action, largely accomplished by 2005, pushed the
EPA toward finalizing the last remediation plans for lingering sites.
But no formal activity to expand the national park to include the smelter site had
occurred, and MDEQ continued to push for remediation projects, while the EPA began
exploring options to finish its work at the smelter. With the intent of ultimately
amending the ROD regarding the smelter site from “no action because of National Park
formation” to some remediation to meet its primary objective of eliminating existing
hazards and the requests of MDEQ, EPA began planning for final remediation efforts.
However, because of the joint Houghton-Hancock City Councils resolution calling for
demolition of the smelter if no park partnership developed cited at the start of this
chapter, U.S. Senator Carl Levin (Mich.) convened a series of stake-holder conference
calls in 2007 with Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Franklin Township,
the Natural Resource Conservation Service of the USDA, Michigan Technological
University, and the Keweenaw National Historical Park specifically to engage all parties
620
621
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interested in the site and find a lasting solution to preserve and remediate the site. 623
Curiously, the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office neglected to join the
conversations, largely relying on NPS for Sections 106 and 110 guidance.
Several key decisions came from these meetings. First, it opened a dialogue
between the national park and EPA regarding the issue of superfund liability, ultimately
resulting in a revocation of the EPA’s 2004 PRP claims on the NPS. 624 Second, it
allowed Franklin Township and key heritage experts at the National Park and MTU a
voice in the final solution for the site. Third, it encouraged direct discussions with EPA
and regional stake holders interested in preservation and, with progress, likely
encouraged Senator Levin, a long-time supporter of Copper Country preservation
projects, to identify funding in the National Budget earmarked for the smelter site.
Fourth, with progress toward preservation, Copper Country Preservation, Inc. (CCPI), a
non-profit organization and wholly owned subsidiary of the KNHP advisory council,
organized to support the park’s mission and partner sites, decided to support the smelter
and local appropriations as its first fund-raising project. In addition to a wide-spread
letter-writing campaign supported by the National Parks Conservation Association, a
national parks advocacy group, CCPI successfully lobbied the cities of Hancock and
Houghton to each pledge $5,000 in 2008 for the restoration of the smelter site, an action
called for in their 2007 resolution that also identified demolition as a potential option. 625
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The EPA, fully aware of the historic nature of the site from the beginning and
anxious to finish the project, now decided to remove the exiting slag piles and grade, cap,
and vegetate all the exposed stamp sands outside the fence EPA erected in 2004 to secure
the cluster of historic buildings on site to appease MDEQ. (See Figure 7.5) But with
evidence citing the chemical stability of slag, including the Old Works Golf Course slagtraps in Montana, EPA, following input from NPS and MTU, decided to leave the large
slag piles in place with some form of passive deterrence to prevent direct public access
and remediate the rest of the areas outside the fence line much like other stamp sands in
the district. 626 The revised plan was presented to the public at a January 2009 meeting
with a follow up presentation of final design alternatives and ROD amendment scheduled
for late July 2009. 627 (See Figure 7.6)
Although the smelter site is a long way from restoration, the decision to pursue a
historic site rather than demolition and new construction seems to be fairly well
established in the community. In late June, 2009, Senator Levin announced an
additional $1,000,000 for the smelter was expected to be earmarked for the 2010 Federal
Budget. 628 This appropriation, however, still had to be approved by the full Senate and
survive the Senate/House conference committee and, even if approved, it won’t be able to
be spent until winter breaks in 2010.
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Figure 7.6 Quincy Smelter Base map for proposed final remediation 2009.
The area inside the dashed lines will be graded, covered with soil, and vegetated
to arrest erosion. The slag plies (b) will be left alone but some passive restraint
will be erected, such as a short fence. The arrows indicate new water drainage
from the hillside. The buildings will not receive any further remediation
treatment beyond the asbestos removal of 2008. (Source: EPA, Proposed Plan for

Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site, 5)

If the Ducktown district is defined by the landscape and in Montana everything is
large, then Michigan can be seen as the most diverse and least clustered. Its mines were
spread over three counties and 100 miles, it had three large mining companies in its eras
of high production and declines instead of one. It had the deepest mines and simplest
processing. It had the largest number of individual stakeholders involved in cleanup and
heritage conflicts including the EPA, NPS, MTU, the State of Michigan, many different
cities, three counties, and 19 contributing heritage sites.
But its overall heritage planning was an odd mix of top-down planning coming
from the National Park Service and, at the superfund sites, EPA and the only partially
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active State of Michigan, and, of course, bottom-up planning coming from the many
heritage sites, the grass-roots groups that advocated the national park designation, and the
Quincy Smelter Association. However, because of the partnership nature of the KNHP
and its limited staff size, the park does not impose much control over the partner sites and
provides only limited technical and financial assistance. However, it does have the
resources and bureaucratic infrastructure to consider district-wide planning initiatives,
unavailable to and likely unnecessary for individual sites, and the legal department of a
federal bureaucracy to respond to letters “encouraging it, as a PRP, to pay for
environmental restoration.” At the same time, its partnership nature has limited the
funding available to it for long-term restoration projects, thus forcing the NPS to work to
find outside funding for projects it cannot afford.
The superfund project had only two direct impacts to the heritage of the region.
First, it covered a considerable area of stamp sands that some considered benign and an
essential part of the region’s character. Second, although EPA wanted to walk away
from the Quincy Smelter in 1992 (and not expend any remediation funding), it was
forced to find a compromise solution between a slowly developing historic preservation
plan advocated by a United States Senator, and the MDEQ’s desires for full remediation.
While the solution does not address either concern fully, it does respect and respond to
the most important components of both sides: protection of the historic structures and
slag piles and a cap-and-cover solution for a substantial portion of the stamp sands to
remediate questionable health dangers.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
Two key factors combined to drive the dramatic technological change in
American copper mining and smelting in the 19th century. First, copper demand
increased at such a rate in the industrial and modern periods that supply often required
significant modifications to existing European technologies to reach greater output and
efficiency. Second, expansive lean and sulfur-rich lodes were discovered that required
complex mechanical, chemical, and thermodynamic procedures to economically extricate
the copper from its ores. American copper demand was so great, and many of its primary
ores so lean, that the industry further required massive corporate organizations and labor
forces to ensure profitable scales of operations. Important 19th and 20th century copper
mines operated in more than twelve states. 629 But such extensive copper recovery from
ores, largely between 0.5% and 2% rich, meant that mining, milling, and smelting
generated a considerable amount of waste, ultimately leading to significant
environmental problems and significant Superfund remediation projects managed by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in, among other places, Montana, Tennessee, and
Michigan.
By 2008, copper production in the United States was largely concentrated on very
low grade porphyry deposits in a few mining districts in Arizona, Utah, New Mexico,
Nevada, and Montana, and processed at one of only three smelters in Arizona or Utah.
Although the U.S. no longer had the largest output in the world, it still produced 1.25
million metric tons of copper and processed scrap in 2008, which was a little above the
629
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yearly U.S. average for the preceding century. 630 Montana copper production, the
smallest of five producing states, came from Montana Resources, Inc. in Butte, and a
small portion of the total scrap handled in America came from Peninsula Copper, Inc.’s
reprocessing of discarded copper-rich components and wire at the former Calumet and
Hecla Smelter site in Hubbell, Michigan.
Both the 2008 Montana and Michigan copper operations were relatively
insignificant reflections of what the industry once meant to the economies of both
regions, but in some small measure, the once dominant regions were still producing
copper-rich materials using means and methods developed decades earlier. The
economic and technological continuity with the past contributed to the heritage and
identities of both regions, especially as they neared the end of controversial Superfund
remediation projects. Although Tennessee had no active copper-related industry left after
its last chemical plant closed in 2008, it too was nearing the end of active remediation.
The Superfund projects in each district defined the end, maybe even the bitter
end, of their once dominant mineralogical periods. While two districts created
noteworthy by-product processes, all three developed significant mining, milling, and
smelting processes on a scale that created jobs, social structures, regional identities, waste
streams, and significant wealth, the latter mostly for outside investors. While there
tended to be a fairly fluid exchange of mining workers and engineers between active
630
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mining districts, later and older generations tended to stay put, especially as production
ended. Those later residents had to face the ultimate decline of production and the
indignities of not only deepening mineralogical insignificance, but the implicit culpability
of being a party to serious environmental degradation without necessarily sharing in
much, if any, of the wealth generated by mining.

This dissertation examined the effects of environmental remediation on the
heritage and preservation of industrial regions, specifically examining copper smelting in
a broader mining landscape, and the complex negotiations undertaken and compromises
reached by outside remediaters and inside preservationists as each argued for what they
considered was the best course of action. Chapters 1-4 explored the technological and
environmental history of copper smelting from its pre-historic origins through the 20th
century when American copper mines and smelters dominated world production and the
American economy dominated world consumption. Chapters 5-7 focused on three of the
most significant 19th-century copper mining districts in the United States—the
Keweenaw Peninsula of Michigan, the Butte-Anaconda district in Montana, and the
Ducktown district in Tennessee—and investigated the conflict between historic
preservation and environmental remediation.
The question posed in the introduction of this dissertation asked:
How does a community that desires to preserve and commemorate parts of its
history articulate and negotiate that desire in the face of sometimes overwhelming
opposition, in this case, from a well-funded organization aimed at remediating the
waste streams that emanated from that very same historic landscape when the
historic resources in question stand in the way of the simplest and most linear
means of remediation?
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The answer required an initial understanding of the economic, demographic, and
perception/value systems of the communities being examined. This analysis suggested a
predictive model for the experiences of the three districts that could be extrapolated to
examine other rural mining and smelting locations facing declining fortunes and
increasing concern about the legacy of industry. (See Below) Using the model to
compare the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana districts ultimately contributed to an
understanding of the forces that led to the three heritage-remediation compromise
landscapes.

Mining District Heritage Model
Each of the three districts went through four distinct phases: (1) significant
growth in the 19th century, (2) periods of high production in the early 20th century, (3) a
period of decline that ultimately led to (4) the abandonment of (most) mining and
smelting operations by the end of the 20th century. All three also had significant and
persistent environmental issues leading to listing on the Superfund National Priorities
List (NPL) or, in the case of Ducktown, Tennessee, a negotiated non-listing with all the
legal and procedural requirements of a listed site. All three also spawned significant and
expanding heritage movements to commemorate their once-proud history—movements
that began as the output of each district began to decline.
At each phase—growth, high-production, decline, and abandonment—issues of
economics and environment/landscape change had clear implications for the self identity
and external perceptions of each region, and many of these issues unfolded along parallel
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lines. These parallel effects suggest a model to illustrate how historic districts deal with
both their contaminated pasts and heritage concerns. This short section will explore this
model, which may have implications for future studies of historic industrial districts
undergoing environmental remediation.
The life span of any extractive industrial district follows a rough bell curve based
on the productivity of and income generated from its mines. (See Figure 8.1)

Figure 8.1 Income from Mining, broadly defined and based on productivity,
increases through growth and high-production periods then declines as ore quality
decreases to a point that mining becomes unprofitable. The growth period in most
profitable and long-lived districts, however, is relatively short and steep and the
decline is long and slow. (Source: Author)
In most instances, mines have significant growth in their early lives, leading to varied
production highs, but as ore quality and quantity dwindle, mining declines. Some
districts may have substantial deposits of lower-grade ores that, after the richer early ores
are harvested, can prolong life, but these usually require a significant increase in the scale
of operations. 631 Ultimately, however, when the quality of ore gets too low to mine and
631
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process profitably, the district’s extractive history comes to an end, often leaving behind
physical remnants of the once-productive landscape including structures, mining cavities,
and mining and processing wastes accumulated over decades of mining efforts under
limited or non-existent waste-handling regulations.
Montana copper production, which, for example, did not exist in any significant
quantity before 1880, grew to 100 million pounds per year in 1887, out producing the
reigning Michigan district. By the late mid-1910s, Montana was averaging over 300
million pounds of copper per year before declining back to 100 million pounds in the
mid-1940s. Although the Berkeley Pit sustained production in the district until 1982,
underground mining came to a halt in the 1960s.
Population size of the districts followed a similar early trajectory to income, but
stabilized after mining ended. (See Figure 8.2)

Figure 8.2 District Population of mining and metal processing regions will
increase through growth and high-production phases, then as mining declines, many
people will leave the area searching for work, ultimately leaving a relatively
stagnant population of long-term residents. (Source: Author)

mine. Mining companies, especially in the 20th century, diversified production, opened new ore deposits,
and vertically integrated to hedge against declining mine production in any one region.
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In many cases in the United States, new mining deposits were found in rural and
isolated areas as geologists ventured west exploring new territories. Often after the
removal of indigenous populations, mining and metal processing expanded rapidly during
the growth and high-production mining stages with sometimes vast numbers of European
and Euro-American settlers moving in and building towns with downtown districts,
theaters, saloons, and new housing developments to support and service the burgeoning
new populations. However, when mine production slowed leading eventually to
operational abandonment, many people, mostly younger, left the regions looking for
work. They left behind a much smaller group of people, now many second, third, or
fourth generation residents, who considered themselves locals with a birthright to the
heritage of the region and a strong affinity for the landscape. They tried to sustain their
communities in the face of declining economic conditions. Members of this group were
often the initiators and drivers of the first heritage and commemoration projects, and also
the key population the EPA was concerned about protecting. Houghton County’s
population, for example, increased during the region’s mining growth period reaching a
recorded high in 1910 of 88,098. Following peak production later in the decade, the
county’s population dropped to 71,930 in 1920, then to 52,581 in 1930. By the 1950s the
population reached the mid 30,00s and has remained near 35,000 from 1960-2000. 632
In the growth and high-production mining phases, regional identity was generally
favorable and based on the success of mineral operations and the importance of its mines,
their financial returns, and their associated political power. (See Figure 8.3)
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Figure 8.3 General Perceptions and Self Identity of a region are usually
favorable as the district is producing wealth, but decline as output slows, incomes
drop, and the reality of environmental contamination set in. It will likely rise
again as remediation efforts finish and the region is officially delisted from the
NPL and heritage projects commemorate the region. (Source: Author)
The region itself, if not the state within which the mines, mills, and smelters resided,
sometimes had high average individual incomes and a strong tax base directly derived
from mining. The mineral companies themselves often had fairly strong political
influence on local and sometimes state and national governments, and were thus able to
keep their operations free from many economically distracting influences like foreign
competition, waste disposal restrictions, and organized labor. Most local residents in
these periods of growth were not really local, but new to the region, lured by the prospect
of good-paying jobs and had a larger affiliation with the industry and had favorable views
toward the work. 633 When the Anaconda Copper Mining Company beat Calumet and

633

This argument, however, is not intended to minimize the significant conflicts that erupted in mining
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control. It merely suggests that mining growth and expansion tended to be viewed broadly as providing
positive economic returns. While the identity of a region on a broad scale can be seen as positive with
positive growth, often that positive identity is more clearly focused in later phases when the negative
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Hecla’s attempt to shut down the Montana industry and Butte became the largest copper
mining district in the world in 1887, local newspapers proclaimed the victory. Similarly,
during their periods of high production both Michigan and Montana copper districts
celebrated their contributions to copper mining proclaiming their world-leading output
and the world’s largest steam-hoist, smoke-stack, and smelter, and the world’s deepest
copper mines.
However, as production slows and infrastructure improvements decline, there is
less investment in the workforce, often causing strikes over unsafe working conditions,
and, with significant environmental decay, local morale and external perception of the
once-productive district falls, sometimes to very low levels. Butte and Anaconda’s
designation as the “ugliest spot in Montana” and one of the “world’s must-miss vacation
spots,” and articles on Tennessee’s Copper Basin titled “the Death of Ducktown” and
“Copper Basin Cover-up” clearly echo the negative perceptions generated during periods
of decline. With positive redevelopment in these regions—both in terms of growing
heritage consciousness and remediation of obvious health risks—perceptions of life in the
region, both internal and external improve. (See Figure 8.3)
While production increases through the first two mining phases, the landscape
changes accordingly, and sometimes at alarming rates often leading to an awareness by
some, of growing environmental threats. (See Figure 8.4) The wastes generated by
mining operations were only important to the mining companies if they presented a
production bottleneck problem, or could at some point in the future be processed for
regional perceptions that accompany production declines, abandonment, and considerations of
contamination cause reflection on earlier, better times.
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Figure 8.4 Environmental Degradation Concern has only a modest effect on
operations in the growth and high-production phase and declines if the mine has
enough capital and political influence to buy-out those concerned. However, it
increases considerably as mining slows and communities assess the long-term
environmental costs of having hosted extractive industries that may no longer
provide any economic benefits to the area. However, in some instances, growthperiod pollution did not exist on a large enough scale to warrant early concern
like Michigan, while in other districts, the effects of early pollution did not
decline, and concern remained high until environmental concern mounted in the
abandonment and superfund periods like in Tennessee. (Source: Author)
income-generating by-products or reprocessed for valuable materials lost using earlier,
less-efficient concentrating methods. Actual environmental degradation during the first
phases, however, was only important to those who were not part of the capitalgenerating-machine or outside of the company influence and being negatively affected.
These parties usually had limited recourse except to take the offending industries to court
and sue for property damages. In some instances, the offending industry simply paid the
damages, acquired the damaged properties, or installed pollution control equipment if the
toxic waste had some salable value. These options were often considered a less-costly
alternative to fighting court cases even those a mining company would likely win. If the
environmental landscape change was significant enough and highly visible, then the
problems were written about in newspapers, journals, or textbooks, but little was usually
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done to hamper the income-generating capacity of the industry. Tennessee/Georgia, and
Montana farmers and land holders, for example, suffered from the deleterious effects of
mining and smelting and took the offending companies to court in the early 20th century.
Anaconda successfully handled its pollution problems with settlements, land purchases,
and negotiated changes to practice, and, after environmental degradation concern dropped
in the early 1930s, could continue operating largely without concern about pollution until
the 1970s. While the Keweenaw never saw an early concern for environmental
contamination, the Ducktown district never lost the stigma of pollution. After lawsuits
forced them to change practices, albeit to new systems that resulted in significantly
improved profits, Tennessee copper companies began remediating the landscape and
continued to do so in 2009. Its concern never went away, but did increase substantially,
like Michigan’s and Montana’s, as new toxins were identified in the later abandonment
and superfund periods.
These early concerns about environmental change formed the roots of later
responses to landscape remediation in the districts, especially after mining and processing
slow down or are abandoned. Quieted sometimes, but never extinguished,
environmental concern grows significantly after mine productivity declines, often
following, but not necessarily related to, the establishment of national social-political
conservation movements (especially following EPA investigations of sites under
Superfund).
In the period of decline, as extractive output slows, people and communities do
not earn as much as they did before, workers benefits and jobs are cut, companies do not
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invest in infrastructure or productive improvements as much, and the regional population
starts to drop almost as fast as it grew in the early stages. With declining mine output and
community wealth, especially noticeable after another mining region surpasses their
once-significant productive capacity, communities’ identities start to change, and second,
third, and fourth generation locals begin to notice how much money has left the region,
and how much they will soon have to contend with rising unemployment, a declining tax
base, declining property values, an aging population, and the environmental and health
impacts left behind. With declining tax income and lessening corporate support for
community projects, towns start looking shabbier as structures are torn down, burned
down, or just abandoned and left to deteriorate, affecting the self identity and external
perception of the region. (See Figure 8.3)
Blame is hard to assign by these communities unless a “new” corporate entity,
such as a petroleum company, can be targeted for causing much of the economic decline
and contamination, like in Montana. But, in other instances, the new corporate entity
may be seen as the savior fixing the problems to the landscape that no-one in particular is
to blame for, such as in Tennessee. In other instances, the communities tacitly blame the
U.S. Government for its wanton disregard for the region’s well-being during the
industrial decline and the instigation negative changes in public opinion after the EPA
declares an area contaminated and in need of significant cleanup. The government, in
turn, often desperately searches for someone to blame (pay) for the environmental
problems, especially if there are acute threats to human health and expensive remediation
alternatives.
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Despite varying degrees of culpability among stakeholders, this is also the time
that locals start thinking back to their times of prosperity (the “golden age”)
independently and begin commemorating their past, like all three districts in this study,
with small heritage projects like museums, National Register nominations, and
interpretive/educational programs in an attempt to hold on to or regain some bit of the
dignity lost with the decline. (See Figure 8.5)

Figure 8.5 Heritage Values of a region, or the concern for commemorating the
past, begin to grow as industries decline. Residents look to commemorate their
once-glorious past as a means of retaining self-respect and generating tourism and
economic development opportunities. Value and perception of the landscape
become much more important as mining and mining income dwindle in the decline
phase.
Like the early concern for environmental degradation, these early heritage projects often
serve as the roots for later heritage projects, especially after Superfund statues allocate
funding beyond remediation and other federal laws mandate consideration of the effects
of all federal projects on cultural resources. Both early heritage concerns and early
environmental concerns reflect the desires of the community, but each needs a powerful
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agent of change like Superfund to really awaken and drive the formalization of localized
planning.
In the 1960s, genuine and mounting concern about the health effects of the more
invisible toxins generated by industry grew following new studies on hazardous wastes
and human health. This concern contributed to a growing social-political movement
against environmental degradation and led Congress to enact its first statues regulating
industrial effluent levels. In the ensuing decades, Congress passed specific laws limiting
air pollution, limiting water pollution, regulating transportation and disposal of hazardous
wastes, and regulating the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste. Most of these new
laws were enacted after a century of American industrial dominance had left significant
scars on the landscape and other nations, with lower production costs and weaker
environmental laws, came to dominate global mineral production.
Near the end of production in a mining district, the environmental effects of the
once former grand industry seem much more pronounced because they are no longer part
of an income-generating productive process, and popular opinion turns decidedly
antagonistic. Community identity is nearly at its all-time low as locals feel abandoned
and contaminated by the industry that once gave their community purpose. Almost
worse, governmental outsiders judge the town’s environmental problems as a result of the
new environmental laws. If they decide it needs significant Federal effort to remediate,
the decision often undermines hopes of new tourism-based development. By now the
region has been completely cleared of its mineral wealth, the community’s tax base is
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gone, many of the jobs/people are gone too, and all that remains are the toxic residues
and the negative association of being declared a Superfund site. (See Figure 8.3)
External judgment and the remediation process present conflicting alternatives to
communities. While a Superfund project in a town reflects the acknowledgment of and
remedy to past sins leading, hopefully, to a “clean bill of health” and a readiness to
redevelop damaged lands, the very same clean up announces to the world that this place
is contaminated and not suitable for immediate redevelopment. Tourism in many ways
fits nicely into this scenario, because people visit the region for a short time, not long
enough to be contaminated, but long enough to inject money into the local economy.
Ironically, remediation efforts often spur historic preservation and heritage awareness
because they threaten to destroy remaining potential sources of pride and revenue.
At this point preserving and promoting heritage become increasingly effective
because parts of the clean-up legislation allow for cultural improvement. However, many
of the clean-up professionals and managers, without the sense of identity shared by the
locals, are mostly interested in fixing the threats to human health and the environment,
not heritage preservation. The first and often least expensive remediation considerations
are often to demolish standing features, and grade and cover contamination—even
historically significant structures—often causing heritage-minded locals, but not
necessarily development-minded locals, to sense the impending loss of their heritage
landscape and identity more acutely. (See Figure 8.5)
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Landscapes
Copper mining and smelting in Montana, Tennessee, and Michigan left important
legacies for later generations described by the model above and Table 8.1 below.

Table 8.1 Legacy and Reaction
Michigan
Tennessee

Montana

Primary Ore Type
Copper Mining and
Smelting Operations
Superfund Listing
Contamination Threat
to Human Health
Key Environmental
Problem
Expected Cost of
Cleanup

Native
1844-1969

Sulfide
1854-1987

Sulfide
1880-1980

1986
Low

2001
High

1983
High

Mill Tailings

Mill Tailings,
Smelter Effluent
$1,000,000,000
(one billion)

Cleanup Funder

EPA-”Super-Fund”

Post mining Economic
Recovery

Heritage, University,
Continued Industry

Acid Production,
Smelter Effluent
$100,000,000s
(hundreds of
millions)
Occidental
Petroleum
Heritage, U.S.
Government

Heritage Priority
Heritage Planning

High
NPS-CommunityNHL-HAER
Medium
1920s/1958
High

High
Cleanup Co.-EPANR
Small
1977
Medium

Community Size
Earliest Museum
Heritage Success?

$15,000,000
(fifteen million)

ARCO (BP)
Heritage, Univ.,
Continued
Industry
High
CommunityNHL-HAER
Medium
1963
High

All three mining districts were developed on important ore lodes, in stunning
mountainous or hilly surroundings, near rich waterways and thick woods. All three
developed or adapted technologies and social structures to overcome the challenges of the
natural landscape and wrest copper from the local rock. These actions ultimately
elevated two of the districts to the top copper-producing-district in the world, and the
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third to national importance, and created landscapes that some locals perceived as heroic.
Those same forces that created the heroic landscape, however, also significantly degraded
the environment. The combination of mining decline, economic decline, blight, and loss
of prestige with the need to clean up past egregious behavior and the stigma of Superfund
led to an ethos of defeat.
Both historic mining and environmental degradation legacies led to important
decisions regarding these opposing community needs. On the one side, the desire to
commemorate the once significant and heroic past and lure visitors to their region drove
locals to preserve historic buildings and landscapes, develop museums, and try to
recapture some of the district’s former glory and character. The value of the tourism
market, which had become the second or third leading industry in each state by the
1950s, was not lost on local heritage planners in the economically declining mining
regions. On the other hand, the desire to clean up the region and eliminate the stigma of
sometimes very serious contamination drove efforts to remediate the landscape as
thoroughly as possible and move on to redevelopment projects not necessarily directed at
short-term visitors, but instead aimed toward creating investment opportunities for the
people who already lived there or luring long-term investments from outside the region.
Negotiating a resolution between these two competing legacies, represented in principal
by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), ultimately
created the landscape of compromise.
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The heroic landscape of the Butte-Anaconda district reflected its large scale.
Sitting in a towering and beautiful mountain-scape at the Continental Divide, the onetime largest non-ferrous mining corporation in the world built the largest smelter complex
and tallest smelter stack. Although Michigan mining and smelting structures were built
on a smaller scale, it sat in a region of arguably equal beauty. Its one-time worlddominant copper production began with the first large-scale mining boom in the United
States, was dispersed over a 100-mile three-county mineral range, produced 82% of the
nation’s copper at one time, and had some of the world’s deepest hard-rock mines. While
Tennessee’s copper production never rivaled Michigan’s or Montana’s, it created,
although does not celebrate, the largest sulfuric-acid-making plant in the world and
perfected nearly fuel-free pyritic smelting. To the residents who live there, however, the
heroic landscape (barren and treeless) reflected a very long-lived and prosperous
industry.
The early landscapes of defeat in Montana and Tennessee reflected mostly the
pollution residue from processing and smelting sulfide ores which had created significant
and early smelter smoke problems and led to important lawsuits against the mining
companies. Although the Anaconda Copper Mining Company resolved many of the legal
challenges to its operations by 1933, the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) and
Ducktown Copper Sulfur and Iron Company (which TCC bought in 1936) were, in the
1930s, just coming to terms with the scale of vegetation loss and erosion left by 19th
century smelting operations. Although Anaconda (as an ARCO subsidiary) would
eventually use the cost of compliance with pollution regulations to justify closing its
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expensive and out-dated Washoe smelter in 1980, it had largely operated without
significant concerns about environmental litigation from the 1930s until EPA came in
under Superfund in the 1980s. The Tennessee Copper Company, or one of its later
corporate incarnations, on the other hand, would work with federal and state agencies for
75 years to remedy the pollution-generated denuded landscape before it too faced larger
remediation issues under Superfund in the 1990s, reflecting a very different experience
with federal agencies than Montana or Michigan.
The Michigan landscape, however, never suffered from significant environmental
problems in its early phase. It generated coal-smoke, denuded some of the surrounding
forests for mining needs, and dumped its tailings into waterways, but its mines were so
spread out in the district that timber was never that far away, and its major 20th century
mills, more centrally located in Houghton County, simply moved to nearby locales on
larger or non-navigable streams or lakes when the Army Corps of Engineers complained
that their mill wastes interfered with navigation.
The more serious landscape of defeat for all three districts occurred during the
declining or post-mining periods after most metals processing had ended and concern
about contamination swelled. Tailings in Montana after a century of mining were heavily
contaminated with a variety of carcinogenic materials including heavy metals, arsenic,
and processing chemicals. Tailings, often dumped directly into nearby streams, were
washed up to 125 miles down the Clark Fork during spring floods, littering and
contaminating its entire length from Butte to impoundment dams in Milltown. Further,
arsenic dust from smelting was distributed through smoke and settled on soils and in
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homes creating especially dangerous conditions near smelter stacks. Acidic waters
drained from the mines, and chemical residues from mining and smelting, slag, and ash
were all dumped on or indiscriminately disbursed into the landscape creating
groundwater and air contamination. All of these conditions led to the largest Superfund
site in the country, and one of the costliest.
Building- and community-loss furthered the sense of defeat in the ButteAnaconda landscape. Significant loses began with the opening of the Berkeley Pit in
1952, and continued in the 1970s with the threat of pit expansion, the rash of arsons, and
general neglect. Exacerbating these loses were the growing complexity and cost of the
Superfund project, beginning in the 1980s. EPA planners often considered
(contaminated) building demolition a cheaper alternative to remediation and preservation
as at the Washoe Smelter in Anaconda. Exacerbating these conditions were highly
visible events such as the relocation of Mill Creek residents in 1986 and the death of 342
snow geese in 1995.
Tennessee was also forced to deal with significant contamination including large
lead accumulations from its several acid plants, slag and ash dumps near former smelting
sites, chemical spills, acid mine drainage, and heavy metal- and chemical-laden
sediments that washed into the Tennessee River watershed from major erosion. Further,
the smoke-denuded moonscape in the middle of heavily-wooded East Tennessee became
a national, if not international spectacle after a two-page photo spread appeared in
National Geographic Magazine in June, 1973. Adding to the defeat, several of the
district’s underground mines collapsed creating areas that were (and are) inaccessible to
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people, and even the community’s effort to preserve a small portion of the denuded
landscape behind the museum failed.
While Glenn Springs Holdings (GSH), the environmental arm of the responsible
party in Tennessee, negotiated to keep the EPA from listing Ducktown on the National
Priorities List (NPL) to avoid, it claimed, the stigma of Superfund-association, it agreed
to fund the cleanup as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by
EPA, Glenn Springs, and the State of Tennessee. Further, to stay off the NPL, GSH was
required to follow the same public-involvement, remedial investigation, work-planning,
execution, and EPA- oversight procedures as if the site had been listed. Despite the
success of staying clear of the NPL, the region continued to carry the stigma of a
distressed and degraded landscape because of persistent imagery, public involvement,
and the on-going EPA-guided cleanup.
Nonetheless, the cleanup remained privately funded and privately managed on
private land, and, although Glenn Springs publically promoted its efforts to remediate the
area and contributed to numerous community projects, it was still a private project and
not required to abide by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act as
interpreted by the EPA, Tennessee SHPO, and GSH. Over the entire process from the
cessation of mining, Ducktown, like Butte-Anaconda, lost much of its structural
character, not only due to economic decline and neglect, but also to cleanup decisions
that selected less expensive remediation alternatives to preservation.
Michigan, on the other hand, never suffered heavily from environmental problems
or stigmas. The district, because of its age and disbursed mining locations, lost many of
361

its structures to neglect, abandonment, or redevelopment as mining and economic centers
moved closer to Houghton over 100 years. Despite this loss, the abandonment of places,
in some ways, led to the growth of early heritage tourism and the exploration of ghost
towns. The biggest problem the EPA identified in Michigan under Superfund was copper
and heavy metal-contaminated stamp sands that only posed a human health threat if the
sands were going to be redeveloped into residential property, otherwise the sands were
considered less critical environmental threats. The EPA covered the tailings with a soil
and vegetative cap, a preventable loss to some in the district who considered the tailings
an important and largely benign historic feature of the landscape.
In all three districts, many of the environmental remedies simply erased character
and identity. In Montana and Michigan, re-graded landscapes and smoothed out bumps
designed to keep new soil intact while non-native grasses grew left a muted and
somewhat subdued, or even boring landscape. The revegetation efforts in Tennessee
were limited to the few tree and grass species that could tolerate the contamination,
leading to significant lack of biodiversity in the “new” woods that feel more like a tree
farm than a forest.

Landscapes of Compromise
In all three of the districts the two opposing schools of landscape restoration were
represented by those that wanted the landscape’s natural beauty and cleanliness restored
(to acceptable levels) so they could get back to the business of economic redevelopment,
and those that wanted historic landscape features preserved or restored to celebrate the
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past and revitalize the declining economy through tourism. However, the three regions
did not hold onto their historic character equally. An important key to successful
preservation negotiation was often the size and diversity of the preservation-minded
population and their successful arguments against certain types of remediation
alternatives.
Similarities existed among the districts. Both Montana and Tennessee had large
petroleum companies ultimately take responsibility for the remediation, spending from
hundreds of millions of dollars to one billion dollars, some of which went to preservation
projects in both districts. Both had significant air pollution problems from sulfur smoke
disbursed over a wide area and significant tailings or water runoff problems affecting
rivers that spread their contaminants downstream. Both had air and water problems that
affected areas far away from the mining district. Both had large, post-mining
contaminant disposal problems and highly visible landscape degradation. Both the
Tennessee Copper Company and Anaconda operated demonstration farms in the 20th
century in a vain attempt to prove there was no contamination.
Michigan and Butte shared different characteristics. Both regions led worldproduction at one point. Both had relatively large populations and diverse heritage
planning communities augmented by new arrivals to the region. Both had state
technological universities in the mining district. Both had significant heritage projects
leading to National Historic Landmark designations and HAER documentations.
Tennessee and Michigan each had early mining histories impacted by the Civil War, were
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in naturally beautiful areas, and wished to celebrate their pasts, but little else relevant in
common for this dissertation.
Where Ducktown had a relatively small, stable, population of long-time
residents, Butte-Anaconda had a larger population with influxes of new people at various
times related to new government programs in the 1970s and the presence of Montana
Tech. Butte also had a major interstate and airport that easily brought people into and
through town. Its larger population allowed Butte to generate several special interest
groups focused on preservation. Many of its new residents were educated, and some
even had interests in the preservation of industrial remains. These outsiders came to
Butte-Anaconda with something to contrast it to as well. Few people came from a region
with a Berkeley Pit, gallows frames dominating a hillside, a structure like the Anaconda
Stack, or a Superfund site as large, and the new residents evaluated the landscape as it
stood when they arrived, not how it used to be.
The special interest groups and preservation-minded newcomers augmented a
preservation movement begun by locals in the 1950s. Together, they generated National
Historic Landmark nominations, created a museum, started an archive, and passed several
local preservation ordinances that included historic mining and industrial features. They
pursued many projects and, with knowledge of preservation law and well-organized
efforts, were able to exert political pressure, articulate preservation desires, and negotiate
long-term plans to confront the pending loss of cultural resources and historic landscapes
by Superfund projects. Even the State Historic Preservation Office ceded control over
Section 106 issues to the local counties (to insure speedy resolution of issues generated
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by the cleanup). Overall, the Butte-Anaconda district preservation population was the
most organized, bottom-up oriented, and successful of the three.
Although Butte-Anaconda, and by extension Milltown, had the largest Superfund
site, in some ways it was the also best set up to negotiate and promote heritage, or to
corrupt a concept from M- L. Quinn cited in Chapter 5, the region had heritagesusceptibility. With a sizeable population of educated, preservation-oriented, and
planning-minded people aware of the law, an established National Historic Landmark
district, maybe even a bit of historic activism left in the once heavy-unionized
community, and a very wealthy, but not necessarily cooperative, responsible party with a
desire to end the expensive cleanup as soon as it could, heritage compromises were frank
and decisive. Further, the district was successful in getting National Park Service
recognition through the HAER project and successive National Historic Landmark
district expansions, although unsuccessful at getting a national historical park in ButteAnaconda. Whether or not a formal unit of the National Park focused on historic mining
and smelting would ultimately have helped the active heritage community or complicated
negotiations, in the long-run, the Butte-Anaconda community was able to define what it
wanted and how it wanted it, and negotiate/compromise to get much of it.
One of the key factors influencing the Ducktown heritage process, on the other
hand, was a heavy EPA and corporate presence that largely overshadowed the local
preservation population, which was relatively small. Although both the EPA and Glenn
Springs Holdings (GSH) considered and interacted with the locals, many of whom were
not dissatisfied with GSH, the company largely drove both the remediation process and
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heritage process, making heritage decisions with limited public consultation. Further, the
population of the region, many of whom wanted heritage and the 30-acre denuded
landscape behind the museum preserved, was small. While the small size of the
population ultimately made it easier for Glenn Springs to make effective community
contributions and generate local support, the population was not large or diverse enough
to generate planning committees to oppose certain heritage decisions or even lobby for
different actions. Often the cleanup company talked to the same group about
remediation, as mandated by the MOU, as it did about heritage issues. Further the
Ducktown Basin Museum, the key heritage organization in the area, was too underfunded
and understaffed to really push for a strong heritage plan it would have to administer in
the long-run. Despite some well intentioned GSH- and EPA-managed heritage projects
in the overall work plan, these conditions ultimately led to a relatively weak voice for
preservation that was further worsened by the inapplicability of Section 106. In many
ways this was the most top-down planning of the three districts. Moreover, heritage
decisions were being made largely by the remediation experts, not heritage experts.
The key difference between the Michigan cleanup and the Ducktown and ButteAnaconda cleanups was its simplicity. Michigan’s Superfund project dealt mainly with
tailings dumped in and exposed in Torch Lake, Portage Lake, and Lake Superior.
Outside of relatively minor removal of contaminated wastes and storage containers, the
project mostly simply graded, capped, and covered exposed tailings at 10 of the 13
locations. This relatively small area and relatively simple work resulted in a
comparatively inexpensive cleanup compared to the other two and also likely influenced
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EPA’s withdraw of its normally aggressive pursuit of potentially responsible parties.
Although the project was federally funded and managed making Section 106 applicable,
only one of the sites, the Quincy Smelter, had properties determined eligible for the
National Register.
The Michigan Copper Country, like Butte-Anaconda, had a fairly stable
population and a means of drawing new people in through a local university that had an
active program dedicated to industrial heritage that sponsored heritage research
throughout the region. Further, after 1992 the new Keweenaw National Historical Park
(KNHP) brought in additional educated historians and historic architects to work with the
19 formal community-partner sites and many other related sites, and also completed
regional management planning documents and cultural landscape reports that supported
the NPS mission. In addition, unlike the other regions, the Keweenaw had a well
established patron in the U.S. Senate who actively pursued funding earmarks for heritage
projects, including the smelter. So in many ways, Michigan’s landscape diversity
extended to its preservation community too. With similar community groups as Butte,
Michigan’s Copper Country hosted a relatively large cadre of professional heritage
practitioners. Michigan copper heritage, as opposed to Montana and Tennessee,
however, had neither a strictly bottom-up nor top-down approach to heritage
management.
Of the three sites, Michigan had the simplest heritage conflict with Superfund but
also the least amount of money available for alternate projects like preservation.
Although the remediation plan seemed simple, EPA both encouraged preservation by
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recognizing the importance of the smelter (which also simplified its workload and final
costs), but also complicated preservation when it attempted to extract money from NPS to
pay for asbestos removal at the site, forcing the most active heritage professionals away
from the project for nearly two years.
In the long-run, however, EPA worked to find compromise solutions to
remediation issues at the Quincy Smelter to appease environmental concerns generated
by the State of Michigan, while respecting the heritage of the site to appease the NPS,
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and many members of
the community. In the long run, however, copper mining and smelting heritage in
Michigan was not affected very much by Superfund. EPA focused on stamp sands, but
not all of them, and Michigan’s other historic copper mining resources were spread out
over a wide area, most of which EPA was not interested in, so preservation had to do
much more with combating neglect and inappropriate redevelopment than anything else,
which is ultimately part of the KNHP’s mission. This is not to argue that all sites in the
region need preservation either, which is not only not necessary, but impossible.
In the end, all three regions successfully commemorated their pasts with
museums, historic sites, and National Register nominations, but they were not equal in
how their heritage was expressed in their landscapes. The two larger districts, with more
significant production, elevated their sites to National Historic Landmark Districts and
welcomed HAER documentation projects. All three districts had interpretive signage
explaining historic processes that gave their districts significance, but Ducktown and
Montana, home to more significant environmental damage and cleanup, interpreted the
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desecration of the environment caused by mining and the near-heroic efforts to
remediate it alongside the technological and social histories. Part of the success in
Michigan and Montana has to reside with the influx of newcomers interested in the
landscape. While many people involved in preservation in both communities were local,
newcomers brought a perception of the landscape not compromised by loss and defeat
and helped coalesce local heritage preservation into a movement.
On the other side of the negotiation, EPA’s mission to protect human health and
the environment drove its activities and defined how it approached other, less missiondirect activities. In superfund projects, EPA project managers, often from district
headquarters far-removed from the region, approached an NPL-listed site to find a quick
“fix” for the problem of contamination without the attachment or regional identity of a
local resident. While this detachment may make remediation decisions simpler and
appear less biased, it also meant that managers who participated in heritage decisions
were missing an important heritage value associated with local identity.
EPA managers understand that the community must be involved and that the EPA
must consider residents’ opinions and factor those opinions into remediation, especially
since there are and will always be multiple ways to approach and negotiate remediation
remedies. They also understand that heritage concerns must be addressed if raised. It is
in this dialog that most heritage decisions are discussed and the more forceful the heritage
voice, the more preservation is considered.
While in general its mission drives EPA’s activities and decisions, and the agency
does not have a strong culture of heritage-protection, some individual EPA managers at
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least respect a community’s desire for heritage even if they don’t share it. In both
Tennessee, where the EPA manager came from Atlanta and actively participated in
heritage decisions with the Glenn Springs project manager, and Michigan, where EPA
planners from the beginning considered the Quincy Smelter an important historic
resource, individual EPA managers demonstrated compassion for, and at times even
enthusiasm for some preservation, but they do not share the understanding of a
professional heritage planner or even a heritage-oriented community member.
The Butte-Anaconda district, however, was different. Because of its size, the
EPA staff contingent was spread from local offices in Butte and Anaconda, to a regional
office in Helena, Montana, to the District office in Denver, Colorado. Because of the
size of the project, the EPA also hired local people to run the local offices, and those with
a regional association and identity with the landscape, identified with the strong local
heritage community, and although they were still EPA mission-driven, they were able to
soften the negotiations.

Resolving a heritage-remediation conflict.
As we have seen, because of different historical, demographic, economic,
geographical, and political circumstances, heritage-remediation conflicts were resolved in
varying manners in the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana copper districts, and heritage
proponents enjoyed varying degrees of success. What then are the most basic lessons
that we can take away from this in-depth study of heritage-remediation conflicts in the
three nationally important copper mining and smelting districts; and, in the face of often
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aggressive remediation and development efforts, what steps can those who wish to
preserve the heritage of industry in their regions take to insure maximum preservation?
Based on our three case studies, there are four keys to success in promoting heritage in
the face of large, environmental remediation projects: organization, knowledge,
persistence, and political sympathy or support from key state agencies or political patrons
in Congress.
Organization is the first key. As our three case studies have shown, the better the
preservation elements in a community are organized, the stronger their message and
political influence becomes, ultimately resulting in a social-force that must be confronted
much more formally by remediation-minded authorities than a small group or individuals
would be. The successful organization of grass-roots groups in Butte-Anaconda
illustrates this directly and the affiliated heritage partners of the Keweenaw National
Historical Park, a large, even loosely, coordinated group, have provided the old Michigan
copper district with preservation advocates capable of encouraging remediation and
development advocates to negotiate and compromise on heritage issues rather than
simply bulldoze everything in its way.
Second, knowledge of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) a.k.a. “Superfund” or other environmental
statutes is critical. The laws normally used to initiate and coordinate environmental
remediation specifically state that project planners must consult with local communities
and consider other relevant legislation, such as the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) and other preservation laws. This knowledge allows an organized group to
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make strong legal arguments because neither CERCLA nor NHPA refutes the other, and
on-site conflicts usually arise out of the inconsistent interpretation of standards outlined
in the laws or ignorance of their intended aims. Further, knowledge of successful
alternative approaches to similar remediation problems gives decision-makers more
options, like the example of the Old Works Golf Course slag-based sand traps in
Montana. Knowledge that smelter slag was being safely used in direct contact with
golfers was cited by heritage advocates in Michigan to influence slag-heap preservation
at the Quincy site. Of course, recruiting a local attorney interested in heritage
preservation to work, hopefully gratis, with local heritage proponents would also
contribute to the local knowledge base on legal issues and recourses.
Third, hedging against heritage loss requires persistence. Butte-Anaconda and the
Keweenaw each pursued heritage planning over decades. Butte’s first heritage plan
began in the 1950s, and continued with successive plans and expanded plans in the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and its latest plan and National Historic Landmark district
designation were finalized in 2005. The Keweenaw, too, started with preservation
projects in the 1950s and, in 2009, was working on its latest National Park Servicesponsored regional cultural management plan.
Lastly, heritage preservation and environmental remediation are both, ultimately,
political in nature. Recognition of this fact and taking the appropriate steps to gain
political support can be critical to the level of success heritage proponents can secure in
preservation-remediation conflicts. Of course, the previous keys--organization,
knowledge, and persistence--can contribute significantly to the ability of local heritage
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advocates to secure such political support too. At the state level, securing the active
support of key state agencies, especially the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO),
the agency specifically charged by the NHPA with oversight of cultural resources, can
lend significant negotiating weight to heritage proponents in conflict with remediation
agencies. For example, in Butte-Anaconda, the Montana SHPO enhanced local heritage
planning and preservation efforts, while the weak involvement of the Tennessee SHPO
all but sealed the fate of important cultural resources there. At the national level, too,
securing political patronage or support is important, especially since the primary
remediating agency—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—is federal. A
political patron at the national level can help reign in an overly-aggressive EPA, secure
funding to enhance heritage preservation, or help secure formal national-level recognition
of “historical significance,” such as Michigan Senators did in the formation of the
Keweenaw National Park and identifying earmarks for the Quincy Smelter, and
Montana’s senators did in the establishment of high-tech projects in Butte.
All four of the keys outlined above—organization, knowledge, persistence, and
political support—are important. Together, they give heritage proponents significant
clout and encourage remediation authorities to seek compromise, because, in the long
run, compromises are cheaper than prolonged debates and court battles.
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